The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

The Wage Rate and the Profit Rate in the Price of Production Equation: a New Solution to an Old Problem

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.

Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value: Evidence from China’s civilian-run firms

This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s civilian-run firms.

The market structure and characteristics of electronic games

A multi-billion dollar industry, electronic games have been experiencing strong and rapid growth in recent times. The world of games is not only exciting due to the magnificent growth of the industry however, but due to a host of other factors. This chapter explores electronic games, providing an analysis of the industry, key motivators for game play, the game medium and academic research concerning the effects of play. It also reviews the emerging relationship games share with sport, recognizing that they can replicate sports, facilitate sports participation and be played as a sport. These are complex relationships that have not yet been comprehensively studied. The current chapter serves to draw academic attention to the area and presents ideas for future research.

Outsider board activity, ownership structure and firm value : evidence from Korea

Using a sample of publicly listed firm in Korea from 2002 to 2006, this article examines the impact of board monitoring on firm value and productivity. We use outsider's attendance of board meetings as a proxy for board monitoring. Consistent with the commitment hypothesis, we find that outsider's attendance rate increases firm value, suggesting that attending board meeting itself is a strong signal that reflects outsider's intention to monitor insiders. While ownership of controlling shareholders negatively affects firm value, this relationship is not moderated by increased monitoring by outsiders. Our findings provide further evidence that the outside director system is less effective in chaebol-affiliated firms. Results also indicate that the effect of outsider's board monitoring activity on investor's valuation of the firm is greater than on productivity improvement of the firm. Our conclusions are robust for possible endogeneity in the relationship between firm value and board attendance by outside directors.

Individual assets, market structure and the drivers of return

Much prior research on the structure and performance of UK real estate portfolios has relied on aggregated measures for sector and region. For these groupings to have validity, the performance of individual properties within each group should be similar. This paper analyses a sample of 1,200 properties using multiple discriminant analysis and cluster analysis techniques. It is shown that conventional property type and spatial classifications do not capture the variation in return behaviour at the individual building level. The major feature is heterogeneity - but there may be distinctions between growth and income properties and between single and multi-let properties that could help refine portfolio structures.

Individual assets, market structure and the drivers of return

Much UK research and market practice on portfolio strategy and performance benchmarking relies on a sector‐geography subdivision of properties. Prior tests of the appropriateness of such divisions have generally relied on aggregated or hypothetical return data. However, the results found in aggregate may not hold when individual buildings are considered. This paper makes use of a dataset of individual UK property returns. A series of multivariate exploratory statistical techniques are utilised to test whether the return behaviour of individual properties conforms to their a priori grouping. The results suggest strongly that neither standard sector nor regional classifications provide a clear demarcation of individual building performance. This has important implications for both portfolio strategy and performance measurement and benchmarking. However, there do appear to be size and yield effects that help explain return behaviour at the property level.

Managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value

This paper extends prior research to examine the managerial ownership influences on firm performance through the choices of capital structures by using a new sample of S& P 500 firm in 2005. The empirical results of OLS regressions replicate the nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. However, we found that the turning points had moved up in our sample compared with previous papers, which implies that the managerial control for pursuing self-interst, and the alignment of interests between managers and other shareholders can only be achieved now by management holding more ownership in a firm than that found in previous studies. Managerial ownership also drives the capital structure as a nonlinear shape, but with a direction opposite to the shape of firm value. the results of simultaneous regressions suggest that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Capital structure is endogenously determined by bith firm value and managerial ownership; while managerial ownership is not endogenously determined by the other two variables.

Stock market liquidity and firm value : an empirical examination of the Australian market

We document a positive relation between stock liquidity and firm value. We examine the mechanism through which stock market liquidity enhances firm value by dividing firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q, into three components, namely, operating income to price, leverage, and operating income to assets. Using the switch to broker anonymity as an exogenous shock to market liquidity, we show that the increase in liquidity around the shock leads to an increase in firm value. Our results suggest that higher firm value for more liquid stocks seems to stem from enhanced stock prices rather than from better operating performance.

Mexican cement industry (technology, market structure and growth)

Includes bibliography

Argentine cement industry (technology, market structure and growth)

Includes bibliography