Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

When does pain and distress relief hastening death become killing?

This paper discusses the question of when pain and distress relief known to hasten death would cross the line between permissible conduct and killing. The issue is discussed in the context of organ donation after cardiac death, and considers the administration of analgesics, sedatives, and the controversial use of paralysing agents in the provision and withdrawal of ventilation.

Moral vitalism: Seeing good and evil as real, agentic forces

Moral vitalism refers to a tendency to view good and evil as actual forces that can influence people and events. We introduce a scale designed to assess the belief in moral vitalism. High scorers on the scale endorse items such as “There are underlying forces of good and evil in this world”. After establishing the reliability and criterion validity of the scale (Studies 1, 2a, 2b), we examined the predictive validity of the moral vitalism scale, showing that “moral vitalists” worry about being possessed by evil (Study 3), being contaminated through contact with evil people (Study 4), and forfeiting their own mental purity (Study 5). We discuss the nature of moral vitalism and the implications of the construct for understanding the role of metaphysical lay theories about the nature of good and evil in moral reasoning.

Is there such a thing as a love drug?

This paper considers recent discussion of the possible use of ‘love drugs’ and ‘anti-love drugs’ as a way of enhancing or diminishing romantic relationships. The primary focus is on the question of whether the idea of using such products commits its proponents to an excessively reductionist conception of love, and on whether the resulting ‘love’ in the use of ‘love drugs’ would be authentic, to the extent that it would be brought about artificially.

The aesthetico-ethical subject : another narrative about being ethically responsible

This paper builds on work I presented at the PESA conference in 2007, which moved through both aesthetic and ethical theory to generate a new theory of creative integrity around the issues of autonomy, agency and authenticity. This preliminary theorizing had its origins in my undergraduate ethics classroom where I was confronted with advertising students who resisted the idea of being taught ethics, along with all the philosophical ethical theories traditionally used to do this.

The question of ethical decision in marketing and ethics

Resumen: Mientras que el marketing está asociado con prácticas negativas que involucran la explotación y la deshonestidad, Anton Jamnik afirma la necesidad de crear una teoría ética para éste. El artículo intenta brindar, por un lado, un breve bosquejo de las principales corrientes de la literatura de la ética del marketing y, por otro, participar de su desarrollo. El autor analiza los desafíos éticos que sur girán en el futuro, provenientes de tres fuentes distintas: las innovaciones tecnológicas, la influencia de la competencia global y la expansión de las actividades de mercado en áreas no tradicionales. Esto requerirá el desarrollo de una ética normativa realista. Para concluir, explica que la ética del marketing debería analizar hasta qué punto ha sido exitosa a la hora de resolver los desafíos éticos del mundo actual.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.

Ethical relativism vs absolutism : research implications

Purpose – The constructs of relativism and absolutism have a significant role to play in the development of ethical theory; however, they are commonly simplified in their depictions and are philosophically more complex than we give them credit for. The purpose of this paper is to undertake an in-depth examination of ethical relativity and ethical absolutism before concluding with a discussion of which research implications warrant further investigation.
Design/methodology/approach – A descriptive, historical, anthological approach has been taken.
Findings – Ethical relativism is regrettably subject to a proliferation of related terminology and, in many instances with different meanings ascribed to similar terms. In addition, ethical relativity appears to attract different research perspectives that are heavily dependent on their academic origins. A clear distinction needs to be made between ethical and situational relativity. It is suggested that relativism is present in the process of moral justification and that ethical relativism should be analyzed from three levels: the individual level, the role and group level, and the cultural levels. The over-riding objection to ethical relativism rests on the consequences of accepting relativism, which undermines the existence and strength of global moral standards and the inherent positioning of ethical absolutism. Absolutism does not deny the existence of multiple moral practices evident around the world, but proposes that variations in ethical actions could still be rooted in common universal moral standards based on our requirements as human beings and the necessities of long-term survival.
Research limitations/implications – The ensuing discussions of relativism and absolutism open up a rich vein of research opportunities and suggest caution is required in regard to research methodologies. From a methodological perspective, care needs to be taken. For example, using hypothetical ethical dilemmas that are often unrelated to a specific industry or cultural setting has resulted in many researchers observing situational relativity rather than true ethical relativity.
Originality/value – This paper specifically examines whether there are differences in underlying and basic moral standards even though similarities in ethical behaviour have been determined, or whether differing ethical actions could, as the absolutists believe, originate from common universal standards despite apparent differences in perceptions and actions across cultures.

Dignity, virtue and punishment : the ethical justification of disciplinary segregation in prisoners

In this paper I reflect on Bersot and Arrigo’s argument that virtue ethics provides a sound ethical theory to guide judicial decisions concerning the legitimacy of subjecting mentality disordered offenders to long-term disciplinary solitary confinement. I expand on three issues evident in the Bersot and Arrigo paper: (1) the nature and justification of punishment; (2) the concept of dignity and its relevance to mentally disordered offenders placed in disciplinary solitary confinement, and (3) the nature and scope of virtue theory in the criminal justice context.

Ethos and Ideology of Knowledge Organization: Toward Precepts for and Engaged Knowledge Organization Drawing on The Arts and Crafts Movement, Critical Theory, and Žižek

Ethos is the spirit that motivates ideas and practices. When we talk casually about the ethos of a town, state, or country we are describing the fundamental or at least underlying rationale for action, as we see it. Ideology is a way of looking at things.It is the set of ideas that constitute one’s goals, expectations, and actions. In this brief essay I want to create a space where we might talk about the ethos and ideology in knowledge organization from a particular point of view; combining ideas and inspiration from the Arts and Crafts movement of the early Twentieth Century, critical theory in extant knowledge organization work, the work of Slavoj Žižek, and the work of Thich Nhat Hahn on Engaged Buddhism.I will expand more below, but we can say here and now that there are many open questions about ethos and ideology in and of knowledge organization, both its practice and products. Many of them in classification, positioned as they are around identity politics of race, gender, and other marginalized groups, ask the classificationist to be mindful of the choice of terms and relationships between terms. From this work we understand that race and gender requires special consideration, which manifests as a particular concern for the form of representation inside extant schemes. Even with these advances in our understanding there are still other categories about which we must make decisions and take action. For example, there are ethical decisions about fiduciary resource allocation, political decisions about standards adoption, and even broader zeitgeist considerations like the question of Fordist conceptions (Day, 2001; Tennis 2006) of the mechanics of description and representation present in much of today’s practice.Just as taking action in a particular way is an ethical concern, so too is avoiding a lack of action. Scholars in Knowledge Organization have also looked at the absence of what we might call right action in the context of cataloguing and classification. This leads to some problems above, and hints at larger ethical concerns of watching a subtle semantic violence go on without intervention (Bowker and Star, 2001; Bade 2006).The problem is not to act or not act, but how to act or not act in an ethical way, or at least with ethical considerations. The action advocated by an ethical consideration for knowledge organization is an engaged one, and it is here where we can take a nod from contemporary ethical theory advanced by Engaged Buddhism. In this context we can see the manifestation of fourteen precepts that guide ethical action, and warn against lack of action.

Uncertainties that matter : risk, response-ability, ethics and the moment of exchange in Live Art

This article examines the moment of exchange between artist, audience and culture in Live Art. Drawing on historical and contemporary examples, including examples from the Exist in 08 Live Art Event in Brisbane, Australia, in October 2008, it argues that Live Art - be it body art, activist art, site-specific performance, or other sorts of performative intervention in the public sphere - is characterised by a common set of claims about activating audiences, asking them to reflect on cultural norms challenged in the work. Live Art presents risky actions, in a context that blurs the boundaries between art and reality, to position audients as ‘witnesses’ who are personally implicated in, and responsible for, the actions unfolding before them. This article problematises assumptions about the way the uncertainties embedded in the Live Art encounter contribute to its deconstructive agenda. It uses the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas, Hans-Thies Lehmann and Dwight Conquergood to examine the mechanics of reductive, culturally-recuperative readings that can limit the efficacy of the Live Art encounter. It argues that, though ‘witnessing’ in Live Art depends on a relation to the real - real people, taking real risks, in real places - if it fails to foreground theatrical frame it is difficult for audients to develop the dual consciousness of the content, and their complicity in that content, that is the starting point for reflexivity, and response-ability, in the ethical encounter.