Seeing music performance : visual influences on perception and experience

Drawing from ethnographic, empirical, and historical / cultural perspectives, we examine the extent to which visual aspects of music contribute to the communication that takes place between performers and their listeners. First, we introduce a framework for understanding how media and genres shape aural and visual experiences of music. Second, we present case studies of two performances, and describe the relation between visual and aural aspects of performance. Third, we report empirical evidence that visual aspects of performance reliably influence perceptions of musical structure (pitch related features) and affective interpretations of music. Finally, we trace new and old media trajectories of aural and visual dimensions of music, and highlight how our conceptions, perceptions and appreciation of music are intertwined with technological innovation and media deployment strategies.

Childhood and social interaction in everyday life : an epilogue

The epilogue pulls together the conceptual and methodological significance of the papers in the special issue exploring childhood and social interaction in everyday life in Sweden, Norway, United States and Australia. In considering the special issue, four domains of childhood are identified and discussed: childhood is a social construct where children learn how to enter into and participate in their social organizations, competency is best understood when communicative practices are examined in situ, children’s talk and interaction show situated culture in action, and childhood consists of shared social orders between children and adults. Emerging analytic interests are proposed, including investigating how children understand locations and place. Finally, the epilogue highlights the core focus of this special issue, which is showing children’s own methods for making sense of their everyday contexts using the interactional and cultural resources they have to hand.

Mitigating Democracy and 'A Question on Reason'

This book details the early political philosophy of Jean-Paul Gagnon. It deals with the ideas of democracy as something endemic to human nature; with practical methods for the improvement of democracy; and a mix of other political concepts. The book also has a response to the Russian Federation's development of the 'mother of all bombs' which leads Gagnon to question reason itself in humanity's progress.

Omissions, causation and responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share, and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads them both to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility, and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law’s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.

Intention, foresight and ending life : a response to "The Double Effect effect" by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope, (CQ 20(1))

In this paper I examine the recent arguments by Charles Foster, Jonathan Herring, Karen Melham and Tony Hope against the utility of the doctrine of double effect. One basis on which they reject the utility of the doctrine is their claim that it is notoriously difficult to apply what they identify as its 'core' component, namely, the distinction between intention and foresight. It is this contention that is the primarily focus of my article. I argue against this claim that the intention/foresight distinction remains a fundamental part of the law in those jurisdictions where intention remains an element of the offence of murder and that, accordingly, it is essential ro resolve the putative difficulties of applying the intention/foresight distinction so as to ensure the integrity of the law of murder. I argue that the main reasons advanced for the claim that the intention/foresight distinction is difficult to apply are ultimately unsustainable, and that the distinction is not as difficult to apply as the authors suggest.

When does pain and distress relief hastening death become killing?

This paper discusses the question of when pain and distress relief known to hasten death would cross the line between permissible conduct and killing. The issue is discussed in the context of organ donation after cardiac death, and considers the administration of analgesics, sedatives, and the controversial use of paralysing agents in the provision and withdrawal of ventilation.

No Exit

Jean Paul Sartre’s 1944 play No Exit comes alive in this new English adaptation by academics and theatre practitioners Caroline Heim and Christian Heim. It is the most complete articulation of the ideals of Sartre’s existentialism. No Exit is an absurdist play about three people who meet in hell. This new adaptation premiered at the World Psychotherapy Congress in Darling Harbour, Sydney in August 2011. The production integrated and extended Sartre's concepts of "The Gaze", "Love and Sadism" and "Nothingness." Post-performance discussions were held after the performances to explore the discourses of the play.

The Socratic classroom : reflective thinking through collaborative inquiry

This book was written to serve two functions. First it is an exploration of what I have called Socratic pedagogy, a collaborative inquiry-based approach to teaching and learning suitable not only to formal educational settings such as the school classroom but to all educational settings. The term is intended to capture a variety of philosophical approaches to classroom practice that could broadly be described Socratic in form. The term ‘philosophy in schools’ is ambiguous and could refer to teaching university style philosophy to high school students or to the teaching of philosophy and logic or critical reasoning in senior years of high school. It is also used to describe the teaching of philosophy in schools generally. In the early and middle phases of schooling the term philosophy for children is often used. But this too is ambiguous as the name was adopted from Matthew Lipman’s Philosophy for Children curriculum that he and his colleagues at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children developed. In Britain the term ‘philosophy with children’ is sometimes employed to mark two methods of teaching that have Socratic roots but have distinct differences, namely Philosophy for Children and Socratic Dialogue developed by Leonard Nelson. The use of the term Socratic pedagogy and its companion term Socratic classroom (to refer to the kind of classroom that employs Socratic teaching) avoids the problem of distinguishing between various approaches to philosophical inquiry in the Socratic tradition but also separates it from the ‘study of philosophy’, such as university style philosophy or other approaches which place little or no emphasis on collaborative inquiry based teaching and learning. The second function builds from the first. It is to develop an effective framework for understanding the relationship between what I call the generative, evaluative and connective aspects of communal dialogue, which I think are necessary to the Socratic notion of inquiry. In doing so it is hoped that this book offers some way to show how philosophy as inquiry can contribute to educational theory and practice, while also demonstrating how it can be an effective way to approach teaching and learning. This has meant striking a balance between speaking to philosophers and to teachers and educators together, with the view that both see the virtues of such a project. In the strictest sense this book is not philosophy of education, insofar as its chief focus is not on the analysis of concepts or formulation of definitions specific to education with the aim of formulating directives that guide educational practice. It relinquishes the role of philosopher as ‘spectator’, to one of philosopher ‘immersed in matter’ – in this case philosophical issues in education, specifically those related to philosophical inquiry, pedagogy and classroom practice. Put another way, it is a book about philosophical education.

The potentiality of the embryo and the somatic cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to posses—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.

Is there such a thing as a love drug?

This paper considers recent discussion of the possible use of ‘love drugs’ and ‘anti-love drugs’ as a way of enhancing or diminishing romantic relationships. The primary focus is on the question of whether the idea of using such products commits its proponents to an excessively reductionist conception of love, and on whether the resulting ‘love’ in the use of ‘love drugs’ would be authentic, to the extent that it would be brought about artificially.