Has social justice any legitimacy in Kant's theory of right? The empirical conditions of the legal state as a civil union

This paper aims at shedding light on an obscure point in Kant's theory of the state. It discusses whether Kant's rational theory of the state recognises the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil independence. It has three aims: 1) to show that Kant's Doctrine of Right can offer solutions for the complex relation between economics and politics in our present time; 2) to demonstrate the claim that Kant embraces a pragmatic standpoint when he tackles the social concerns of the state, and so to refute the idea that he argues for an abstract conception of politics; and 3) to suggest that a non-paternalistic theory of rights is not necessarily incompatible with the basic tenets of a welfare state.

The role of the BNDES in the Brazilian development financing: contributions from the paper “towards a legal theory of finance” of Katharina Pistor

This paper aims to verify the main contributions and adjustments that the paper “Towards a Legal Theory of Finance” from Katharina Pistor may bring to the role of the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) in the Brazilian development financing. In order to do so, I work with two questions in this paper: (i) such theory presents elements which allow analyzing the role of the BNDES and from there, if it is required, adjustments can be made in the governance of the BNDES? and (ii) there are academics and scholars that, together with the theory, also contribute with the improvement of the BNDES role in the development of Brazil?

Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.

The relativity of evaluative sentences: disagreeing over disagreement

Evaluative sentences (moral judgments, expressions of taste, epistemic modals) are relative to the speaker's standards. Lately, a phenomenon has challenged the traditional explanation of this relativity: whenever two speakers disagree over them they contradict each other without being at fault. Hence, it is thought that the correction of the assertions involved must be relative to an unprivileged standard not necessarily the speaker's. I will claim instead that so far, neither this nor any other proposal has provided an explanation of the phenomenon. I will point out several problems presented by them and I will hint to how this phenomenon could be explained by making minor adjustments to our semantic theory.

Continuing education learning preferences and styles of legal clinic lawyers /

The purpose of this qualitative research was to study the learning preferences and styles of management lawyers who work in Ontario's legal aid clinics. Data were gathered from two sources and analyzed using the constant comparison method. A preand postconference survey provided the principal data on clinic lawyers' learning preferences. Follow-up interviews were then conducted with 3 purposefully selected survey participants to explore their personal learning styles. Kolb's experiential learning theory provided the theoretical framework for discussing personal learning styles. The findings showed a general consistency among the lawyers to learn by listening to lectures and experts. This preference may suggest a lingering influence from law school training. The lawyers' more informal learning associated with daily practice, however, appeared to be guided by various learning styles. The learning style discussions provided some support for Kolb's model but also confirmed some shortcomings noted by other authors. Educators who design continuing education programs for lawyers may benefit from some insights gained from this exploratory research. This study adds to a limited but growing body of work on the learning preferences and styles of lawyers and suggests new questions for future research.

On the design of customized risk measures in insurance, the problem of capital allocation and the theory of fluctuations for Lévy processes

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions quelques problèmes fondamentaux en mathématiques financières et actuarielles, ainsi que leurs applications. Cette thèse est constituée de trois contributions portant principalement sur la théorie de la mesure de risques, le problème de l’allocation du capital et la théorie des fluctuations. Dans le chapitre 2, nous construisons de nouvelles mesures de risque cohérentes et étudions l’allocation de capital dans le cadre de la théorie des risques collectifs. Pour ce faire, nous introduisons la famille des "mesures de risque entropique cumulatifs" (Cumulative Entropic Risk Measures). Le chapitre 3 étudie le problème du portefeuille optimal pour le Entropic Value at Risk dans le cas où les rendements sont modélisés par un processus de diffusion à sauts (Jump-Diffusion). Dans le chapitre 4, nous généralisons la notion de "statistiques naturelles de risque" (natural risk statistics) au cadre multivarié. Cette extension non-triviale produit des mesures de risque multivariées construites à partir des données financiéres et de données d’assurance. Le chapitre 5 introduit les concepts de "drawdown" et de la "vitesse d’épuisement" (speed of depletion) dans la théorie de la ruine. Nous étudions ces concepts pour des modeles de risque décrits par une famille de processus de Lévy spectrallement négatifs.

Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility

The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.

Theory of mind and language comprehension in schizophrenia

Resumen tomado de la publicación

Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.