Phoenix activity: Regulatory challenges and the law

Remedying the mischief of phoenix activity is of practical importance. The benefits include continued confidence in our economy, law that inspires best practice among directors, and law that is articulated in a manner such that penalties act as a sufficient deterrent and the regulatory system is able to detect offenders and bring them to account. Any further reforms must accommodate and tolerate legal phoenix activity. Phoenix activity pushes tolerance of entrepreneurial activity to its absolute limits. The wisest approach would be to front end the reforms so as to alleviate the considerable detection and enforcement burden upon regulatory bodies. There is little doubt that breach of the existing law is difficult and expensive to detect; and this is a significant burden when regulators have shrinking budgets and are rapidly losing feet on the ground. This front end approach may need to include restrictions on access to limited liability. The more limited liability is misused, the stronger the argument to limit access to limited liability. This paper proposes that such an approach is a legitimate next step for a robust and mature capitalist economy.

Takeovers: Acceptance facilities revisited in the Patrick case

Takeovers undertaken in Australia are highly regulated transactions. Once shareholders in the target accept an offer they have a limited opportunity, if any at all, to reconsider or revoke their acceptance in the light of new circumstances. Arguably, this explains target shareholders reluctance to accept an offer made for their shares under a takeover. The problem of shareholder inertia in takeovers has been identified by bidders, who have sought to induce bid acceptance through the use of innovative mechanisms. The efficacy of the Acceptance Facility mechanism was recently revisited in the Panel decision in Patrick Corporation Ltd’s takeover by Toll Holdings Ltd.

The impact of target board recommendations in Australian takeovers

This paper examines the impact of targe board recommendations on the probability of the bid being successful in the Australian takeovers context. Specifically, we model the success rate of the bid as a binary dependent variable and target board recommendations or the board hostility as our key independent variable by using logistic regression framework. Our model also includes bid structures and conditions variables (such as initial bid premium, bid conditions, toehold, and interlocking relationship) and bid events (such as panel and bid duration) as our control variables. Overall, we find board hostility has statistically significant negative effect on the success rate of the bid and almost all control variables (except for the initial bid premium) are statistically significant with the correct sign. That is, we find toehold, the percentage of share required to make the bid becomes successful, and the unconditional bid have positive impact on the success rate of the bid, at least as predictive determinants prior to the release of any hostile recommendation. Consistent with Craswell (2004), we also find the negative relation between interlocking relationship and the success rate of the bid. Our finding supports that from target investors’ point of view, interlock is consistent with the negative story of self interest by directors. Finally, like Walking (1985), we find that the initial bid premium does not have influence on the success rate of the bid. Hence our results reinstate Walking’s bid premium puzzle in Australian context.