Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Committed to reform? Pragmatic antitrust enforcement in electricity markets

This thesis is a collection of essays about the instrumental use of commitment decisions to facilitate the completion of the European internal electricity market. European policy can shape markets in many ways, two most evident being regulation and competition enforcement. The interplay between these two instruments attracts a lot of scholarly attention. One of the major concerns in the competition vs. regulation debate is the instrumental use of competition rules. It has been observed that competition enforcement is triggered not only as a response to an anticompetitive harm occurring in the market, but that it sometimes becomes a powerful tool in the European Commission’s hands to pursue regulatory goals. This thesis looks for examples of such instrumentalisation in the context of electricity markets and finds that the Commission is very pragmatic in using all the possible instruments it has at hand to push forward its project of creating the internal electricity market. This includes regulation, competition enforcement and all sorts of political pressure. To the extent that commitment decisions accelerate sector-specific regulation and overcome political deadlocks, they contribute to the Commission’s energy policy goals. However, instrumentalisation of competition rules comes at a certain cost to competition policy, energy policy and, most importantly, to electricity markets themselves. Markets might be negatively affected either indirectly, by application of sector-specific regulation or competition policy building on previous commitment decisions, or directly, through the implementation of inadequate commitments in individual cases. Concluding, commitment decisions generally contributed to achieving the policy objectives of the internal electricity market, but their use for that purpose does not come without cost. Given that this cost is ultimately borne by the internal electricity market, the Commission should take a more balanced approach to the instrumental use of commitment decisions so that it does not do more harm than good.

Patent pools and competition law : an examination of the enforcement strategies of competition authorities

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche"

European antitrust control and standard setting. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/01, February 2012

Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the risk of hold-up, standard-setting organisations often require patent holders to disclose their standard-essential patents before the adoption of the standard and to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The European Commission normally investigates unfair pricing abuse in a standard-setting context if a patent holder who committed to FRAND ex-ante is suspected not to abide to it ex-post. However, this approach risks ignoring a number of potential abuses which are likely harmful for welfare. That can happen if, for example, ex-post a licensee is able to impose excessively low access rates (‘reverse hold-up’) or if a patent holder acquires additional market power thanks to the standard but its essential patents are not encumbered by FRAND commitments, for instance because the patent holder did not directly participate to the standard setting process and was therefore not required by the standard-setting organisations to commit to FRAND ex-ante. A consistent policy by the Commission capable of tackling all sources of harm should be enforced regardless of whether FRAND commitments are given. Antitrust enforcement should hinge on the identification of a distortion in the bargaining process around technology access prices, which is determined by the adoption of the standard and is not attributable to pro-competitive merits of any of the involved players.

Antitrust on the ‘G string’: What’s behind the Commission’s investigations of Google and Gazprom? CEPS Commentary, 15 June 2015

The past few weeks have marked a shift of gear in EU antitrust enforcement. First, the new European Commissioner for Competition Margarethe Vestager announced on April 15th that the Commission had sent a Statement of Objections to Google, arguing that the giant IT company abused its dominant position in the “general Internet search” market and also in the market for mobile operating systems, apps and services. Exactly one week later, she also sent a Statement of Objections to Gazprom for having created artificial barriers to trade between certain EU countries, preventing gas flows and competition across national borders and charging unfair prices in five Central and Eastern European countries. It is indeed hard to recall any other time in which two investigations of this size – both potentially leading to billions of euros of fines – have been launched almost simultaneously.

Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge

In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with three other penalty regimes: fixed penalties; penalties based on revenue, and penalties based on profits. Our analysis is the first to compare these regimes in terms of their impact on both (i) the prices charged by those cartels that do form; and (ii) the number of stable cartels that form (deterrence). We show that the class of penalties based on profits is identical to the class of fixed penalties in all welfare-relevant respects. For the other three types of penalty we show that, for those cartels that do form, penalties based on the overcharge produce lower prices than those based on profit) while penalties based on revenue produce the highest prices. Further, in conjunction with the above result, our analysis of cartel stability (and thus deterrence), shows that penalties based on the overcharge out-perform those based on profits, which in turn out-perform those based on revenue in terms of their impact on each of the following welfare criteria: (a) average overcharge; (b) average consumer surplus; (c) average total welfare.

Essays on cartels and market distortions

This dissertation is a conjunction of three essays on the Industrial Organization field, this empirical work is applied to the Brazilian retail gasoline market. The first essay investigates the existence of spillover effects from cartel activity. The second essay relates the well-known economic puzzle of asymmetric cost pass through to prices with the existence of horizontal coordination - cartels - in the relevant market. Finally, the third essay investigates the effectiveness of antitrust interventions inside the offenders and the consequences of its disclosure in related markets.

Aspetti processuali del Regolamento n. 1/2003/Ce

The recent reform in European antitrust enforcement is embodied in Regolation n. 1/2003/ Ce and related Communications. Since 2004 when it came into force, some crytical assessments can already be made. The work starts from some technical analysis of the reform, under a procedural perspective, to assess the proceedings’ real impact on parties’ rights and to criticize its limits. Decentralisation has brought about more complicacies, since community procedural systems are not harmonized, neither in their administrative rules, nor in their civil proceedings, which are all involved in the European antitrust network. Therefore, antitrust proceedings end un as being more jurisdictional in their effects than in their guarentees, which is a flaw to be mended by legislators. National laws shoud be harmonized, community law should be clarified and the system should turn more honestly towards a rationalized jurisdiction-cented mechanism. Otherwise, parties defense rights and the overall efficiency are put into doubt. Italy is a good exemple of how many colmlicacies can outburst from national procedures and national decentralised application. An uncertain pattern of judicial control, together with unclear relationships among the institutions to cooperate in the antitrust network can produce more problems than they aim to solve. As to the private enforcement, Regulation n.1 does not even attempt to give precise regulation to this underdeveloped sector. A continual comparison with U.S. system has brought the Commission to become aware both of the risks and of the advanteges of an increased civil antitrust litigation in fronto of national judges. In order to substain a larger development of this parallel and, presently, difficult way of judicial compensation, it is presently ongoing a consultation among states to find suitable incentives to make private enforcement more appealing and effective. The solution to this lack of private litigation is not to be sought in Regulation n. 1 which calls into action national legislators and proceedures to implement further improvements. As a conclusion, Regulation n. 1 is the outpost of an ambitious community design to create an efficient control mechanism over antitrust violations. It focuses on Commission proceedings, powers and sanctions in order to establish deterrence, then it highlights civil litigation perspectives and it involves directly states into antitrust application. It seems that more could be done to technically shape administrative proceedings in a more jurisdictionally oriented form, then to clarify respective roles and coordination mecanisms in order to prevent difficulties easy to forsee. Some of jurisprudential suggestions have been accepted, but much more is left to be done in the future to improve european antitrust enforcement system.

The Dragon awakes: Is Chinese competition policy a cause for concern? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/14, 22 October 2013

China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2007, is largely compatible with antitrust law in the European Union, the United States and other jurisdictions. Enforcement activity by the Chinese authorities is also approaching the level seen in the EU. The Chinese law, however, leaves significant room for the use of competition policy to further industrial policy objectives. The data presented in this Policy Contribution indicates that Chinese merger control might have asymmetrically targeted foreign companies, while favouring domestic companies. However, there are no indications that antitrust control has been used to favour domestic players. A strategy to achieve convergence in global antitrust enforcement should include support for Chinese competition authorities to develop the institutional tools they already have, and to improve merger control by promoting the adoption of a consumer-oriented test and enforcing M&A notification rules.

Regulating Vertical Agreements: A Comparative Law & Economics analysis of Brazil and Europe

This PhD thesis discusses antitrust enforcement of anti-competitive vertical agreements in Europe and in Brazil from an institutional perspective. It considers both the evolution of the legal framework and the application of the existing policies, with the analysis of case studies. The research highlights the main challenges of the current approaches adopted by the competition authorities in these jurisdictions and formulates specific proposals for future improvements. Because the Brazilian competition rules were originally inspired by the European legal framework, this thesis also summarizes the contemporary discussions regarding comparative law and the efficiency of transplanting laws and good practices. In a Law & Economics perspective, vertical agreements have always been a paradoxical topic and constitute one of the most dynamic disputes for antitrust enforcement. The reason for that concern is the fact that those contracts among companies are complex in nature. Taking into account this background, the thesis provides an original analysis of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of vertical agreements, based on the classical literature of Law & Economics. One of the novelties of the research is the extension of the economic analysis of vertical agreements to also consider new forms of contractual abuses in the context of digital markets, such as the contractual restrictions that are being put I practice in e-commerce platforms. The international comparative approach focuses on the Brazilian and European experiences, and opens up a reflection about the policy recommendations applied to several countries with similar economic and institutional realities.

Abusing data dominance in the digital market. The application of merger control and article 102 TFEU to data-related conducts.

The internet and digital technologies revolutionized the economy. Regulating the digital market has become a priority for the European Union. While promoting innovation and development, EU institutions must assure that the digital market maintains a competitive structure. Among the numerous elements characterizing the digital sector, users’ data are particularly important. Digital services are centered around personal data, the accumulation of which contributed to the centralization of market power in the hands of a few large providers. As a result, data-driven mergers and data-related abuses gained a central role for the purposes of EU antitrust enforcement. In light of these considerations, this work aims at assessing whether EU competition law is well-suited to address data-driven mergers and data-related abuses of dominance. These conducts are of crucial importance to the maintenance of competition in the digital sector, insofar as the accumulation of users’ data constitutes a fundamental competitive advantage. To begin with, part 1 addresses the specific features of the digital market and their impact on the definition of the relevant market and the assessment of dominance by antitrust authorities. Secondly, part 2 analyzes the EU’s case law on data-driven mergers to verify if merger control is well-suited to address these concentrations. Thirdly, part 3 discusses abuses of dominance in the phase of data collection and the legal frameworks applicable to these conducts. Fourthly, part 4 focuses on access to “essential” datasets and the indirect effects of anticompetitive conducts on rivals’ ability to access users’ information. Finally, Part 5 discusses differential pricing practices implemented online and based on personal data. As it will be assessed, the combination of an efficient competition law enforcement and the auspicial adoption of a specific regulation seems to be the best solution to face the challenges raised by “data-related dominance”.

Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law. Research Paper in Law 08/2013, December

The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.

Authorizing the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws : report, to accompany S. 716.

"Calendar no. 446."

Le contrôle des pratiques anticoncurrentielles au sein des marchés de l'Union Européenne, des États-Unis et du Canada : perspectives d'un droit antitrust international

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit des affaires"