Iraq and the Arab revolutions : protesting the failure to democratise governance

As the Arab Revolutions swept across the Middle East and North Africa in late 2010 and into 2011, Iraqis were confronted with the failures of their own democracy to deliver on the many promises made to them since 2003. This led to weeks of scattered protests across Iraq, culminating in the “Day of Rage” (February 25, 2011) in which thousands of protestors took to the streets in at least 17 separate demonstrations across the country following Friday prayers. On the surface, these protests shared much in common with others across the region: the use of Facebook and other social media to promote the protests, and the focus on corruption, unemployment and poor public infrastructure. Also similar was the reaction of key Iraqi political figures such as Maliki and Barzani who met Iraqi protests with a mixture of brutal suppression and modest political and economic concessions. However, as this paper will demonstrate, upon closer inspection the Iraqi protests are in fact very different to others across the MENA and are therefore among the most significant for the future of democracy in the region. The Iraqi people were not protesting against an autocratic regime or an entrenched monarchy that had held power for decades, but a relatively new – and supposedly ‘democratic’ - political elite who had been brought to power in the wake of the US invasion. Indeed, while protestors across the region called for more democracy in the form of a written constitution, free and fair elections, a robust media sphere and the rule of law, Iraqis were protesting against the failures of the Iraqi government to democratise such mechanisms of governance (all of which they more or less have). They felt routinely disenfranchised by a state that has manipulated the very institutions and discourses of democracy to retain, rather than diffuse, power.

Conclusion : the promises and challenges of the Arab revolutions

This concluding chapter analyses the various promises and challenges that were embodied in the Arab revolutions and face the region as it moves forward. It concludes by noting that if those who participated in these popular movements are patient, engage and invest in this period of change to make their own authentic and democratic future, then there is real hope for the region. It is up to the people of the MENA to decide whether the spark ignited in the many ‘Tahrir’ squares is snuffed out or burns brightly.

Introduction : people power and the Arab revolutions : towards a new conceptual framework of democracy in the Middle East

This introductory chapter analyses the various debates and discussions that have been triggered by the Arab Revolutions. It seizes a unique opportunity to reflect on these seismic events, their causes and consequences, as well as on the core issues facing the region in the future. The central arguments and the key contributions of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, to situate the Arab Revolutions within their broader contextual background, arguing that a unique set of historical events as well as local, regional and global dynamics have converged to provide the catalyst that triggered the recent revolts. Secondly, this book will attempt to situate the events within a new conceptual framework. The argument here is that the Arab Revolutions pose a very specific challenge to conventional wisdom concerning democracy and democratisation in the Middle East.

Russia’s Middle East policy after the Arab revolutions. OSW Commentary No. 59, 2011-07-26

Russia’s policy towards the Middle East is instrumental. Its activity in the region has been growing since the middle of the last decade, and its aim is to help Moscow achieve its objectives in other areas, particularly in its policies towards the US and Europe, as well as its energy policy. The establishment of these political influences constitutes a bargaining chip for Russia in its relations with the US. Russia’s participation in resolving conflicts is aimed at building up its image as a supra-regional power. Russia’s Middle East policy is a key element in its contacts with the Muslim world. At the same time, Russia’s policy in the region remains cautious – despite its return to the region, Russia has not decided to ‘play’ for the Middle East, and its position and role in the region remain limited. The balance of power in the Middle East has been shifting in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions. However, it does not seem that they have opened up larger opportunities for Russian policy in the region. The Russian elite has been divided in its assessment of the consequences of these events. One part of it has displayed scepticism, treating the revolutions rather as a threat than a chance to strengthen their own position. The revolutions were not seen as democratisation processes, but rather as a destabilisation of the region and as posing an increased danger from radical Islam. For the other part of the elite, the revolutions were the natural consequence of the social changes occurring in the region. This internal dispute made it difficult for Russia to present a cohesive approach to the Arab revolutions, and its stance was reactive. The defensive position which Moscow adopted showed that Russia did not have the potential to mould the political situation, either in the region as a whole or its individual countries; neither did it display any willingness to do so. What Moscow is doing is positioning itself in such a way so as not to spoil relations with any other actor in the region, and to be able to exploit any possible emerging opportunities in case of further-reaching changes.

Shall Tunisia Succeed in Becoming a Strong Democratic State? EUSpring Arab Citizenship Review No. 13, December 2015

From the Introduction. Arab revolutions have sparked real hopes for democracy, but the situation varies from one state to another and change has taken various directions, with unpredictable outcomes in the future. In light of current events, most of these countries seem to have failed in their democratic transition and also face the dissolution of their state apparatus in bloody civil wars. This leaves the door open to interpretations associating democracy with chaos. In this view, preserving post-colonial states – authoritarian in most cases – is better than having no state at all. This partially justified the coup that took place in Egypt, where the ‘Deep State’ has recovered its capabilities in a dictatorial manner. The Arab world thus faced an impasse: the state is either stable but authoritarian or democratic yet threatened with dissolution. The dilemma results in an impossible choice between stable dictatorship or freedom ending in chaos.

The Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions : protests and public power in post-Saddam Iraq

Since the democratic elections held across Iraq in 2005 and 2010 much attention has understandably been paid to the new Iraqi government. Unfortunately, it has become increasingly clear that much of Iraq’s political elite are practising the type of governance referred to in the literature on other Arab states alternatively as ‘liberalised autocracy’ (Brumberg, 2002), ‘semi-authoritarianism’ (Ottaway, 2003) or ‘pluralised authoritarianism’ (Posusney & Angrist, 2005). That is to say, that the Iraqi government actually utilises (and controls) nominally democratic mechanisms such as elections, media freedoms, political opposition and civil society as part of their strategy to retain power. This is perhaps best demonstrated via the nine month political stalemate that followed the March 2010 elections and PM Maliki’s refusal to step down despite having narrowly lost the election. Not surprisingly, the Iraqi people have become increasingly disillusioned and critical of their political leaders – hence the mass protests that have swept across Iraq in the context of the popular Arab Revolutions of 2010-11.

However, these latest Iraqi protests are only the most recent and overt sign of the hidden geographies that are agitating towards democracy in this deeply troubled and increasingly authoritarian state. Since the invasion of 2003, a complex array of political, religious and ethno-sectarian factions have formed civil society movements; uncensored news has been consumed across the nation; ordinary citizens have taken to the streets to protest key government decisions; and various local councils have been formed, deliberating on key decisions facing their immediate communities (Davis, 2004, 2007). Given this context, this chapter focuses on the specific case of the Iraqi Federation of Oil Unions (IFOU), Iraq’s largest and most powerful independent workers union. The IFOU has repeatedly taken the Iraqi government to task over their poor pay and the dangerous nature of their work, as well as the government’s initial kowtowing to US plans to privatise the entire Iraqi oil sector. To do this, the IFOU have utilised a variety of very democratic mechanisms including peaceful strikes and protests, media campaigns and political lobbying. Such moves have met with mixed results in Baghdad – at times the central government has pandered to the requests of IFOU, but it has also gone as far as issuing arrest warrants for its senior members. The IFOU therefore serve as an interesting example of public power in Iraq and may well pose one of the greatest challenges to rising authoritarianism there.

Trajectories and outcomes of the 'Arab Spring' : comparing Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria

Almost three years have passed since the 'Arab Spring' began in late 2010. In the major sites of popular uprisings, political conditions remain unsettled or violent. Despite similarities in their original opposition to authoritarian rule, the outcomes differed from country to country. In Tunisia and Egypt, processes of transiting from authoritarian rule produced contrasting consequences for democratic politics. Uprisings led to armed rebellion in Libya and Syria, but whereas Gaddafi was overthrown, Asad was not. What explains the different trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring? How were these shaped by the power structure and levels of social control of the pre-uprising regimes and their state institutions, on the one hand, and by the character of the societies and oppositional forces that rose against them? Comparing Tunisia with Egypt, and Libya with Syria, this paper discusses various factors that account for variations in the trajectories and outcomes of the Arab Spring, namely, the legacy of the previous regime, institutional and constitutional choices during "transition" from authoritarian rule, socioeconomic conditions, and the presence of absence of ethnic, sectarian and geographic diversity.

The Arab Spring: where was the EU, and what is its future in the region? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 13 No. 4, February 2013

From the Introduction. In 2010 the martyring of Mohamed Bouazizi began a ripple of civil uprisings across the Middle East, and would lead to a wave of revolutions that the media would dub the Arab Spring. From North Africa to the Gulf Region, these civil uprisings made major headlines but found little intervention on behalf of world superpowers such as the United States or the European Union. Acting as more of an observer than as an active participant in these revolutions, it would seem that the European Union played a small role in preventing civil unrest, or in aiding in the policing of these oppressive governments. By example of the passive position held by Europe during these revolutions, the EU appears to be ill equipped to handle security issues such as the massive revolutionary chain witnessed across the Mediterranean. Now, however, they have a new opportunity to be involved in a post- Arab Spring Mediterranean. This paper seeks to address some reasons behind the Arab Spring, describe the institutional framework previously and currently in place, as well as to analyze the progress of Europe’s relationship with the Mediterranean by analyzing the EU’s past and current role in the Mediterranean. It will also look at critiques of the EU’s role in the Arab Spring, as well as the opportunities to be taken in the Mediterranean region.

A mérsékelt iszlamista mozgalmak szerepe az "arab tavaszt" követő politikai átmenetben (The Role of Moderate Islamist Movements in the Political Transition Following the Arab Spring)

Up to January 2011 authoritarian political regimes in the Middle East had widely been considered stable due to the armed forces, the underdeveloped political institutions, the economic embeddedness of the regimes, the neo-patrimonial structure of the Arab societies and, eventually the characteristics of Islam. Middle Eastern political systems are often considered to belong to a special sub-group of non-democratic regimes called “liberalized autocracies”. The 2011 events show that there is a new, as yet non-defined political structure emerging. Although there are different interpretations of the developments, there is a consensus on the determinant role of the Islamist organizations in the development of the new political structure. The results of the Egyptian and Tunisian parliamentary elections show that the secular political parties could not attract the public, while in Tunisia the long forbidden Hizb an-Nahda could form a government. In Egypt Hizb al-Hurriya established by the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 won almost half of the parliamentary mandates, and to a great surprise, the Salafi Hizb an-Nour also received 24.3% of the votes. On the basis of the above developments the thesis of the Islamist re-organization of the Middle East, i.e. of a new wave of Islamism was elaborated, according to which the main political winners of the revolts in the Arab countries are the Islamist organizations, which could step in and fill in the political vacuum. While some speak of an Islamist autumn or Islamist winter as the result of the Arab Spring, others prefer the term Islamic revolutions.

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is part of the geographic region known as the Middle East. With a land mass of 82,000 square kilometres, predominantly desert and mountains it is bordered by Oman, Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf. The UAE is strategically located due to its proximity to other oil rich Middle Eastern countries such as Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The UAE was formed from a federation of seven emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Ajman, Fujuriah, and Um Al Quain) in December 1971 (Ras Al Khaimah did not join the federation until 1972) (Heard-bey, 2004, 370). Abu Dhabi is the political capital, and the richest emirate; while Dubai is the commercial centre. The majority of the population of the various Emirates live along the coast line as sources of fresh water often heavily influenced the site of different settlements. Unlike some near neighbours (Iran and Iraq) the UAE has not undergone any significant political instability since it was formed in 1971. Due to this early British influences the UAE has had very strong political and economic ties with first Britain, and, more recently, the United States of America (Rugh, 2007). Until the economic production of oil in the early 1960’s the different Emirates had survived on a mixture of primary industry (dates), farming (goats and camels), pearling and subsidies from Britain (Davidson 2005, 3; Hvit, 2007, 565) Along with near neighbours Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the UAE is part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a trading bloc. (Hellyer, 2001, 166-168).

eBusiness use in the United Arab Emirates : lessons for evolving markets

Since the early 1990’s the United Arab Emirates has been actively seeking to diversify into non-oil sectors. The nation has set out to market itself as a hub for foreign and domestic companies; realizing to achieve these goals that it must provide appropriate e-business frameworks and infrastructures. While the nation itself is paving the way for other nations in the Middle East to undertake electronic business initiatives, the use of everyday e-business in the UAE appears to be somewhat stifled. An investigation into reasons for the apparent low levels of adoption of e-business by UAE inhabitants has been conducted using an autoethnographic research methodology coupled with qualitative interviews of selected stakeholders. Findings from this research may contribute to a better understanding of how e-business initiatives in specific regions need to take into account local cultural and other issues which may be irrelevant elsewhere.

Copyright law in the United Arab Emirates in the digital age

This article gives an overview of copyright law in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and critically evaluates its operation in the digital era, providing suggestions for reform.