q-Leibniz Algebras

2000 Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary 17A32, Secondary 17D25.

Multi-temporal shoreline change rates on Taku Atoll

Recent-past shoreline changes on reef islands are now subject to intensified monitoring via remote sensing data. Based on these data, rates of shoreline change calculated from long-term measurements (decadal) are often markedly lower than recent short-term rates (over a number of years). This observation has raised speculations about the growing influence of sea-level rise on reef island stability. This observation, however, can also be explained if we consider two basic principles of geomorphology and sedimentology. For Takú Atoll, Papua New Guinea, we show that natural shoreline fluctuations of dynamic reef islands have a crucial influence on the calculation of short-term rates of change. We analyze an extensive dataset of multitemporal shoreline change rates from 1943 to 2012 and find that differing rates between long- and short-term measurements consistently reflect the length of the observation interval. This relationship appears independent from the study era and indicates that reef islands were equally dynamic during the early periods of analysis, i.e. before the recent acceleration of sea-level rise. Consequently, we suggest that high rates of shoreline change calculated from recent short-term observations may simply result from a change in temporal scale and a shift from geomorphic equilibrium achieved over cyclic time towards an apparent disequilibrium during shorter periods of graded time. This new interpretation of short- and long-term shoreline change rates has important implications for the ongoing discussion about reef island vulnerability, showing that an observed jump from low to high rates of change may be independent from external influences, including but not limited to sea-level rise.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 627 - Unterlagen zu den Vorlesungen "Über den Begriff der Seele seit Leibniz", "Einleitung in die Philosophie" und "Die Aufklärung" (p. VIII 45-VIII 47,1-2)

"Über den Begriff der Seele seit Leibniz" (GS 13, S. 515-569), Vorlesung Sommersemester 1958, Hilmar Tillack: Ausgearbeitete Nachschrift der Vorlesung von Max Horkheimer, Typoskript, 49 Blatt; "Einleitung in die Philosophie", Vorlesung Sommersemester 1959, Max Horkheimer: 1 Heft, eigene Notizen, 8 Blatt, davon 4 leer und 3 zusätzliche Blätter; Hilmar Tillack: Ausgearbeitete Nachschrift der Vorlesung Max Horkheimers, Typoskript 107 Blatt; "Die Aufklärung" (GS 13, S. 570-645), Vorlesung und Proseminar Wintersemester 1959/60, Max Horkheimer: eigenhändige Notizen, 1 Heft, 40 Blatt, davon 23 leer und 21 zusätzliche Blätter (GS 14, S. 146, 145-155); Hilmar Tillack: Ausgearbeitete Nachschrift der Vorlesung Max Horkheimers, Typoskript 70 Blatt;

G.W. Leibniz and Scientific Societies

The famous philosopher Leibniz (1646-1716) was also active in the (cultural) politics of his time. His interest in forming scientific societies never waned and his efforts led to the founding of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. He also played a part in the founding of the Dresden Academy of Science and the St. Petersburg Academy of Science. Though Leibniz's models for the scientific society were the Royal Society and the Royal Science Academy of France, his pansophistic vision of scientific cooperation sometimes took on utopian dimensions. In this paper, I will present Leibniz's ideas of scientific cooperation as a kind of religious activity and discuss his various schemes for the founding of such scientific societies.

Réfutation inédite de Spinoza / par Leibniz. précédée d'un Mémoire / par A. Foucher de Careil

Comprend : Mémoire sur la réfutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibniz

Perception, aperception et conscience chez Leibniz

Cet article propose une interprétation de certains passages qui posent un problème de cohérence dans la théorie leibnizienne de la perception et de l’aperception. C’est le cas notamment d’un passage des Nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain (1704), qui accorde aux animaux l’aperception, et du quatrième paragraphe des Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce (1710), où Leibniz semble plutôt faire coïncider aperception et réflexion, celle-ci étant pourtant réservée aux esprits raisonnables ailleurs dans son œuvre. Afin d’éviter la contradiction, notre interprétation donne une crédibilité particulière au passage des Nouveaux essais en défendant l’idée que Leibniz accorde l’aperception aux animaux, mais réserve la réflexion aux esprits. Nous tâcherons aussi de rendre évident comment certains passages semblant contredire cette position peuvent néanmoins être interprétés en ce sens.

Sistema em Leibniz e Descartes

Descartes concebe que a verdadeira ordem científica é a ordem das razões, na qual se parte das verdades mais fáceis e evidentes em direção às mais difíceis e complexas. Assim, estabelece-se uma ordem única, progressiva e irreversível, onde cada membro da cadeia depende daqueles que o antecederam, de modo que cada tese possui um lugar não-intercambiável dentro da doutrina. Leibniz, ao contrário, defende que "[...] uma mesma verdade pode ter vários lugares, conforme as diferentes relações que pode possuir" (Novos Ensaios, IV, XXI, § 4). A fim de evitar as repetições, reunindo-se o máximo de verdades no mínimo de volumes, o autor propõe que a melhor ordem científica é a disposição sistemática das matérias, que consiste em uma organização do saber na qual cada lugar reenvia a outros, tornando clara a conexão entre os conhecimentos. Em contraposição ao modelo de sistema cartesiano, no modelo leibniziano, as teses se fundamentam mutuamente e a ordem das verdades estabelecidas é reversível. Ora, é devido a essas diferenças na concepção de sistema que Leibniz, ao contrário de Descartes, pode pretender tomar o que há de melhor nos sistemas legados pela tradição para constituir o seu próprio sistema, já que para ele há uma certa maleabilidade na constituição do sistema filosófico.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 620 - Notizhefte zu Vorlesungen und Seminaren (p. VIII 34-VIII 39)

Notizheft mit eigenhändigen Notizen, u.a. über Scheeler, Heidegger, Hegel, zu Diskussionen über Metaphysik mit Tillich, Adorno, Stoltenberg, Riezler, Gelb, Mannheim, 1 Heft, 27 Blatt, davon 18 leer, und 5 zusätzliche Blätter; Notizheft mit eigenhändigen Notizen zur Einführung in die Philosophie, größtenteils zur Philosophie Kants, 1 Heft, 32 Blatt, davon 1 leer; Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie seit dem 17. Jahrhundert bis zu Kant, Vorlesungsmanuskript, 1 Heft, 63 Blatt; Über Hegel, Manuskript für einen Vortrag in der Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft in Frankfurt am Main, 1 Heft, 13 Blatt; Über Spinoza und Leibniz, Manuskript, 1 Heft, 16 Blatt; Über Phänomenologie, Manuskript, 4 Blatt;