Strategic trade policy under uncertainty: Sufficient conditions for the optimality of ad valorem, specific and quadratic trade taxes

In most previous work on strategic trade policy the form of government intervention has been prescribed in advance. In this paper, we apply a solution concept discussed by Klemperer and Meyer for games in which the strategy space consists of the class of all (non state-contingent) price quantity schedules. We examine a series of specific assumptions on demand and supply conditions and derive the associated equilibrium trade policies. We derive welfare implications for all cases examined.

The Winnipeg principles, WTO and sustainable development: Proposed policies for reconciling trade and the environment

There is, a widespread belief that the WTO has made virtually no concessions to environmentalists about their concerns arising from free trade and the process of globalization. There are concerns that these processes may undermine prospects for sustainable development. Following, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the International Institute for Sustainable Development was established to advocate policies to support sustainable development within Canada and globally. In 1994, it proposed the Winnipeg Principles as. a means for reconciling international trade and development so as to: achieve sustainable development (ISD, 1994a,b). These seven principles are outlined in this article and assessed:. Although the International Institute for Sustainable Development had hoped: through these principles to influence the work programme of the Environment and Trade Committee of WTO, it seems to have little effect. Probably if these principles had been seriously considered by WTO, the serious social conflicts which emerged globally at the beginning of this century would have been avoided, and we would be in a better position to understand the complex links between trade, environment and sustainable development and adopt relevant policies. Copyright (C) 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Strategic trade policy and signaling costs with differentiated goods

We consider a trade policy model, where the costs of the home firm are private information but can be signaled through the output levels of the firm to a foreign competitor and a home policymaker. We compute the separating equilibrium and the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and we compare the subsidies, firms’ expected profits and home government’s welfare in both equilibria, for different values of the own price effect parameter.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Trade policy and regional inequalities

This paper aims to analyse the effects of trade policies in the pattern of regional inequalities within a country. Inspired firstly, by the debate concerning the role of protectionist policies in the settlement of a pattern of striking regional inequalities in the Spanish industrialisation process and secondly, by current evidence of an increase in these inequalities following the entry of Spain in the EU (1986), we set a model that shows that trade liberalisation increases regional inequalities.

Trade policy and regional inequalities

This paper aims to analyse the effects of trade policies in the pattern of regional inequalities within a country. Inspired firstly, by the debate concerning the role of protectionist policies in the settlement of a pattern of striking regional inequalities in the Spanish industrialisation process and secondly, by current evidence of an increase in these inequalities following the entry of Spain in the EU (1986), we set a model that shows that trade liberalisation increases regional inequalities.

Competitiveness and Trade Policy Problems in Agricultural Exports: The Case of Colombia. Doctoral Thesis Project

Este estudio explora el estado actual y el potencial competitivo de las exportaciones agrícolas colombianas a los mercados de Estados Unidos y la Unión Eurpea. Los mercados de estos paises industrializados se constituyen en los más importantes para Colombia, pero al mismo tiempo tienen varias restricciones en el sector agrícola. Este estudio mostrará que la competitividad no es solamente una función de los impedimentos locales o internacionales tales como la pobreza institucional, la baja capacidad tecnológica, la disponibilidad de capital, capital humano y mano de obra, sino también de impedimentos externos como el acceso a los mercados. Por lo tanto, éste es un importante objetivo del presente estudio con el objeto de proyectar posibles escenarios para el comercio colombiano, a fin de investigar la eliminación de estas restricciones. En la parte empírica se enfatizará en los impactos de las restricciones externas en el sentido de un estudio econométrico, sin embargo, la influencia de las restricciones internas será discutida como tal.

Piecemeal Oligopoly, Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Trade Policy.

Este artículo analiza el efecto sistemático de la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio, cuando un gobierno local debe evaluar políticas comerciales estratégicas lineales y cuadráticas. Este ejercicio se realiza para modelos de mercado Cournot y Bertran. El modelo prueba que tanto el esquema lineal como el cuadrático tienen el mismo efecto sobre el bienestar social de los países, y que la volatilidad de la tasa de cambio domestica lleva a los gobiernos a reducir los subsidios a las exportaciones o bajan los impuestos a las exportaciones, de acuerdo a la variable estratégica elegida por las firmas. La tasa de cambio extranjera tiene diferentes efectos dependiendo de si las firmas producen bajos rendimientos a escalas constantes o decrecientes.