890 resultados para [JEL:G34] Financial Economics - Corporate Finance and Governance - Mergers
Resumo:
It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.
Resumo:
L’objectif de ce papier est de déterminer les facteurs susceptibles d’expliquer les faillites bancaires au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) entre 1980 et 1995. Utilisant le modèle logit conditionnel sur des données en panel, nos résultats montrent que les variables qui affectent positivement la probabilité de faire faillite des banques sont : i) le niveau d’endettement auprès de la banque centrale; ii) un faible niveau de comptes disponibles et à vue; iii) les portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux par rapport au total des crédits; iv) le faible montant des dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le ratio actifs liquides sur actifs totaux. En revanche, les variables qui contribuent positivement sur la vraisemblance de survie des banques sont les suivantes : i) le ratio capital sur actifs totaux; ii) les bénéfices nets par rapport aux actifs totaux; iii) le ratio crédit total sur actifs totaux; iv) les dépôts à terme à 2 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le niveau des engagements sous forme de cautions et avals par rapport aux actifs totaux. Les ratios portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux et actifs liquides par rapport aux actifs totaux sont les variables qui expliquent la faillite des banques commerciales, alors que ce sont les dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans qui sont à l’origine des faillites des banques de développement. Ces faillites ont été considérablement réduites par la création en 1989 de la commission de réglementation bancaire régionale. Dans l’UEMOA, seule la variable affectée au Sénégal semble contribuer positivement sur la probabilité de faire faillite.
Resumo:
Ce texte présente ce qu’est la décentralisation fiscale, fait ressortir ses forces et ses faiblesses et identifie les raisons de son succès, le tout dans le contexte de huit pays en développement en faisant appel à de l’information sur l’Argentine, la Chine, la Colombie, l’Inde, l’Indonésie, le Maroc, le Pakistan et la Tunisie. Le texte est divisé en trois parties. La première expose les concepts pertinents, la seconde présente un certain nombre d’indicateurs quantitatifs et la troisième évalue les conditions de succès de la décentralisation.
Resumo:
We examine for the first time the association of different measures of ownership and control, and separation ratios with firm’s value and performance for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the period 1998 to 2002. We found that large blockholders exert a positive influence upon firm’s valuation and performance, which validates the positive monitoring approach of large shareholders, but also found that this relation is not monotone implying that when separation of control and ownership tends to increase, a negative effect is exerted on firm’s valuation. Furthermore, we report first estimates of a survey of corporate governance practices conducted in 2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. The index’s scores suggest that implementation of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor as measured by the average of the Index that is below half the maximum attainable value. Regrettably, we did not find any support to recent theories that predict a positive association between good governance practices, measured by the CGI, and performance. At most there exists a positive relationship for sub-index but the results were not statistically significant in general.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.
Resumo:
Although growth opportunities fade and profitability declines as firms mature, older firms are no more likely to be acquired than young firms are. This article documents and explains that phenomenon. We argue that, because mature organizations are rationally less flexible, they are more costly to integrate and therefore comparatively unattractive acquisition candidates. The evidence supports this explanation of the negative age dependence of takeover hazard. The evidence also shows that negative exogenous shocks to merger benefits further reduce the takeover hazard of mature firms. We test many alternative explanations and find no evidence that they can explain the hazard decline.
Resumo:
This paper investigates whether managers rely on dividends to obtain a higher price in a stock offering and whether the stock price reaction to dividend and offering announcements justifies such a coordination. The evidence does not support either conjecture. Issuing firms are not more likely to pay or increase dividends than nonissuing forms. Moreover, there is little evidence that firms time stock offering announcements right after dividend declarations to befefit from the attendant information disclosure. The analysis of dividend and stock offering announcement effects suggests few if any benefits from linking divbidend and stock offering announcements.
Resumo:
We investigate whether insiders of bankrupt firms hold less stock or reduce their stockholdings compared to what we observed for insiders of similar firms that do not go bankrupt. We find little evidence of such time-series and cross-sectional differences in spite of the fact that the stock value of bankrupt firms falls by more than ninety percent in the five years preceding bankruptcy. One implication of our results is that the amount of stock owned and the magnitude of the trades undertaken by corporate insiders of both bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms appear to provide no information about firm value.
Resumo:
La Ley 964 de 2005 modifica la regulación del manejo, el aprovechamiento y la inversión de los recursos que hacen parte del mercado de valores colombiano. En este trabajo se busca llamar la atención sobre las posibles consecuencias que esta ley puede traer sobre las corporaciones en Colombia. Se analizan algunas reformas anteriores del mercado y, separadamente, se describe la configuración de propiedad de las corporaciones colombianas a la luz de ciertos enfoques metodológicos desarrollados en los últimos años (incluyendo la agenda de investigación de La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer y Vishny). Se concluye que, dadas las particularidades del mercado colombiano, la nueva Ley del Mercado de Valores puede favorecer el crecimiento de los fondos de inversión extranjera decididos a incluir a Colombia en su portafolio, pero también puede llegar a transformar el esquema de incentivos de las corporaciones colombianas.
Resumo:
The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature did not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigated the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm’s rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examined the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigated how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results supported the non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examined the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examined the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supported the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examined the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis showed that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.
Resumo:
The increase in the number of financial restatements in recent years has resulted in a significant decrease in the amount of market capitalization for restated companies. Prior literature does not differentiate between single and multiple restatements announcements. This research investigates the inter-relationships among multiple financial restatements, corporate governance, market microstructure and the firm's rate of return in the form of three essays by differentiating between single and multiple restatement announcement companies. First essay examines the stock performance of companies announcing the financial restatement multiple times. The postulation is that prior research overestimates the abnormal return by not separating single restatement companies from multiple restatement companies. This study investigates how market penalizes the companies that announce restatement more than once. Differentiating the restatement announcement data based on number of restatement announcements, the results support for non persistence hypothesis that the market has no memory and negative abnormal returns obtained after each of the restatement announcements are completely random. Second essay examines the multiple restatement announcements and its perceived resultant information asymmetry around the announcement day. This study examines the pattern of information asymmetry for these announcements in terms of whether the bid-ask spread widens around the announcement day. The empirical analysis supports the hypotheses that the spread does widen not only around the first restatement announcement day but around every subsequent announcement days as well. The third essay empirically examines the financial and corporate governance characteristics of single and multiple restatement announcements companies. The analysis shows that corporate governance variables influence the occurrence of multiple restatement announcements and can distinguish multiple restatements announcement companies from single restatement announcement companies.