An analysis on the network access pricing rules

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Conflict resolution through negotiation in a railway open access market : a multi-agent system approach

Open access reforms to railway regulations allow multiple train operators to provide rail services on a common infrastructure. As railway operations are now independently managed by different stakeholders, conflicts in operations may arise, and there have been attempts to derive an effective access charge regime so that these conflicts may be resolved. One approach is by direct negotiation between the infrastructure manager and the train service providers. Despite the substantial literature on the topic, few consider the benefits of employing computer simulation as an evaluation tool for railway operational activities such as access pricing. This article proposes a multi-agent system (MAS) framework for the railway open market and demonstrates its feasibility by modelling the negotiation between an infrastructure provider and a train service operator. Empirical results show that the model is capable of resolving operational conflicts according to market demand.

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

La Ley de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (L1341/09). Actualización de un marco legal para un sector en constante evolución

La necesidad de preparar al sector de tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones para hacer frente a los desafíos que trae consigo el desarrollo de la convergencia en todas sus dimensiones, implicaba plantear un nuevo equilibrio entre la promoción del desarrollo competitivo del sector y el cumplimiento de los compromisos sociales de cobertura derivados de la naturaleza de servicio público que ostentan las telecomunicaciones. En consecuencia, desde comienzos de 2007 se trabajó, con una permanente retroalimentación intragubernamental y sectorial, en la estructuración de los pilares del Proyecto de Ley 112/07 Cámara - 340/08 Senado, que culminó en la sanción presidencial de la Ley 1341 el30 de julio de 2009. Este nuevo marco legal para un sector en constante evolución constituye un hito sin precedentes, que rompe con la tradición de más de diez años y seis intentos fallidos de ajuste legislativo e institucional.

Oligopoly Model of a Debit Card Network

JEL Classification: G21, L13.

Pricing a Shared Access Link for Fair and Efficient Operation with Variable User Data Rates

The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data; this leads to variable user data rates. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. User preferences are modelled by concave increasing utility functions. Further, we introduce two additional elements: a convex increasing disutility function and a convex increasing multiplicative congestion-penally function. The disutility function takes the shortfall (contracted rate minus present rate) as its argument, and essentially encourages users to send traffic at their contracted rates, while the congestion-penalty function discourages heavy users from sending excess data when the link is congested. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices for fair and efficient link sharing; moreover, we show that a single price for all users achieves this. We illustrate the ideas using a simple experiment.

Application of reinforcement learning in an open railway access market price negotiation

In an open railway access market price negotiation, it is feasible to achieve higher cost recovery by applying the principles of price discrimination. The price negotiation can be modeled as an optimization problem of revenue intake. In this paper, we present the pricing negotiation based on reinforcement learning model. A negotiated-price setting technique based on agent learning is introduced, and the feasible applications of the proposed method for open railway access market simulation are discussed.

Submission to House Standing Committee on Infrastructure and Communications inquiry into IT Pricing

The strategies of price discrimination engaged in by a number of international publishers, coupled with a lack of competition and restrictions on the ability of consumers to engage in arbitrage, is likely to undermine the legitimacy of copyright law in Australia. By increasing prices beyond a reasonable and fair level, these strategies also undermine the goal of copyright law to enhance access to cultural goods. Enhancing access – and therefore lowering prices – is crucial to enhancing Australia's innovative capacity and the ability of Australians to experience, learn, act, and grow through cultural works. We recommend that the committee investigates the following options: 1. Repeal parallel importation restrictions; 2. Fundamentally reconsider the operation of anti-circumvention law in the context of digital distribution models; 3. Prohibit and render unenforceable contractual restrictions on parallel importation; 4. Introduce a right of digital resale in Australia.

A closed-form approximation for pricing temperature-based weather derivatives

This paper develops analytical distributions of temperature indices on which temperature derivatives are written. If the deviations of daily temperatures from their expected values are modelled as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with timevarying variance, then the distributions of the temperature index on which the derivative is written is the sum of truncated, correlated Gaussian deviates. The key result of this paper is to provide an analytical approximation to the distribution of this sum, thus allowing the accurate computation of payoffs without the need for any simulation. A data set comprising average daily temperature spanning over a hundred years for four Australian cities is used to demonstrate the efficacy of this approach for estimating the payoffs to temperature derivatives. It is demonstrated that expected payoffs computed directly from historical records are a particularly poor approach to the problem when there are trends in underlying average daily temperature. It is shown that the proposed analytical approach is superior to historical pricing.

Turing and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Intellectual Property, Public Health, and Access to Essential Medicines

A recent controversy in the United States over drug pricing by Turing Pharmaceuticals AG has raised larger issues in respect of intellectual property, access to medicines, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). In August 2015, Turing Pharmaceuticals AG – a private biopharmaceutical company with offices in New York, the United States, and Zug, Switzerland - acquired the exclusive marketing rights to Daraprim in the United States from Impax Laboratories Incorporated. Martin Shkreli, Turing’s Founder and Chief Executive Officer, maintained: “The acquisition of Daraprim and our toxoplasmosis research program are significant steps along Turing’s path of bringing novel medications to patients with serious disorders, some of whom often go undiagnosed and untreated.” He emphasised: “We intend to invest in the development of new drug candidates that we hope will yield an even better clinical profile, and also plan to launch an educational effort to help raise awareness and improve diagnosis for patients with toxoplasmosis.” In September 2015, there was much public controversy over the decision of Martin Shkreli to raise the price of a 62 year old drug, Daraprim, from $US13.50 to $US750 a pill. The drug is particularly useful in respect to the treatment and prevention of malaria, and in the treatment of infections in individuals with HIV/AIDS. Daraprim is listed on the World Health Organization’s (WHO) List of Essential Medicines. In the face of much criticism, Martin Shkreli has said that he will reduce the price of Daraprim. He observed: “We've agreed to lower the price on Daraprim to a point that is more affordable and is able to allow the company to make a profit, but a very small profit.” He maintained: “We think these changes will be welcomed.” However, he has been vague and ambiguous about the nature of the commitment. Notably, the lobby group, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhARMA), disassociated itself from the claims of Turing Pharmaceuticals. The group said: “PhRMA members have a long history of drug discovery and innovation that has led to increased longevity and improved lives for millions of patients.” The group noted: “Turing Pharmaceutical is not a member of PhRMA and we do not embrace either their recent actions or the conduct of their CEO.” The biotechnology peak body Biotechnology Industry Organization also sought to distance itself from Turing Pharmaceuticals. A hot topic: United States political debate about access to affordable medicines This controversy over Daraprim is unusual – given the age of drug concerned. Daraprim is not subject to patent protection. Nonetheless, there remains a monopoly in respect of the marketplace. Drug pricing is not an isolated problem. There have been many concerns about drug pricing – particularly in respect of essential medicines for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria. This recent controversy is part of a larger debate about access to affordable medicines. The dispute raises larger issues about healthcare, consumer rights, competition policy, and trade. The Daraprim controversy has provided impetus for law reform in the US. US Presidential Candidate Hillary Clinton commented: “Price gouging like this in this specialty drug market is outrageous.” In response to her comments, the Nasdaq Biotechnology Index fell sharply. Hillary Clinton has announced a prescription drug reform plan to protect consumers and promote innovation – while putting an end to profiteering. On her campaign site, she has emphasised that “affordable healthcare is a basic human right.” Her rival progressive candidate, Bernie Sanders, was also concerned about the price hike. He wrote a letter to Martin Shkreli, complaining about the price increase for the drug Daraprim. Sanders said: “The enormous, overnight price increase for Daraprim is just the latest in a long list of skyrocketing price increases for certain critical medications.” He has pushed for reforms to intellectual property to make medicines affordable. The TPP and intellectual property The Daraprim controversy and political debate raises further issues about the design of the TPP. The dispute highlights the dangers of extending the rights of pharmaceutical drug companies under intellectual property, investor-state dispute settlement, and drug administration. Recently, the civil society group Knowledge Ecology International published a leaked draft of the Intellectual Property Chapter of the TPP. Knowledge Ecology International Director, James Love, was concerned the text revealed that the US “continues to be the most aggressive supporter of expanded intellectual property rights for drug companies.” He was concerned that “the proposals contained in the TPP will harm consumers and in some cases block innovation.” James Love feared: “In countless ways, the Obama Administration has sought to expand and extend drug monopolies and raise drug prices.” He maintained: “The astonishing collection of proposals pandering to big drug companies make more difficult the task of ensuring access to drugs for the treatment of cancer and other diseases and conditions.” Love called for a different approach to intellectual property and trade: “Rather than focusing on more intellectual property rights for drug companies, and a death-inducing spiral of higher prices and access barriers, the trade agreement could seek new norms to expand the funding of medical research and development (R&D) as a public good, an area where the US has an admirable track record, such as the public funding of research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and other federal agencies.” In addition, there has been much concern about the Investment Chapter of the TPP. The investor-state dispute settlement regime would enable foreign investors to challenge government policy making, which affected their investments. In the context of healthcare, there is a worry that pharmaceutical drug companies will deploy their investor rights to challenge public health measures – such as, for instance, initiatives to curb drug pricing and profiteering. Such concerns are not merely theoretical. Eli Lilly has brought an investor action against the Canadian Government over the rejection of its drug patents under the investor-state dispute settlement regime of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Health Annex to the TPP also raises worries that pharmaceutical drug companies will able to object to regulatory procedures in respect of healthcare. It is disappointing that the TPP – in the leaks that we have seen – has only limited recognition of the importance of access to essential medicines. There is a need to ensure that there are proper safeguards to provide access to essential medicines – particularly in respect of HIV/AIDs, malaria, and tuberculosis. Moreover, there must be protection against drug profiteering and price gouging in any trade agreement. There should be strong measures against the abuse of intellectual property rights. The dispute over Turing Pharmaceuticals AG and Daraprim is an important cautionary warning in respect of some of the dangers present in the secret negotiations in respect of the TPP. There is a need to preserve consumer rights, competition policy, and public health in trade negotiations over an agreement covering the Pacific Rim.

Universalization of access to modern energy services in Indian households-Economic and policy analysis

Provision of modern energy services for cooking (with gaseous fuels)and lighting (with electricity) is an essential component of any policy aiming to address health, education or welfare issues; yet it gets little attention from policy-makers. Secure, adequate, low-cost energy of quality and convenience is core to the delivery of these services. The present study analyses the energy consumption pattern of Indian domestic sector and examines the urban-rural divide and income energy linkage. A comprehensive analysis is done to estimate the cost for providing modern energy services to everyone by 2030. A public-private partnership-driven business model, with entrepreneurship at the core, is developed with institutional, financing and pricing mechanisms for diffusion of energy services. This approach, termed as EMPOWERS (entrepreneurship model for provision of wholesome energy-related basic services), if adopted, can facilitate large-scale dissemination of energy-efficient and renewable technologies like small-scale biogas/biofuel plants, and distributed power generation technologies to provide clean, safe, reliable and sustainable energy to rural households and urban poor. It is expected to integrate the processes of market transformation and entrepreneurship development involving government, NGOs, financial institutions and community groups as stakeholders. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The Case for Non-Cooperative Multihoming of Users to Access Points in IEEE 802.11 WLANs

In many cases, a mobile user has the option of connecting to one of several IEEE 802.11 access points (APs),each using an independent channel. User throughput in each AP is determined by the number of other users as well as the frame size and physical rate being used. We consider the scenario where users could multihome, i.e., split their traffic amongst all the available APs, based on the throughput they obtain and the price charged. Thus, they are involved in a non-cooperative game with each other. We convert the problem into a fluid model and show that under a pricing scheme, which we call the cost price mechanism, the total system throughput is maximized,i.e., the system suffers no loss of efficiency due to selfish dynamics. We also study the case where the Internet Service Provider (ISP) could charge prices greater than that of the cost price mechanism. We show that even in this case multihoming outperforms unihoming, both in terms of throughput as well as profit to the ISP.

European CMBS pricing: bond, mortgage and real estate characteristics

The recent global economic crisis is often associated with the development and pricing of mortgage-backed securities (i.e. MBSs) and underlying products (i.e. sub-prime mortgages). This work uses a rich database of MBS issues and represents the first attempt to price commercial MBSs (i.e. CMBSs) in the European market. Our results are consistent with research carried out in the US market and we find that bond-, mortgage-, real estate-related and multinational characteristics show different degrees of significance in explaining European CMBS spreads at issuance. Multiple linear regression analysis using a databank of CMBSs issued between 1997 and 2007 indicates a strong relationship with bond-related factors, followed by real estate and mortgage market conditions. We also find that multinational factors are significant, with country of issuance, collateral location and access to more liquid markets all being important in explaining the cost of secured funding for real estate companies. As floater coupon tranches tend to be riskier and exhibit higher spreads, we also estimate a model using this sub-set of data and results hold, hence reinforcing our findings. Finally, we estimate our model for both tranches A and B and find that real estate factors become relatively more important for the riskier investment products.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.