Communication and Economic Growth.

Overs the past millennium, each of the three centuries of most rapid demographic growth in the West Coincided with the diffusion of a new communications technology. This paper examines the hypothesis of Harold Innis (1894-1952) that there is two-way feeback between such innovations and economic growth.

Essays on industrial organization

Esta tese compõe-se de três ensaios que versam sobre o formato, em termos de estrutura de governança, das indústrias e como a estrutura interna das mesmas in fluenciam esses formatos e seus produtos. O primeiro capítulo apresenta um modelo de como a qualidade institucional, confiança e incompleteza contratual afetam as decisiões das firmas sobre a melhor forma de se organizarem internacionalmente. O segundo capítulo vai na mesma direcão de explicar a organização das indústrias, mas com foco no efeito da transmissão de informação entre as unidades constituintes das organizações sobre o formato ótimo das mesmas. Ambos trabalhos usam modelos dinâmicos. O terceiro capítulo se utiliza da modelagem de organização industrial para mostrar como a estrutura interna de uma indústria in fluencia no risco de crédito consignado.

Essays on Industrial Organization and Environmental Economics

This dissertation studies environmental regulation issues in the hog production industry as well as forces behind the reorganization of the industry during the past two decades. Federal and State-level environmental regulations imposed on U.S. hog production during the year 2003 are examined in Chapter 1. Based on the number of regulations passed by the Federal government and states, the 2003 regulatory index is constructed. The regulatory stringency index suggests that state-level regulations vary across states and have increased over the years. In addition, state-level regulations are more stringent than federal regulations. Chapter 2 develops an empirically implementable theoretical model which allows us to investigate the long-run effects of environmental regulations on the U.S. hog industry. Hog feeding operations (HFOs) are divided into large feeding operations (LHFOs) and small feeding operations (SHFOs). The impact of the presence of a large number of LHFOs on the entry and exit of CHFOs is also examined. Results of this study suggest that: Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of SHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of LHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the number of SHFOs; SHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; LHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; the number of SHFOs significantly increases in states that have a greater numbers of LHFOs; regulation increases the average SHFO size; and regulation decreases the average LHFO size. Chapter 3 examines the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, agglomeration economies and environmental regulations on the reorganization of U.S. hog production for a panel of 22 U.S. hog producing states which include, Northern states, Southern states and Midwest states for the period 1994-2006. Results from this study suggest that: Hog production in a state is positively affected by hog production in a nearby state, confirming the presence of agglomeration economies; Environmental regulations and high corn price have negative effects on state-level U.S. hog production; High hog prices, and favorable labor cost, and land values attract hog production; and transportation cost has no effect on hog production. Advisors: Azzeddine Azzam and Karina Schoengold

A Divergent Path of Industrial Upgrading: Emergence and Evolution of the Mobile Handset Industry in China

Starting from almost null in the late 1990s, China's mobile phone handset industry has grown to account for more than 40 percent of the current world production. While export growth has been overwhelmingly led by multi-national corporations (MNCs), increasingly fierce competition in the domestic market ignited by the advent of local handset makers has induced unique industrial evolution: (1) outgrowth of independent design houses specialized in handset development and (2) emergence of IC fabless ventures that design core ICs for handsets. In the background of this evolutionary industrial growth there are factors such as, the scale and increasing diversity of China's domestic market that advantages local firms vis-a-vis MNCs; modularization of handset and semiconductor technologies; policy interventions that supports local startups. The emergence and evolution of China's handset industry is likely to have international implications as the growth of the global demand for low-cost and multi-function mobile phone handsets is expected to accelerate. Thus, our case suggests that the conventional view of latecomer industrialization and upgrading that emphasizes the key role of international production networks organized by MNCs needs to be modified in order to accommodate China's rise into perspective.

Essays in Industrial Organization

This dissertation extends the empirical industrial organization literature with two essays on strategic decisions of firms in imperfectly competitive markets and one essay on how inertia in consumer choice can result in significant welfare losses. Using data from the airline industry I study a well-known puzzle in the literature whereby incumbent firms decrease fares when Southwest Airlines emerges as a potential entrant, but is not (yet) competing directly. In the first essay I describe this so-called Southwest Effect and use reduced-form analysis to offer possible explanations for why firms may choose to forgo profits today rather than wait until Southwest operates the route. The analysis suggests that incumbent firms are attempting to signal to Southwest that entry is unprofitable so as to deter its entry. The second essay develops this theme by extending a classic model from the IO literature, limit pricing, to a dynamic setting. Calibrations indicate the price cuts observed in the data can be captured by a dynamic limit pricing model. The third essay looks at another concentrated industry, mobile telecoms, and studies how inertia in choice (be it inattention or switching costs) can lead to consumers being on poorly matched cellphone plans and how a simple policy proposal can have a considerable effect on welfare.

Essays on Energy Economics and Industrial Organization

The dissertation consists of three chapters related to the low-price guarantee marketing strategy and energy efficiency analysis. The low-price guarantee is a marketing strategy in which firms promise to charge consumers the lowest price among their competitors. Chapter 1 addresses the research question "Does a Low-Price Guarantee Induce Lower Prices'' by looking into the retail gasoline industry in Quebec where there was a major branded firm which started a low-price guarantee back in 1996. Chapter 2 does a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to drive police indications and offers a new explanation of the firms' incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Chapter 3 develops the energy performance indicators (EPIs) to measure energy efficiency of the manufacturing plants in pulp, paper and paperboard industry.

Chapter 1 revisits the traditional view that a low-price guarantee results in higher prices by facilitating collusion. Using accurate market definitions and station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I conducted a descriptive analysis based on stations and price zones to compare the price and sales movement before and after the guarantee was adopted. I find that, contrary to the traditional view, the stores that offered the guarantee significantly decreased their prices and increased their sales. I also build a difference-in-difference model to quantify the decrease in posted price of the stores that offered the guarantee to be 0.7 cents per liter. While this change is significant, I do not find the response in comeptitors' prices to be significant. The sales of the stores that offered the guarantee increased significantly while the competitors' sales decreased significantly. However, the significance vanishes if I use the station clustered standard errors. Comparing my observations and the predictions of different theories of modeling low-price guarantees, I conclude the empirical evidence here supports that the low-price guarantee is a simple commitment device and induces lower prices.

Chapter 2 conducts a consumer welfare analysis of low-price guarantees to address the antitrust concerns and potential regulations from the government; explains the firms' potential incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee. Using station-level data from the retail gasoline industry in Quebec, I estimated consumers' demand of gasoline by a structural model with spatial competition incorporating the low-price guarantee as a commitment device, which allows firms to pre-commit to charge the lowest price among their competitors. The counterfactual analysis under the Bertrand competition setting shows that the stores that offered the guarantee attracted a lot more consumers and decreased their posted price by 0.6 cents per liter. Although the matching stores suffered a decrease in profits from gasoline sales, they are incentivized to adopt the low-price guarantee to attract more consumers to visit the store likely increasing profits at attached convenience stores. Firms have strong incentives to adopt a low-price guarantee on the product that their consumers are most price-sensitive about, while earning a profit from the products that are not covered in the guarantee. I estimate that consumers earn about 0.3% more surplus when the low-price guarantee is in place, which suggests that the authorities should not be concerned and regulate low-price guarantees. In Appendix B, I also propose an empirical model to look into how low-price guarantees would change consumer search behavior and whether consumer search plays an important role in estimating consumer surplus accurately.

Chapter 3, joint with Gale Boyd, describes work with the pulp, paper, and paperboard (PP&PB) industry to provide a plant-level indicator of energy efficiency for facilities that produce various types of paper products in the United States. Organizations that implement strategic energy management programs undertake a set of activities that, if carried out properly, have the potential to deliver sustained energy savings. Energy performance benchmarking is a key activity of strategic energy management and one way to enable companies to set energy efficiency targets for manufacturing facilities. The opportunity to assess plant energy performance through a comparison with similar plants in its industry is a highly desirable and strategic method of benchmarking for industrial energy managers. However, access to energy performance data for conducting industry benchmarking is usually unavailable to most industrial energy managers. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), through its ENERGY STAR program, seeks to overcome this barrier through the development of manufacturing sector-based plant energy performance indicators (EPIs) that encourage U.S. industries to use energy more efficiently. In the development of the energy performance indicator tools, consideration is given to the role that performance-based indicators play in motivating change; the steps necessary for indicator development, from interacting with an industry in securing adequate data for the indicator; and actual application and use of an indicator when complete. How indicators are employed in EPA’s efforts to encourage industries to voluntarily improve their use of energy is discussed as well. The chapter describes the data and statistical methods used to construct the EPI for plants within selected segments of the pulp, paper, and paperboard industry: specifically pulp mills and integrated paper & paperboard mills. The individual equations are presented, as are the instructions for using those equations as implemented in an associated Microsoft Excel-based spreadsheet tool.

Competitor Information andCompetitive Knowledge Management in a Large Industrial Organization

Thisthesis supplements the systematic approach to competitive intelligence and competitor analysis by introducing an information-processing perspective on management of the competitive environment and competitors therein. The cognitive questions connected to the intelligence process and also the means that organizational actors use in sharing information are discussed. The ultimate aim has been to deepen knowledge of the different intraorganizational processes that are used in acorporate organization to manage and exploit the vast amount of competitor information that is received from the environment. Competitor information and competitive knowledge management is examined as a process, where organizational actorsidentify and perceive the competitive environment by using cognitive simplification, make interpretations resulting in learning and finally utilize competitor information and competitive knowledge in their work processes. The sharing of competitive information and competitive knowledge is facilitated by intraorganizational networks that evolve as a means of developing a shared, organizational level knowledge structure and ensuring that the right information is in the right place at the right time. This thesis approaches competitor information and competitive knowledge management both theoretically and empirically. Based on the conceptual framework developed by theoretical elaboration, further understanding of the studied phenomena is sought by an empirical study. The empirical research was carried out in a multinationally operating forest industry company. This thesis makes some preliminary suggestions of improving the competitive intelligence process. It is concluded that managing competitor information and competitive knowledge is not simply a question of managing information flow or improving sophistication of competitor analysis, but the crucial question to be solved is rather, how to improve the cognitive capabilities connected to identifying and making interpretations of the competitive environment and how to increase learning. It is claimed that competitive intelligence can not be treated like an organizational function or assigned solely to a specialized intelligence unit.

Essays in Industrial Organization

This dissertation comprises four essays on the topic of industrial organization and environmental economics. The first essay investigates the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a differential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. In the second essay, using the same approach as the first one, we study the profitability of horizontal merger of firms where the demand function is nonlinear. We take into consideration the open-loop equilibrium. The third essay studies the profitability of exogenous output constraint in a differential game model with price dynamics under the feedback strategies. The fourth essay investigates a second-best trade agreement between two countries when pollution spillovers are asymmetric to examine the strategic behavior of governments in using pollution taxes and tariffs under trade liberalization.

Essays in Industrial Organization and Information Technology

Chapter 1 studies how consumers’ switching costs affect the pricing and profits of firms competing in two-sided markets such as Apple and Google in the smartphone market. When two-sided markets are dynamic – rather than merely static – I show that switching costs lower the first-period price if network externalities are strong, which is in contrast to what has been found in one-sided markets. By contrast, switching costs soften price competition in the initial period if network externalities are weak and consumers are more patient than the platforms. Moreover, an increase in switching costs on one side decreases the first-period price on the other side. Chapter 2 examines firms’ incentives to invest in local and flexible resources when demand is uncertain and correlated. I find that market power of the monopolist providing flexible resources distorts investment incentives, while competition mitigates them. The extent of improvement depends critically on demand correlation and the cost of capacity: under social optimum and monopoly, if the flexible resource is cheap, the relationship between investment and correlation is positive, and if it is costly, the relationship becomes negative; under duopoly, the relationship is positive. The analysis also sheds light on some policy discussions in markets such as cloud computing. Chapter 3 develops a theory of sequential investments in cybersecurity. The regulator can use safety standards and liability rules to increase security. I show that the joint use of an optimal standard and a full liability rule leads to underinvestment ex ante and overinvestment ex post. Instead, switching to a partial liability rule can correct the inefficiencies. This suggests that to improve security, the regulator should encourage not only firms, but also consumers to invest in security.

Domestic Market-based Industrial Cluster Development in Modern China

China’s huge domestic market is constantly expanding, and is low-end demand oriented and highly dispersed. The domestic market-based development of China’s industrial cluster, however, is not only a quantitative expansion, but has also been accompanied with remarkable qualitative upgrading. Specialized markets are a microcosm that clearly indicate this paradoxical phenomenon. By analyzing three typical cases of industrial clusters that have specialized markets, this paper will make the case that under modern China’s market conditions, the local public sector is the crucial driving force for upgrading industrial clusters, which organize complicated transactions, promote quality control, and stimulate the division of labor.