Batch Verification of Validity of Bids in Homomorphic E-auction

Bid opening in e-auction is efficient when a homomorphic secret sharing function is employed to seal the bids and homomorphic secret reconstruction is employed to open the bids. However, this high efficiency is based on an assumption: the bids are valid (e.g., within a special range). An undetected invalid bid can compromise correctness and fairness of the auction. Unfortunately, validity verification of the bids is ignored in the auction schemes employing homomorphic secret sharing (called homomorphic auction in this paper). In this paper, an attack against the homomorphic auction in the absence of bid validity check is presented and a necessary bid validity check mechanism is proposed. Then a batch cryptographic technique is introduced and applied to improve the efficiency of bid validity check.

A Multiplicative Homomorphic Sealed-Bid Auction-Based on Goldwasser-Micali Encryption

Instead of the costly encryption algorithms traditionally employed in auction schemes, efficient Goldwasser-Micali encryption is used to design a new sealed-bid auction. Multiplicative homomorphism instead of the traditional additive homomorphism is exploited to achieve security and high efficiency in the auction. The new scheme is the currently known most efficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction with bid privacy.

Residential sales by auction : a property type or geographic consideration

The sale of residential property by auction is a preferred sale method by real estate agents, but not always preferred by some vendors and most residential property buyers. In many residential property markets, the performance and measure of residential property market activity is based on the number of properties offered for sale by auction, auction clearance rates and the number of properties sold prior to auction. However, in many specific residential property markets, sale by auction may not be the preferred or supported method of sale. This paper will review the type of residential property sale within the Sydney residential property market and track the auction sales and clearance rates for Sydney over the past 5 months and compare these results in relation to clearance rates, passed in sales, and properties sold prior to auction This will provide a breakdown of real estate agency sale practice over a large metropolitan region to determine the impact of geographic location and socio-economic factors on the auction of residential property. In addition the paper will analyse the weekly auction sales in the Sydney residential property market to determine what areas of Sydney have the greatest number of house auctions and the performance of the auctions in relation location and socio economic factors.

Misleading and deceptive conduct at an auction

An unusual factual situation recently arose for consideration by Lindsay J of the Federal Circuit Court. In Carter v Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd [2013] FCCA 783, an application was brought by the owners of a residential property in Western Australia, the Carters, for damages for misleading or deceptive conduct under s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (“ACL”) and for damages for breach of contract arising from an auction of their house. Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd was a trustee of a family trust with Mr Ilahi being a director and shareholder of the company as well as a beneficiary under the family trust. It was established that Delgrove Holdings Pty Ltd engaged in the business of property acquisition for the purposes of generating rental income...

A combinatorial procurement auction for QoS-aware web services

Business processes and application functionality are becoming available as internal web services inside enterprise boundaries as well as becoming available as commercial web services from enterprise solution vendors and web services marketplaces. Typically there are multiple web service providers offering services capable of fulfilling a particular functionality, although with different Quality of Service (QoS). Dynamic creation of business processes requires composing an appropriate set of web services that best suit the current need. This paper presents a novel combinatorial auction approach to QoS aware dynamic web services composition. Such an approach would enable not only stand-alone web services but also composite web services to be a part of a business process. The combinatorial auction leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. An important feature of the model is the incorporation of service level agreements. We describe a software tool QWESC for QoS-aware web services composition based on the proposed approach.

Design of an optimal auction for sponsored search auctions

In this paper we first describe a framework to model the sponsored search auction on the web as a mechanism design problem. Using this framework, we design a novel auction which we call the OPT (optimal) auction. The OPT mechanism maximizes the search engine's expected revenue while achieving Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality of the advertisers. We show that the OPT mechanism is superior to two of the most commonly used mechanisms for sponsored search namely (1) GSP (Generalized Second Price) and (2) VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves). We then show an important revenue equivalence result that the expected revenue earned by the search engine is the same for all the three mechanisms provided the advertisers are symmetric and the number of sponsored slots is strictly less than the number of advertisers.

An auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel in a heterogenous wireless network

In this paper, we develop a novel auction algorithm for procuring wireless channel by a wireless node in a heterogeneous wireless network. We assume that the service providers of the heterogeneous wireless network are selfish and non-cooperative in the sense that they are only interested in maximizing their own utilities. The wireless user needs to procure wireless channels to execute multiple tasks. To solve the problem of the wireless user, we propose a reverse optimal (REVOPT) auction and derive an expression for the expected payment by the wireless user. The proposed auction mechanism REVOPT satisfies important game theoretic properties such as Bayesian incentive compatibility and individual rationality.

An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges

Combinatorial exchanges are double sided marketplaces with multiple sellers and multiple buyers trading with the help of combinatorial bids. The allocation and other associated problems in such exchanges are known to be among the hardest to solve among all economic mechanisms. In this paper, we develop computationally efficient iterative auction mechanisms for solving combinatorial exchanges. Our mechanisms satisfy Individual-rationality (IR) and budget-nonnegativity (BN) properties. We also show that our method is bounded and convergent. Our numerical experiments show that our algorithm produces good quality solutions and is computationally efficient.