An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars

I examine a situation where a firm chooses to locate a new factory in one of several jurisdictions. The value of the factory may differ among jurisdictions and it depends on the private information held by each jurisdiction. Jurisdictions compete for the location of the new factory. This competition may take the form of expenditures already incurred on infrastructure, commitments to spend on infrastructure, tax incentives or even cash payments. The model combines two elements that are usually considered separately; competition is desirable because we want the factory to be located in the jurisdiction that values it the most, but competition in itself is wasteful. I show that the expected total amount paid to the firm under a large family of arrangements is the same. Moreover, I show that the ex-ante optimal mechanism that is, the mechanism that guarantees that the firm chooses the jurisdiction with the highest value for the factory, minimizes the total expected payment to the firm, and balances the budget in an ex-ante sense - can be implemented by running a standard auction and subsidizing participation.

Auction price anomalies: Evidence from wool auctions in Australia

Using detailed Australian wool auction data we test for further evidence of pricing anomalies at sequential auctions. We find that an anomaly frequently exists and order is frequently endogenously determined. Moreover, prices increase through some sales and decrease through others. We examine whether it is possible to explain the variation in the anomaly across sales and conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the direction of the price anomaly and the characteristics of the wool or the auction. We do, however, find evidence that an anomaly, is more likely in longer sales.

Auction of financial transmission rights in electricity market environment

An auction model is used to increase the individual profits for market players with products they do not use. A Financial Transmission Rights Auction has the goal of trade transmission rights between Bidders and helps them raise their own profits. The ISO plays a major rule on keep the system in technical limits without interfere on the auctions offers. In some auction models the ISO decide want bids are implemented on the network, always with the objective maximize the individual profits for all bidders in the auction. This paper proposes a methodology for a Financial Transmission Rights Auction and an informatics application. The application receives offers from the purchase and sale side and considers bilateral contracts as Base Case. This goal is maximize the individual profits within the system in their technical limits. The paper includes a case study for the 30 bus IEEE test case.

Distributed Model Predictive Control for Housing with Hourly Auction of Available Energy

This paper presents a distributed model predictive control (DMPC) for indoor thermal comfort that simultaneously optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource. The control objective of each subsystem is to minimize the heating/cooling energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature and used power inside bounds. In a distributed coordinated environment, the control uses multiple dynamically decoupled agents (one for each subsystem/house) aiming to achieve satisfaction of coupling constraints. According to the hourly power demand profile, each house assigns a priority level that indicates how much is willing to bid in auction for consume the limited clean resource. This procedure allows the bidding value vary hourly and consequently, the agents order to access to the clean energy also varies. Despite of power constraints, all houses have also thermal comfort constraints that must be fulfilled. The system is simulated with several houses in a distributed environment.

Distributed MPC for Thermal Comfort and Load Allocation with Energy Auction

This paper presents a distributed predictive control methodology for indoor thermal comfort that optimizes the consumption of a limited shared energy resource using an integrated demand-side management approach that involves a power price auction and an appliance loads allocation scheme. The control objective for each subsystem (house or building) aims to minimize the energy cost while maintaining the indoor temperature inside comfort limits. In a distributed coordinated multi-agent ecosystem, each house or building control agent achieves its objectives while sharing, among them, the available energy through the introduction of particular coupling constraints in their underlying optimization problem. Coordination is maintained by a daily green energy auction bring in a demand-side management approach. Also the implemented distributed MPC algorithm is described and validated with simulation studies.

Reverse Auction: A Potential Strategy for Reduction of Pharmacological Therapy Cost

Background:Polypharmacy is a significant economic burden.Objective:We tested whether using reverse auction (RA) as compared with commercial pharmacy (CP) to purchase medicine results in lower pharmaceutical costs for heart failure (HF) and heart transplantation (HT) outpatients.Methods:We compared the costs via RA versus CP in 808 HF and 147 HT patients followed from 2009 through 2011, and evaluated the influence of clinical and demographic variables on cost.Results:The monthly cost per patient for HF drugs acquired via RA was $10.15 (IQ 3.51-40.22) versus $161.76 (IQ 86.05‑340.15) via CP; for HT, those costs were $393.08 (IQ 124.74-774.76) and $1,207.70 (IQ 604.48-2,499.97), respectively.Conclusion:RA may reduce the cost of prescription drugs for HF and HT, potentially making HF treatment more accessible. Clinical characteristics can influence the cost and benefits of RA. RA may be a new health policy strategy to reduce costs of prescribed medications for HF and HT patients, reducing the economic burden of treatment.

Structural inferences from first-price auction experiments

We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Preferred suppliers in auction markets

In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability, their joint surplus can be increased by an agreement which grants to the preferred supplier a right-of-first-refusal on the lowest price offer from the other suppliers. When the buyer does have this ability, one agreement which maximizes their joint surplus includes a revelation game for the cost of the preferred supplier and a reserve price in the procurement auction based on that cost.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

A general continuous auction model with insiders

We analyse in a unified way how the presence of a trader with privilege information makes the market to be efficient when the release time is known. We establish a general relation between the problem of finding an equilibrium and the problem of enlargement of filtrations. We also consider the case where the time of announcement is random. In such a case the market is not fully efficient and there exists equilibrium if the sensitivity of prices with respect to the global demand is time decreasing according with the distribution of the random time.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Auction theory, sequential local service privatization, and the effects of geographical scale economies on effective competition

A sequential weakly efficient two-auction game with entry costs, interdependence between objects, two potential bidders and IPV assumption is presented here in order to give some theoretical predictions on the effects of geographical scale economies on local service privatization performance. It is shown that the first object seller takes profit of this interdependence. The interdependence externality rises effective competition for the first object, expressed as the probability of having more than one final bidder. Besides, if there is more than one final bidder in the first auction, seller extracts the entire bidder¿s expected future surplus differential between having won the first auction and having lost. Consequences for second object seller are less clear, reflecting the contradictory nature of the two main effects of object interdependence. On the one hand, first auction winner becomes ¿stronger¿, so that expected payments rise in a competitive environment. On the other hand, first auction loser becomes relatively ¿weaker¿, hence (probably) reducing effective competition for the second object. Additionally, some contributions to static auction theory with entry cost and asymmetric bidders are presented in the appendix

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