Animalism and Person as a Basic Sort

In this paper Animalism is analysed. It will be argued that Animalism is correct in claiming (i) that being of a certain sort of animal S is a fundamental individuative substance sortal concept (animal of the species Homo Sapiens), (ii) that this implies that Animalism is correct in claiming that persons such as us are, by necessity, human beings, (iii) that remaining the same animal is a necessary condition for our identity over time. Contrary to Animalism it will be argued that this does not imply that person should be understood as a phased sortal concept. It will be argued that Animalism rests upon a prior conception of person, and that this implies that person must be understood as a basic substance sortal concept through which we have to individuate ourselves and others. It is further argued that this, together with the insights of Animalism, implies that persons, by necessity, are beings of a biological nature.

De assinalações a DESTERRO: investigações entre arte e subjetividade

De Assinalações a DESTERRO: investigações entre arte e subjetividade é uma reflexão sobre o processo de construção das obras das séries SORTERRO e DESTERRO. Tais trabalhos se utilizam de pelos e cabelos como matéria física e conceitual na sua elaboração e a partir destes elementos dar-se inicio a uma série de investigações que buscam trazer a tona os meandros do processo da criação e produção artística. A investigação inicia com a visita a algumas obras anteriores em que o elemento cabelo aparece. A partir daí uma serie de temas atravessam o caminho. Dentre os quais estão as questões relativas ao corpo, à vida e à morte, ao desejo, ao trauma, à biografia, ao acaso, ao medo, ao erotismo, à animalidade, à perversão, a sublimação e à linguagem. Dentre os autores mais visitados estão: Georges Bataille, Jacques Derrida e Gilles Deleuze

The ‘Is’ in Animal-is-m

Eric T. Olson argues for a position in personal identity called Animalism. Olson's definition of ‘what we are’ is what the biological community currently defines as the ‘human animal’. While Olson argues his definition is determinate and anti-relativist, I object by maintaining that his definition is fundamentally soft relativist. This is accomplished by asking : 1) why favour the biological definition over other cultural definitions ? – and by arguing : 2) that nothing stops the biological definition from changing ; 3) that the biological definition is classificatory and not ontologically explanatory ; 4) that biology may drop the concept ‘human animal’ leaving no definition of ‘what we are’. Finally, I look at which ontological decisions Olson makes and ask if there is any hope for Animalism and for the human philosopher with no proven ontology. In my conclusion, I follow Olson’s surprising admission by suggesting that I have no idea what we are.

Luz e sombra: uma interpretação de suas significações imaginárias nas imagens do cinema expressionista alemão e do cinema noir americano

The present investigation proposes an approach of light and shadow and their imaginary significations in the images of both German expressionist movie and the American noir movie, whose aesthetic experience is expressed through a contrasting bright/dark photography, loaded with symbolism. The interpretation of the imaginary significations of this imagistic material is based on Gilbert Durand´s imaginary anthropological theories that deal with a myriad of symbols gathered according to their semantic isomorphism and linked to more general structures named as Daily and nightly Image Regime . There come to gravitate, around such regimes, symbols attached to division and purification, ascensional and spectacular, with imaginary significations homological to Light and Good, and symbols associated to night, fall and animalism, isomorphic of Shadow and Evil

Persons : their identity and individuation

This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons.