Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who takes the stronger line?

A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial position of the company. In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of the CLERP 9 approach.

The impact of auditor independence regulations on established and emerging firms.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study whether auditor independence reforms introduced in 2004 led to an enhancement in earnings quality in the post-reform era. Design/methodology/approach – This study predicts that as the cost of compliance will vary based on a firm's existing corporate governance regime and the level of external scrutiny (monitoring) it faces, we compare the earnings quality of a sample of “established” (S&P/ASX 100) to a sample of “emerging” (S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index) firms. The paper examines the reporting behaviour of the two groups of listed entities, covering the regulatory change period 2003-2006. The paper uses regression modelling to test the associations between increased audit independence, earnings quality and corporate governance mechanisms over the pre- and post-regulatory period. Findings – The paper's results confirm that earnings quality for the established firms was enhanced in the post-reform period; while this was not the case for emerging firms. The evidence also suggests that corporate governance mechanisms of board independence and board financial skill are associated with higher earnings quality; while the higher the concentration of insider firm ownership is associated with lower earnings quality. Practical implications – This study provides policy makers with evidence as to changes in reporting behaviour following law reform aimed at strengthening auditor independence. Originality/value – The studies on earnings quality are informed by the US market practices. Australia provides a unique setting through its auditor independence reforms to examine the impact of reform choices. This study also investigates two specific subsets of the market: established firms and emerging firms.

Auditor independence : an analysis of the adequacy of selected provisions in CLERP 9

Worldwide corporate collapses in the past have highlighted various weaknesses in corporate governance, which included auditor independence. This thesis advocates the use of private interest theory as a framework to evaluate proposals for law reform related to the independence of external company auditors. This study argues that the current regulation of auditor independence falls short of the 'ideal independence' required by the general public. This is because the regulation was developed, in some instances, to serve the private interests of powerful lobby groups rather than the public interest. This research concludes that there is a case for reform of the existing requirements in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in respect of auditor independence.

An evaluation of the indicators of threat to auditor independence in an Islamic legal system: The case of Iran

This study aimed to assist in developing a more effective framework for regulating auditor independence practice in Iran, a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system. It investigated the following general research question: In order to increase auditor independence in a non-IFRS country with an Islamic legal system, what are the potential indicators of threats to auditor independence, and how should a regulator prioritise addressing these threats?

The market for financial report audits : regulation of and competition for auditor independence

The independence of auditors and the quality of financial report audits generally are rarely tested except in circumstances of corporate failure when alleged sub-optimality is present. Often auditors have good defences as to their expertise or competency, but rarely do they have equally convincing defences for the independence of their audit. A major issue for the regulation of auditor independence is that the threats to independence are often subtle and difficult to measure. This paper argues that firms undertaking financial report audits need to be transparent and competitive in respect of auditor independence. Two models that adopt this premise are proposed.

Auditor independence: regulation, oversight and inspection

Much of what auditors do is unobservable. Indeed, what goes on in an audit has been described as ‘secret audit business’. Audits in this context are of financial reports and those financial reports are the representations of the management of those companies, not the auditors. The audits of financial reports are of value in that they provide a competent and independent (of auditee management) attestation of the validity of those management representations. This attestation lowers the ‘information risk’ for the users of these financial reports. There has been a marked increase in activity to regulate matters relating to independence. The proposals outlined in CLERP 9 are one example of this. The requirements in the United States under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are a further example.

Audit firms operate in a highly regulated yet highly competitive market. Evidence exists to suggest that audit firms are active competitors in respect of audit pricing and competency, including specialist industry expertise. Until recently, there has been little or no observable evidence that audit firms compete in respect of independence. The issues as they relate to audit independence are complex. One issue is that threats to independence are frequently subtle and difficult to observe and measure. Hence, controlling the decisions that relate to them cannot rely solely on regulation which itself inevitably relies on crude definitions and imprecise measures. Additionally, further regulation may not achieve the desired end without other processes being but in place in tandem.

This paper argues that:

1. auditors of certain classes of companies (in particular, those that are publicly traded) should be provided with incentives or requirements to have observable processes on independence
2. the means of observability should be in the form of an inspection and review process focussing on issues critical to the audit, such as independence
3. expert persons not having a current or past financial interest in the firm or in the commercial outcomes of the review should be used in the inspection and review process
4. the review process should have wide-ranging powers of inspection to examine the policies, processes, structures and ‘culture’ of audit firms
5. the report of the inspection and review should be made public, unedited and in full, and in a timely fashion. The primary objectives of this proposal are to (1) make more transparent to the market for information the characteristics of the audit firms and their process to ensure audit independence, and (2) provide a rigorous oversight of independence decision-making by persons who have no commercial interest in the outcome of the decision.

Auditor independence and the nexus with corporate governance-quo vadis?

"Where were the auditors?" Yet again, the independence of the auditor has come under close, critical scrutiny with ongoing collapses of large listed companies, which have global implications for the proper functioning of investment markets. The most recent collapse being that of ENRON in the United States of America, (USA).

"Who are the auditors?" The nexus of auditor independence with corporate governance is examined drawing on Foucault's notion of the relationships between power I knowledge and ethics in the construction of ethical identity. In the face of declining public confidence and demands for more stringent regulation, the tensions between greater self-regulation of auditors by the accounting profession and moves by governments to impose more stringent legislation I regulation, including the creation of public oversight bodies is apparent. This paper presents a comparative analysis of recent developments internationally, with particular reference to South Africa and Australia, intended to more rigorously enforce auditor independence and improve corporate governance. Five key areas identified by various Commissions and regulatory bodies that are regarded as posing significant threats to auditor independence are highlighted. Recommendations for changes to independence requirements in professional codes of ethics and corporate legislation, intended to safeguard auditor independence and to enhance investor protection, are critically examined. It is argued that the "new" independence recommendations while providing more detailed guidance for dealing with the independence threats fail to introduce any new concepts and may be found as ineffective as the plethora of earlier regulations. (This paper represents work in progress, which is intended to spark debate, and accordingly, the authors invite comment from readers to develop further aspects of research into this critical area).

Auditor independence : shared meaning between the demand and supply sides of the audit services market?

Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to examine the extent to which there is shared meaning of the concept of auditor independence between the three major groups of parties on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market – auditors, financial report preparers and financial report users.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper utilises the measurement of meaning framework (semantic differential analysis) originally proposed by Osgood et al. in 1957. The framework is used to investigate the extent to which there is shared meaning (agreement in interpretations) of the independence concept, in response to alternative audit engagement case contexts, between key parties to the financial reporting communication process. The study's research data was collected in the period March 2004-May 2005.

Findings – Findings indicate a robust and stable single-factor cognitive structure within which the research participants interpret the connotative meaning of the auditor independence concept. An analysis of the experimental cases finds similarities in connotations (interpretations) of an audit firm's independence for the participant groups for most cases, with the exception of cases involving the joint provision of audit and non-audit (taxation) services.

Research limitations/implications – The usual external validity threat that applies to experimental research generally applies to the study. That is, the results may not be generalisable to settings beyond those examined in the study. An important implication of the study is that it emphasises the continuing problematic nature of the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, even in situations where the non-audit services comprise only traditional taxation services.

Originality/value – The study is the first to examine the concept of auditor independence by means of the Osgood et al. measurement of meaning research framework using, as research participants, the three major groups on the demand and supply sides of the audit services market.

Review of Post-CLERP 9 Australian auditor independence research

The Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (CLERP 9) added substantial new provisions pertaining to auditor independence, and followed in the wake of financial reporting scandals during 2000 to 2003. Many of the regulatory changes were framed in the earlier Ramsay Report, which drew on independence concerns raised in the academic literature. This review paper reviews Australian academic research investigating auditor independence, framed by our conceptual understanding of auditor independence, to assess what we have learned about the impact of CLERP 9 on auditor independence. Our review of Australian auditor independence research published post-CLERP 9 reveals little evidence of the impact of the regulatory changes on auditor behaviour (independence in fact) and perceptions (independence in appearance). We conclude there are substantial needs for further research on the impact of the CLERP 9 amendments on auditor independence and any enduring independence issues. We identify particular areas for future research that may better inform policy development and argue that the prospect of high-quality relevant research will increase if regulatory agencies, the accounting profession and audit practitioners engage more with academics in the research process. We identify several ways in which this might occur.

The Effect of Non-Audit Services on Auditor Independence : A study on 11 food retail- and wholesale companies in the United Kingdom

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of non-audit services on auditor independence, and the importance of non-audit services as a source of income for audit firms in the United Kingdom. Design/method/approach – This study will examine 11 companies in the food retail- and wholesale industry during 2007 - 2014. Five indicators have been used; (1) Appointed auditor and provision of non-audit services to audit clients; (2) Auditor tenure; (3) Non-audit services in relation to total services; (4) Tax-services in relation to non-audit services, (5) Big Four’s revenue. Information has been collected using the quantitative approach through annual- and transparency reports. The threshold used to measure possible independence threats (self-review-, self-interest- and familiarity threat) has been set at 18,5 %. Findings – This study concludes that the jointly provision of audit- and nonaudit services possibly causes impairment of auditor independence, and that non-audit services is an important source of income for audit firms. The findings showed that in 99 %, companies purchased non-audit services from their statutory auditor. Non-audit services in relation to total services surpassed the threshold in 78 % of all financial years. Likewise, tax-services in comparison to non-audit services exceeded the threshold in 65 % of all financial years. The Big Four’s revenue from non-audit services to audit clients in relation to total revenue is almost constantly below the threshold. However, in all financial years except from one, total revenue from non-audit services surpassed revenue from audit services by far. Contribution – The study contributes to the ongoing discussion about nonaudit services effect on auditor independence. Originality/value – This study is one of few that provide detailed information about non-audit services in the food retail- and wholesale industry. It highlights social and ethical issues with regard to agency relationships.  

Auditor disaffiliation program in China and auditor independence

SUMMARY: This study examines whether the disaffiliation program introduced by the Chinese government improved auditor independence and whether auditor quality affects this relationship. Auditor independence is measured in terms of the likelihood of receiving a qualified report and the level of earnings management (measured by noncore operating income). The results show that the likelihood of receiving qualified audit opinions for listed companies significantly increased, and noncore operating earnings significantly decreased, after auditors were disaffiliated. However, companies audited by auditors without any affiliation also showed an increase in the likelihood of receiving qualified opinions and a decrease in noncore operating earnings, possibly because of the increased surveillance by the regulatory bodies that accompanied the act of disaffiliation. The results also show that the association between the disaffiliation program and the likelihood of receiving qualified audit opinions is stronger for small auditors than for large auditors, possibly because of the initial lower audit quality of small auditors. Auditor size, however, did not significantly affect the association between the disaffiliation program and noncore operating earnings.