La loi morale et le sentiment de respect : les deux ressorts de l’action morale chez Kant

Le présent texte porte sur la question du ressort ou mobile (« Triebfeder ») de l’action morale chez Kant. L’interprétation qui y est soutenue consiste à dire qu’il n’y a pas qu’un seul ressort de ce type chez Kant, comme le soutiennent maints commentateurs, mais plutôt deux : la loi morale et le sentiment de respect. Le nerf argumentatif de cette thèse réside dans la prise en compte systématique des aspects des facultés de l’esprit humain impliquées dans la question du ressort moral chez Kant. Deux éléments jouent ici un rôle particulièrement important : (i) les deux sens explicites attribués par Kant au mot « volonté », mot qui peut signifier (a) la raison pratique et (b) la faculté de désirer, et (ii) la division de la faculté de désirer en (a) (libre) arbitre et (b) raison pratique. Plus d’une douzaine d’interprétations, réparties sur plus d’un siècle, sont analysées de manière critique, et deux modifications du manuscrit allemand de la « Critique de la raison pratique » sont proposées pour le chapitre « Des ressorts de la raison pure pratique ».

Huit chants héroïques de l'ancienne France (XIIe-XVIIIe siècles) Poèmes et musique recueillis et publiés avec notices historiques,

Piano accompaniment.

Bulletin /

Description based on: 38. année, no. 2-3 (déc. 1930-jan. 1931)

Morale en action

Mode of access: Internet.

La morale en action par l'historie,

Mode of access: Internet.

Monographie du Syndicat des agriculteurs de Loir-et-Cher (Fondé le 7 juillet 1883). Historique. -- Organisation et fonctionnement des services d'approvisionnement agricole. Action économique, éducatrice et morale ...

Mode of access: Internet.

Environnement et légitimité morale de l'ordre constitutionnel libéral

The environmental crisis threatens the fundamental values of the political liberal tradition. As the autonomy, the security and the prosperity of persons and peoples are jeopardized by political inaction, the legitimacy of the liberal constitutional order is compromised. Because of important collective action problems, the democratic processes are unfit to address the present crisis and protect adequately the natural environment. Two institutional solutions deemed capable of preserving the legitimacy of the functional domination at the heart of social order are analyzed. The first is the constitutionalization of a right to an adequate natural environment, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of legislative power. The second is the declaration of a limited state of emergency and the use of exceptional powers, which purports to circumvent the paralysis of both legislative and judiciary powers. Despite their legitimacy, the diligent application of these political solutions remains improbable.

L'éducation morale des spectateurs face à l'image dans le cinéma de Michael Haneke

Michael Haneke est reconnu pour la froideur de sa mise en scène depuis ses premiers films. Le cinéaste a mis en scène plusieurs personnages dans des situations violentes, personnages entourés de média. Le présent projet vise à identifier l’évolution de la démarche du cinéaste dans la représentation des média au sein de ses œuvres. Pour ce faire, j’ai déterminé trois phases dans sa filmographie. À l’aide de trois cadres théoriques distincts, je préciserai ces trois étapes : l’observation, à l’aide des écrits de Marshall McLuhan ; son passage à l’acte, avec les théories d’interaction du microsociologue Erving Goffman et ; l’affirmation, une possible solution par l’accompagnement avec les écrits de Serge Tisseron et Marie-José Mondzain. Je tenterai de déterminer, par l’analyse des films de Michael Haneke, que ces différentes phases dans sa filmographie visent l’éducation morale des spectateurs face à l’image.

Responsabilité morale et déterminisme : Une approche par le contrôle causal

À première vue, la responsabilité morale serait incompatible avec le déterminisme causal, le premier requérant un contrôle total sur sa personne et le second soutenant que nos actions sont fortement influencées (ou même dictées) par celles des autres. Dans cet article, je me positionnerai contre l’incompatibilisme, dont l’erreur résulte de la conception du libre arbitre. Si une personne s’avère jouer un rôle nécessaire dans l’obtention d’une action ou d’une conséquence, elle en est la cause principale bien qu’elle ne détienne pas un contrôle total sur sa personne. Cet article cherchera à établir les conditions permettant d’identifier les personnes jouant un rôle nécessaire dans la séquence causale et celles qui n’en jouent pas. Dans un premier temps, je reprendrai la théorie de John Martin Fisher et de Mark Ravizza : un individu est moralement responsable lorsqu’il détient un contrôle de guidage. Le contrôle de guidage doit être distingué du contrôle régulateur. Sommairement, le contrôle de guidage est détenu par l’individu étant à la source de la séquence causale, et le contrôle régulateur est détenu par l’individu qui peut influencer l’orientation cette séquence causale. Dans un second temps, j’arguerai, contre Fisher et Ravizza cette fois-ci, que la détention du contrôle régulateur permet également d’imputer une responsabilité morale.

L'effet de compensation morale ou comment les 'bonnes actions' peuvent aboutir à une situation indésirable

Des recherches récentes arguent qu’une « bonne action » pourrait contribuer à « désinhiber » l’individu en lui permettant d’entreprendre des actions « moins souhaitables » par la suite. Cet effet de compensation morale reste un domaine peu étudié, en dépit des conséquences potentielles considérables sur l’efficacité des politiques publiques. L’objectif de notre contribution est de définir et de caractériser cet effet tout en soulignant les risques d’effets pervers associés. Nous utilisons à cet effet des études et des exemples tirés de divers domaines, comme la consommation alimentaire ou les comportements prosociaux, et identifions des pistes de recherche visant à mieux comprendre les conséquences directes et indirectes de cet effet, tout en mentionnant quelques stratégies envisageables afin d’atténuer ce biais.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists