Local Utility Functions and Local Probability Transformations

This note shows that, under appropriate conditions, preferences may be locally approximated by the linear utility or risk-neutral preference functional associated with a local probability transformation.

Jointly radial and translation homothetic preferences: generalized constant risk aversion

The paper identifies the structural restrictions on preferences required for them to exhibit both translation homotheticity in particular direction and radial homotheticity. The results are illustrated by an application to an asset allocation problem in the absence of riskless asset.

Invariant risk attitudes

Concepts of constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion have proved useful in the analysis of choice under uncertainty, but are quite restrictive, particularly when they are imposed jointly. A generalization of constant risk aversion, referred to as invariant risk aversion is developed. Invariant risk aversion is closely related to the possibility of representing preferences over state-contingent income vectors in terms of two parameters, the mean and a linearly homogeneous, translation-invariant index of riskiness. The best-known index with such properties is the standard deviation. The properties of the capital asset pricing model, usually expressed in terms of the mean and standard deviation, may be extended to the case of general invariant preferences. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Economics and psychology in the twenty-first century

This paper begins by exploring four different possible forms of relationship between economics and psychology, which have different connotations in terms of the relative status of the two disciplines. It then focuses on the future for one of these, psychological economics. After setting out the hardcore axioms and positive and negative heuristics of a research programme in psychological economics, it explores institutional and psychological barriers to the success of such a research programme in the context of both research and teaching.

Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology

(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149-190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This result depends on the assumption that the technology is given by a stochastic production function with a single scalar input. The object of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Magill and Quinzii to the case of multiple inputs. We show that their main result extends to this general case if and only if, for each firm, the number of linearly independent combinations of securities having payoffs correlated with, but not dependent on, the firms output is equal to the number of degrees of freedom in the firm's production technology.

Interpersonal interaction and economic theory: the case of public goods

Interpersonal interaction in public goods contexts is very different in character to its depiction in economic theory, despite the fact that the standard model is based on a small number of apparently plausible assumptions. Approaches to the problem are reviewed both from within and outside economics. It is argued that quick fixes such as a taste for giving do not provide a way forward. An improved understanding of why people contribute to such goods seems to require a different picture of the relationships between individuals than obtains in standard microeconomic theory, where they are usually depicted as asocial. No single economic model at present is consistent with all the relevant field and laboratory data. It is argued that there are defensible ideas from outside the discipline which ought to be explored, relying on different conceptions of rationality and/or more radically social agents. Three such suggestions are considered, one concerning the expressive/communicative aspect of behaviour, a second the possibility of a part-whole relationship between interacting agents and the third a version of conformism.