The impact of target board recommendations in Australian takeovers

This paper examines the impact of targe board recommendations on the probability of the bid being successful in the Australian takeovers context. Specifically, we model the success rate of the bid as a binary dependent variable and target board recommendations or the board hostility as our key independent variable by using logistic regression framework. Our model also includes bid structures and conditions variables (such as initial bid premium, bid conditions, toehold, and interlocking relationship) and bid events (such as panel and bid duration) as our control variables. Overall, we find board hostility has statistically significant negative effect on the success rate of the bid and almost all control variables (except for the initial bid premium) are statistically significant with the correct sign. That is, we find toehold, the percentage of share required to make the bid becomes successful, and the unconditional bid have positive impact on the success rate of the bid, at least as predictive determinants prior to the release of any hostile recommendation. Consistent with Craswell (2004), we also find the negative relation between interlocking relationship and the success rate of the bid. Our finding supports that from target investors’ point of view, interlock is consistent with the negative story of self interest by directors. Finally, like Walking (1985), we find that the initial bid premium does not have influence on the success rate of the bid. Hence our results reinstate Walking’s bid premium puzzle in Australian context.

Termination fees in a ‘bright line’ jurisdiction

We seek to statistically inform the debate regarding the Australian Takeovers Panel’s ‘bright line’ policy towards break fees. Based on 313 takeovers from 2002 to 2006, 85 involving break fees, we find post-bid competition to be unrelated to break fee usage and inversely related to bid success. We also find that break fee usage has a detrimental effect on shareholder wealth as measured by both the final bid premium and abnormal returns. Therefore, although break fees appear to be neither anticompetitive nor coercive within the Australian context, they do appear to have had a deleterious effect on shareholder wealth.