Naturalism and agnosticism : the Gifford lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the years 1896-1898 /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Agnosticism; sermons preached in St. Peter's, Cranley gardens, 1883-4,

Mode of access: Internet.

Agnosticism and religion,

pt. I. Huxley and scientific agnosticism.--pt. II. Philosophical agnosticism.--pt. III. Spiritual religion: Its evolution and essence.

Agnosticism; sermons preached in St. Peter's,

Mode of access: Internet.

How should biologists engage with controversial mathematical theory?

Mathematics is beautiful and precise and often necessary to understand complex biological phenomena. And yet biologists cannot always hope to fully understand the mathematical foundations of the theory they are using or testing. How then should biologists behave when mathematicians themselves are in dispute? Using the on-going controversy over Hamilton's rule as an example, I argue that biologists should be free to treat mathematical theory with a healthy dose of agnosticism. In doing so biologists should equip themselves with a disclaimer that publicly admits that they cannot entirely attest to the veracity of the mathematics underlying the theory they are using or testing. The disclaimer will only help if it is accompanied by three responsibilities - stay bipartisan in a dispute among mathematicians, stay vigilant and help expose dissent among mathematicians, and make the biology larger than the mathematics. I must emphasize that my goal here is not to take sides in the on-going dispute over the mathematical validity of Hamilton's rule, indeed my goal is to argue that we should refrain from taking sides.

Le conservatisme comme épistémologie : le cas de la tradition conservatrice canadienne

Nous chercherons à nous enquérir du statut de la relation à la fois délicate et complexe du conservateur avec la connaissance politique rendue possible par l’entremise de sa raison, théorique et pratique. Nous travaillerons d’abord à faire ressortir les dispositions épistémologiques du conservateur qui débouchent typiquement sur l’antirationalisme et le scepticisme. Nous procèderons ensuite à l’examen des conséquences, sur le plan de l’action politique, de la conception conservatrice de la connaissance, conséquences qui amènent souvent ses partisans à adopter une posture politique distinctement pessimiste. Nous parcourrons finalement la lecture conservatrice de l’histoire politique canadienne dans l’objectif d’éclairer notre étude subséquente d’un certain nombre d’attitudes épistémologiques et politiques conservatrices particulières, dont ont tour à tour fait preuve diverses figures de proue de la tradition conservatrice canadienne. Au terme de notre enquête, nous espérons proposer un nouvel angle d’étude du conservatisme, celui de l’épistémologie, capable d’améliorer notre compréhension, et notre évaluation, des entreprises politiques et morales du mouvement conservateur canadien.

On a neglected argument in French philosophy: Sceptical humanism in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus

This paper wants to draw out a common argument in three great philosophers and littérateurs in modern French thought: Michel de Montaigne, Voltaire, and Albert Camus. The argument makes metaphysical and theological scepticism the first premise for a universalistic political ethics, as per Voltaire's: "it is clearer still that we ought to be tolerant of one another, because we are all weak, inconsistent, liable to fickleness and error." The argument, it seems to me, presents an interestingly overlooked, deeply important and powerful contribution to the philosophical discourse of modernity. On one hand, theological and post-structuralist critics of "humanism" usually take the latter to depend either on an essentialist philosophical anthropology, or a progressive philosophy of history. The former, it is argued, is philosophically contestable and ethically contentious (since however we define the human "essence," we are bound to exclude some "others"). The latter, for better or worse, is a continuation of theological eschatology by another name. So both, if not "modernity" per se, should somehow be rejected. But an ethical universalism - like that we find in Montaigne, Bayle, Voltaire, or Camus - which does not claim familiarity with metaphysical or eschatological truths, but humbly confesses our epistemic finitude, seeing in this the basis for ethical solidarity, eludes these charges. On the other hand, philosophical scepticism plays a large role in the post-structuralist criticisms of modern institutions and ideas in ways which have been widely taken to license forms of ethics which problematically identify responsibility, with taking a stand unjustifiable by recourse to universalizable reasons. But, in Montaigne, Voltaire and Camus, our ignorance concerning the highest or final truths does not close off, but rather opens up, a new descriptive sensitivity to the foibles and complexities of human experience: a sensitivity reflected amply, and often hilariously, in their literary productions. As such, a critical agnosticism concerning claims about things "in the heavens and beneath the earth" does not, for such a "sceptical humanism," necessitate decisionism or nihilism. Instead, it demands a redoubled ethical sensitivity to the complexities and plurality of political life which sees the dignity of "really-existing" others, whatever their metaphysical creeds, as an inalienable first datum of ethical conduct and reflection. After tracking these arguments in Montaigne, Voltaire, and Camus, the essay closes by reflecting on, and contesting, one more powerful theological argument against modern agnosticism's allegedly deleterious effects on ethical culture: that acknowledging ignorance concerning the highest things robs us of the basis for awe or wonder, the wellspring of human beings' highest ethical, aesthetic, and spiritual achievements.

Present day tracts on the non-Christian philosophies of the age,

W. G. Blaikie: Christianity and secularism compared in their influence and effects.--N. Porter: Agnosticism.--W. F. Wilkinson: Modern materialism.--J. Iverach: The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer examined.--J. R. Thomson: Modern pessimism.--J. R.Thomson: Utilitarianism.--J. R. Thomson: Auguste Comte.--J. Iverach: The ethics of evolution examined.

Agnosticisme; essai sur quelques théories pessimistes de la connaissance,

Mode of access: Internet.