An evaluation of the effectiveness of Value-at-Risk (VaR) models for Australian banks under Basel III

This study compares Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures for Australian banks over a period that includes the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to determine whether the methodology and parameter selection are important for capital adequacy holdings that will ultimately support a bank in a crisis period. VaR methodology promoted under Basel II was largely criticised during the GFC for its failure to capture downside risk. However, results from this study indicate that 1-year parametric and historical models produce better measures of VaR than models with longer time frames. VaR estimates produced using Monte Carlo simulations show a high percentage of violations but with lower average magnitude of a violation when they occur. VaR estimates produced by the ARMA GARCH model also show a relatively high percentage of violations, however, the average magnitude of a violation is quite low. Our findings support the design of the revised Basel II VaR methodology which has also been adopted under Basel III.

O impacto da implementação do Basel III no capital dos bancos portugueses

Este trabalho é uma análise dos efeitos da implementação das últimas recomendações do Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) também conhecidas como o Basel III de 2010 que deverão ser faseadamente implementadas desde 1 de Janeiro de 2013 até 1 de Janeiro de 2019, no capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses. Neste trabalho assume-se que os ativos pesados pelo risco de 2012 mantêm-se constantes e o capital terá de ser aumentado segundo as recomendações ano após ano até ao fim de 2018. Com esta análise, pretende-se entender o nível de robustez do capital próprio dos bancos Portugueses e se os mesmos têm capital e reservas suficientes para satisfazer as recomendações de capital mínimo sugeridas pelo BCBS ou caso contrário, se necessitarão de novas injeções de capital ou terão de reduzir a sua atividade económica. O Basel III ainda não foi implementado em Portugal, pois a União Europeia está no processo de desenvolvimento e implementação do Credit Requirement Directive IV (CRD IV) que é uma recomendação que todos os bancos centrais dos países da zona Euro deverão impor aos respetivos bancos. Esta diretiva da União Europeia é baseada totalmente nas recomendações do Basel III e deverá ser implementada em 2014 ou nos anos seguintes. Até agora, os bancos Portugueses seguem um sistema com base no aviso 6/2010 do Banco de Portugal que recomenda o cálculo dos rácios core tier 1, tier 1 e tier 2 usando o método notações internas (IRB) de avaliação da exposição do banco aos riscos de crédito, operacional, etc. e onde os ativos ponderados pelo risco são calculados como 12,5 vezes o valor dos requisitos totais de fundos calculados pelo banco. Este método é baseado nas recomendações do Basel II que serão substituídas pelo Basel III. Dado que um dos principais motivos para a crise económica e financeira que assolou o mundo em 2007 foi a acumulação de alavancagem excessiva e gradual erosão da qualidade da base do capital próprio dos bancos, é importante analisar a posição dos bancos Portugueses, que embora não sejam muito grandes a nível global, controlam a economia do país. Espera-se que com a implementação das recomendações do Basel III não haja no futuro uma repetição dos choques sistémicos de 2007. Os resultados deste estudo usando o método padrão recomendado pelo BCBS mostram que de catorze bancos Portugueses incluídos neste estudo, apenas seis (BES, Montepio, Finantia, BIG, Invest e BIC) conseguem enquadrar nas recomendações mínimas do Basel III até 1-1- 2019 e alguns outros estão marginalmente abaixo dos rácios mínimos (CGD, Itaú e Crédito Agrícola).

Market risk charge of the trading book: a comparison of the Basel II and Basel III

This paper aims to investigate if the market capital charge of the trading book increased in Basel III compared to Basel II. I showed that the capital charge rises by 232% and 182% under the standardized and internal model, respectively. The varying liquidity horizons, the calibration to a stress period, the introduction of credit spread risk, the restrictions on correlations across risk categories and the incremental default charge boost Basel III requirements. Nevertheless, the impact of Expected shortfall at 97.5% is low and long term shocks decrease the charge. The standardized approach presents advantages and disadvantages relative to internal models.

Is the Basel III Leverage Ratio countercyclical? A study for Portuguese banks

This work analyses how the leverage ratio behaves through the cycle, vis-à-vis other capital ratios. For a sample of the largest Portuguese banks, the Basel III leverage ratio is indeed countercyclical. This result is relevant from a regulatory perspective, since the introduction of a limit on the leverage ratio will function as a restriction in the banks’ balance sheet size, reducing the economic costs associated with the excessive growth of leverage in periods of economic expansion followed by aggressive deleveraging in the downturn. However, one cannot exclude that restrictions on banks’ leverage incentivize its transference to less regulated intermediaries.

Basel III new capital requirements, impacts and bank behavior

For some years, researchers could not find a clear effect of capital adequacy on the risk profile of banks, as shareholders could increase the riskiness of the assets (qualitative effect), crowding-out the effect of reduced leverage (volume effect). Some shareholders might have the will to increase the riskiness of the assets, but they may lack the power to do so. Considering only ”powerful” shareholders, definitive conclusions were drawn but with constant ownership profile. In this paper I investigate whether there is a significant change in the type of shareholders in response to regulatory capital shocks and, if so, will the banking system be in the hands of more “desired” shareholders. I find that ownership profile responds to a regulatory shock, changing the risk appetite of the ruling power at the bank. I find more banks and the government in the ownership of undercapitalised banks and much less institutional shareholders and free float. I claim that these new shareholders may not the desired ones, given the objective of the regulatory change, as they are associated with a preference for more leverage. One possible explanation for this crowding-out effect is that regulators are trying to contain idiosyncratic risk (more linked to the riskiness of the assets) with a rule that contains systematic risk (capital adequacy). This has a distorting effect on ownership. Another insight can be drawn from the tests: supervisors should be aware of significant ownership movements that cause the crowding-out.

Basel III: The impact of new capital requirements on profitability of Portuguese Banks

This empirical study aims to explore the impact of increased capital ratio requirements, on the ROE of the Portuguese banking sector. The paper employs both a quantitative- and qualitative approach, with the qualitative approach as the main method of research. The method adopted to conduct the qualitative research was semi structured elite interviews with banking executives. Higher capital requirements decrease the ROE of banks in Portugal, but huge impairments charges, macroeconomic factors and increased costs of deposits are clearly the dominant reasons for the reduced levels of ROE the past years. Among the measures taken to increase capital ratios, reduction of RWAs and non-core assets have been the main focus, but the issuance of CoCos is regarded as the most expensive measure due to high interest payments. However, the CoCos will not have any effect on the ROE in the long term. It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the impact of more equity in the balance sheet on the ROE of Portuguese banks, as many banks currently don’t generate enough money to pay back on shareholders´ investments.

Implementing Basel III in Europe: disgnosis and avenues for improvement. CEPS Policy Brief No. 275, 27 June 2012

This Policy Brief provides a preliminary diagnosis of the proposed regulatory reforms contained in the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV-CRR), which translate into EU law the Basel III standards adopted by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, and suggests avenues for improvement. The main criticism is that the proposal is not ambitious enough. In some crucial areas, such as the leverage ratio and the long-term liquidity requirements adopted under the Basel III framework, the CRD IV-CRR proposal stops short of making a strict commitment to introduce binding requirements and instead is contented with weaker (and possibly divergent) disclosure requirements.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

The impact of Basel III on European banks business models

O acordo Basel III representa, em diversos aspectos, uma verdadeira mudança no paradigma regulatório. Este trabalho examina uma amostra composta por 81 bancos europeus para detectar até que ponto o impacto do Basel III é já perceptível em modelos de negócios alternativos. Descobre-se que os ajustes nos modelos de negócios causados pelo Basel III são mínimos, enquanto que as principais mudanças entre 2010 e 2013 deveram-se a outros factores exógenos, como por exemplo a crise da dívida soberana europeia. Devido à longa observação e aos períodos de transição, as maiores mudanças nos modelos de negócios como consequência do Basel III estarão ainda para acontecer.

A Viable Alternative to Basel III Prudential Capital Rules. CEPS Policy Brief No. 291, May 2013

Stefano Micossi argues in this paper that the Basel framework for bank prudential requirements is deeply flawed and that the Basel III revision has failed to correct these flaws, making the system even more complicated, opaque and open to manipulation. In practice, he finds that the present system does not offer regulators and financial markets a reliable capital standard for banks and its divergent implementation in the main jurisdictions of the European Union and the United States has broken the market into special fiefdoms governed by national regulators in response to untoward special interests. The time is ripe to stop tinkering with minor adjustment and revisions in order to rescue the system, because the system cannot be rescued. In response to the current situation, Micossi calls for abandoning reference to risk-weighted assets calculated by banks with their internal risk management models for the determination of banks’ prudential capital, together with the preoccupation with the asset side of banks in correcting for risk exposure. He suggests that the alternative may be provided by a combination of a straight capital ratio and a properly designed deposit insurance system. It is a logical, complete and much less distortive alternative; it would serve better the cause of financial stability as well as the interest of the banks in clear, transparent and level playing field.

Anchoring countercyclical capital buffer in Basel III

This thesis proposes two top-down approch frameworks to assess the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer. The empirical results demonstrate that sovereign sector distance-to-default and market illiquidity are more suitable indicator for guiding the decision of the buffer during both build-up and release phase than the official indicator, credit-to-GDP ratio. The findings in this thesis are important to help safeguard the globe financial system.

Basileia III e os dilemas da supervisão do sistema bancário internacional

A regulação e supervisão do sistema financeiro sempre foram motivos de apreensão por parte das principais autoridades econômicas mundiais. A globalização, o processo de liberalização financeira e a consequente interconexão econômica entre países maximizaram o risco sistêmico, aumentando a necessidade de marco regulatório e fiscalização mais eficientes. Assim, com a eclosão da crise norte-americana em 2008, o G-20 começou a atuar de forma mais ativa em prol da manutenção da higidez do sistema financeiro mundial. Para os bancos, o G-20 instruiu as principais instituições reguladoras como o Fundo Monetário Internacional, o Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira e o Comitê de Basileia (BCBS) a desenvolverem recomendações a fim de se solucionar o considerado principal problema da regulação dos mercados, o fato destes atualmente serem pró-cíclicos. Diante de tal cenário, em dezembro de 2009, o Comitê publicou um documento que considerou uma série de medidas a fim de solucionar tal problema, entre estas estava a inclusão do buffer de capital contracíclicodo novo marco regulatório proposto pelo Comitê, o Basileia III. O intuito do presente estudo é estudar esse buffer e analisar sua aplicabilidade no sistema bancário brasileiro e, porventura, sugerir metodologias alternativas de cálculo.

Abordagem ao risco de crédito no âmbito do acordo de Basileia III em Portugal

Dissertação para a obtenção do Grau de Mestre em Contabilidade e Finanças Orientador: Mestre Adalmiro Álvaro Malheiro de Castro Andrade Pereira