How can computer simulations produce new knowledge?

It is often claimed that scientists can obtain new knowledge about nature by running computer simulations. How is this possible? I answer this question by arguing that computer simulations are arguments. This view parallels Norton’s argument view about thought experiments. I show that computer simulations can be reconstructed as arguments that fully capture the epistemic power of the simulations. Assuming the extended mind hypothesis, I furthermore argue that running the computer simulation is to execute the reconstructing argument. I discuss some objections and reject the view that computer simulations produce knowledge because they are experiments. I conclude by comparing thought experiments and computer simulations, assuming that both are arguments.

Why Monte Carlo Simulations are Inferences and not Experiments

Monte Carlo simulations arrive at their results by introducing randomness, sometimes derived from a physical randomizing device. Nonetheless, we argue, they open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. We show that Monte Carlo simulations cannot produce knowledge other than by inference, and that they resemble other computer simulations in the manner in which they derive their conclusions. Simple examples of Monte Carlo simulations are analysed to identify the underlying inferences.

Good just isn't Good enough. Best System Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics

Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two strategies, viz. a globalist as suggested by Loewer, and a localist as advocated by Frigg and Hoefer. Both strategies fail because the system they are part of have rivals that are roughly equally good, while ontic probabilities should be part of a clearly winning system. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.

Statistical Methods and the Meaning of Probabilities. A Philosopher Looks at Statistics

The talk starts out with a short introduction to the philosophy of probability. I highlight the need to interpret probabilities in the sciences and motivate objectivist accounts of probabilities. Very roughly, according to such accounts, ascriptions of probabilities have truth-conditions that are independent of personal interests and needs. But objectivist accounts are pointless if they do not provide an objectivist epistemology, i.e., if they do not determine well-defined methods to support or falsify claims about probabilities. In the rest of the talk I examine recent philosophical proposals for an objectivist methodology. Most of them take up ideas well-known from statistics. I nevertheless find some proposals incompatible with objectivist aspirations.

Representation via Probabilities: Models of Probabilistic Modeling

How do probabilistic models represent their targets and how do they allow us to learn about them? The answer to this question depends on a number of details, in particular on the meaning of the probabilities involved. To classify the options, a minimalist conception of representation (Su\'arez 2004) is adopted: Modelers devise substitutes (``sources'') of their targets and investigate them to infer something about the target. Probabilistic models allow us to infer probabilities about the target from probabilities about the source. This leads to a framework in which we can systematically distinguish between different models of probabilistic modeling. I develop a fully Bayesian view of probabilistic modeling, but I argue that, as an alternative, Bayesian degrees of belief about the target may be derived from ontic probabilities about the source. Remarkably, some accounts of ontic probabilities can avoid problems if they are supposed to apply to sources only.

Hat der Raum-Relationalismus Hand und Fuss? Händigkeit und andere Herausforderungen für den Relationalismus

Eine rechte Hand unterscheidet sich von einer linken Hand. Diese bekannte Tatsache hat nach Kant philosophische Implikationen: Sie bringt den sog. Relationalismus in Schwierigkeiten. Dieser sieht den Raum als Inbegriff räumlicher Beziehungen zwischen materiellen Gegenständen. Für Kant kann der Relationalismus nun nicht zwischen linken und rechten Händen unterscheiden. Aber stimmt das wirklich? Und wie ist der Relationalismus vor dem Hintergrund der modernen Physik zu beurteilen? Der Vortrag entfaltet ausgehend von Kants Überlegungen zur Händigkeit die Debatte um den Relationalismus.

More than just Good Luck. How to Explain the Success of Monte Carlo Simulations

Monte Carlo simulation is a powerful method in many natural and social sciences. But what sort of method is it? And where does its power come from? Are Monte Carlo simulations experiments, theories or something else? The aim of this talk is to answer these questions and to explain the power of Monte Carlo simulations. I provide a classification of Monte Carlo techniques and defend the claim that Monte Carlo simulation is a sort of inference.