Relationship between nurse leader emotional intelligence and registered nurse job satisfaction

Aim: To determine the relationship between nurse leader emotional intelligence and registered nurse job satisfaction. ^ Background: Nurse leaders influence the work environments of nurses working at the bedside. Nursing leadership plays an important role in fostering work environments that attract and retain nurses. ^ Methods: A non-experimental, predictive design study conducted in 5 hospitals evaluated relationships between 31 nurse leaders and 799 registered nurses. The nurse leaders were administered the MSCEIT and MBTI. The registered nurses participated in the 2010 NDNQI RN Job Satisfaction Survey. ^ Measurements and Results: The sample population completed two online instruments, the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) and the Myers Brigg Trait Inventory (MBTI). Nurse leader demographic data was collected consisting of age, sex, race, educational level, certification status and years in the profession of nursing. The relationships among characteristics of the nurse leader and staff nurses were examined using regression analysis and stepwise deletion. The results from the MBTI were obtained electronically from CPP. Inc. and the results of MSCEIT were obtained electronically from MHS, Inc. The nurse leader response rate was 46% and the NDNQI RN Job Satisfaction response rate was 62%. The sample of 31 nurse leaders were 65 percent female and 67.7% were White, 12.9% Black, and 19.4% Hispanic. The most prevalent MBTI type was ESTJ (19.35%), followed by ENFJ and ISFJ (9.68% each). The nurse leader sample was primarily extroverts (n=20), sensing (n=18), thinking (n=16) and judging (n=19). The nurse leaders' overall MSCEIT scores ranged from 69 to 111 (implying a range from those who should consider development to competent) with a mean score of 89.84 (consider improvement). The nurse leaders scored highest in the MSCEIT Facilitating subscale with scores ranging from 69 to 121 (consider development to strength) and a mean score of 95.19 (low average score). The overall mean MSCEIT mean scores for the entire sample ranged from 89.90 to 95.19 (consider emotional intelligence improvement to low average score) Overall, staff nurse participants in the NDNQI RN Job Satisfaction Survey were moderately satisfied with the nurse leaders as noted by a mean t score of 55.03 of 60 and this score was consistent with the comparison hospitals that participated in the 2010 NDNQI RN Job Satisfaction Survey (American Nurses Association, 2010). Staff nurses gave nurse leaders a mean score of 4.50 for patient assignments appropriate, and rated a mean score of 4.35 and moderately agreeing to recommend the hospital to a friend. ^ Conclusions: Future research is needed to determine if there is a relationship between nurse leader emotional intelligence ability and registered nurse job satisfaction. Additional research is also needed to determine what to measure in regards to nurse leader emotional intelligence, ability or behavior. Another issue that emerged in the examination of EI is the moderating relationship between the nurse leaders span of control and staff nurse satisfaction on the NDNQI. ^

The shift of paradigm in the organizations like foundation of the style of ethical leadership

La presente investigación tiene por objeto analizar el cambio de paradigma en las organizaciones como fundamento del liderazgo ético desde una realidad postmoderna a fin de detectar la necesidad de un liderazgo ético en las organizaciones donde los líderes sean formadores de valores a través del modelaje directivo; es un estilo de liderazgo en el que la visión ética, sistémica e integradora son unas de las principales aptitudes que el líder ético ha de poner en la práctica. Se han desarrollado teorías de liderazgo centradas no tanto en los rasgos o comportamientos de los líderes, sino en la relación entre líder y sus seguidores

In vivo function of mutated spliced leader RNAs in Caenorhabditis elegans

The role of spliced leader RNA (SL RNA) in trans-splicing in Caenorhabditis elegans has been studied through a combination of in vitro mutagenesis and in vivo complementation of rrs-1 mutant nematodes, which lack endogenous SL1 RNA. Three classes of mutant SL1 RNAs have been found—those that rescue the lethal phenotype at low concentration of transforming DNA, those that rescue at high but not low concentration, and those that do not rescue at all. These studies showed that some mutations in the otherwise highly conserved 22-nt spliced leader are tolerated for splicing and post-splicing events. A longer spliced leader also can be tolerated but only when present in high copy number. Changes in the first 16 nucleotides result in the appearance of no SL RNA, consistent with the in vitro studies by others showing that the SL1 RNA promoter partly resides within the spliced leader sequence.

Preferential interaction of the his pause RNA hairpin with RNA polymerase β subunit residues 904–950 correlates with strong transcriptional pausing

RNA secondary structures (hairpins) that form as the nascent RNA emerges from RNA polymerase are important components of many signals that regulate transcription, including some pause sites, all ρ-independent terminators, and some antiterminators. At the his leader pause site, a 5-bp-stem, 8-nt-loop pause RNA hairpin forms 11 nt from the RNA 3′ end and stabilizes a transcription complex conformation slow to react with NTP substrate. This stabilization appears to depend at least in part on an interaction with RNA polymerase. We tested for RNA hairpin interaction with the paused polymerase by crosslinking 5-iodoUMP positioned specifically in the hairpin loop. In the paused conformation, strong and unusual crosslinking of the pause hairpin to β904–950 replaced crosslinking to β′ and to other parts of β that occurred in nonpaused complexes prior to hairpin formation. These changes in nascent RNA interactions may inhibit reactive alignment of the RNA 3′ end in the paused complex and be related to events at ρ-independent terminators.

Plastid-localized acetyl-CoA carboxylase of bread wheat is encoded by a single gene on each of the three ancestral chromosome sets

5′-End fragments of two genes encoding plastid-localized acetyl-CoA carboxylase (ACCase; EC 6.4.1.2) of wheat (Triticum aestivum) were cloned and sequenced. The sequences of the two genes, Acc-1,1 and Acc-1,2, are 89% identical. Their exon sequences are 98% identical. The amino acid sequence of the biotin carboxylase domain encoded by Acc-1,1 and Acc-1,2 is 93% identical with the maize plastid ACCase but only 80–84% identical with the cytosolic ACCases from other plants and from wheat. Four overlapping fragments of cDNA covering the entire coding region were cloned by PCR and sequenced. The wheat plastid ACCase ORF contains 2,311 amino acids with a predicted molecular mass of 255 kDa. A putative transit peptide is present at the N terminus. Comparison of the genomic and cDNA sequences revealed introns at conserved sites found in the genes of other plant multifunctional ACCases, including two introns absent from the wheat cytosolic ACCase genes. Transcription start sites of the plastid ACCase genes were estimated from the longest cDNA clones obtained by 5′-RACE (rapid amplification of cDNA ends). The untranslated leader sequence encoded by the Acc-1 genes is at least 130–170 nucleotides long and is interrupted by an intron. Southern analysis indicates the presence of only one copy of the gene in each ancestral chromosome set. The gene maps near the telomere on the short arm of chromosomes 2A, 2B, and 2D. Identification of three different cDNAs, two corresponding to genes Acc-1,1 and Acc-1,2, indicates that all three genes are transcriptionally active.

Transcript leader regions of two Saccharomyces cerevisiae mRNAs contain internal ribosome entry sites that function in living cells

In higher eukaryotes, translation of some mRNAs occurs by internal initiation. It is not known, however, whether this mechanism is used to initiate the translation of any yeast mRNAs. In this report, we identify naturally occurring nucleotide sequences that function as internal ribosome entry sites (IRESes) within the 5′ leader sequences of Saccharomyces cerevisiae YAP1 and p150 mRNAs. When tested in the 5′ untranslated regions of monocistronic reporter genes, both leader sequences enhanced translation efficiency in vegetatively growing yeast cells. Moreover, when tested in the intercistronic region of dicistronic mRNAs, both sequences were shown to contain IRESes that functioned in living cells. The activity of the p150 leader was much greater than that of the YAP1 leader. The second cistron was not expressed in control dicistronic constructs that lacked these sequences or contained the 5′ leader sequence of the CLN3 mRNA in the intercistronic region. Further analyses of the p150 IRES revealed that it contained several nonoverlapping segments that were able independently to mediate internal initiation. These results suggested a modular composition for the p150 IRES that resembled the composition of IRESes contained within some cellular mRNAs of higher eukaryotes. Both YAP1 and p150 leaders contain several complementary sequence matches to yeast 18S rRNA. The findings are discussed in terms of our understanding of internal initiation in higher eukaryotes.

The Superagency Solution

In many parts of the country, hydraulic fracturing has brought energy development onto people’s doorsteps. Efforts by local governments to employ traditional land use mechanisms to study and mitigate some of the impacts of these latest intrusions have erupted into battles over the scope of statewide agencies’ control. Forgotten in this fray are many renewable energy resources. As a general rule, they are not subject to statewide oversight, and consequently renewable energy providers must navigate the myriad of siting and permitting requirements of local jurisdictions. For several years, scholars have urged more statewide renewable energy siting procedures to level the playing field. California is the national leader in renewable energy deployment, yet its statewide energy commission does not have jurisdiction over the siting of photovoltaic solar or wind energy plants. This article explores when statewide siting is beneficial and when it may be contraindicated, making a case for consolidation of all large-scale siting under the purview of California’s “superagency,” the California Energy Commission.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 6, October 2014. EGYPT. The Return to Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Citizenship Rights

Citizenship and democratic rights have been shrinking in Egypt with the rise of president Abd El Fattah El Sisi, widely popular among Egyptians who fear more violence and unrest in an increasingly volatile region. In this EU Spring Policy Brief, Moataz El Fegiery examines the political landscape in the run-up of parliamentary elections, arguing that the short term is likely to see further curtailment of acquired rights, further crackdown on the opposition and consolidation of military power. In the longer term, however, it is in the interest of Egyptian society and institutions as well as of Europe to reverse the politics of exclusion and ensure that freedoms, pluralism and participation prevent the rise of extremism and political violence.

What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 125, 22.01.2014

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to disputes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led movement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden's security policy. OSW Commentary No. 126, 28.01.2014

Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on defence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish parliament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite concerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future direction of the country’s security and defence policy. It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a greater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant strengthening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.

No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014

The North Caucasus has been the most unstable region of the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Considering the scale of violence, the conflict in the region should be regarded as a local civil war between the Salafi Islamic armed underground and the secular authorities of the North Caucasus republics, supported by the security services. The Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, who has made himself de facto independent from Moscow, holds a particularly strong position in the region and his ambition is to gain control of the neighbouring territories. The Russian leadership, which sees the security of the Winter Olympics in Sochi as its top priority, is facing a strategic choice between trying to integrate the North Caucasus with the rest of the federation, or isolating the region and accepting the existence of an informal "internal abroad” within Russia. The cultural processes taking place in the region, including Islamisation, de-modernisation and de-Russification, have been driving the North Caucasus ever further away from the rest of Russia, strengthening a mutual sense of foreignness.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Slovakia: the Eurogroup’s enfant terrible. OSW Commentary No. 63, 2011-10-14

When Slovakia’s parliament rejected the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) reform on 11 October it undermined Slovakia’s reputation as a credible partner within the EU. Moreover, Prime Minister Iveta Radicova combined the vote on the strengthening of the EFSF – a key anti-crisis mechanism in the Eurozone – with a vote of confidence for her cabinet. This eventually led to the collapse of the government. Before Slovakia’s decision, the strengthening of the EFSF had been endorsed by the national parliaments of all the eurozone countries. Slovakia, which had opted to be the last one to carry out the ratification procedure, adopted the EFSF reform only in a re-vote on 13 October, due to the support of the opposition left-wing party. However, problems with ratification have cast a shadow over the achievements of Slovakia which as one of the freshest members of the eurozone had been actively seeking to influence the creation of EU mechanisms for dealing with the debt crisis. For the past eighteen months the Slovak government, formed by conservative and liberal parties, has consistently called for the controlled bankruptcy of Greece, a tightening of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, and for the private sector’s participation in financing the rescue packages for indebted states. It was in part down to Slovakia that these proposals, previously regarded as extreme, were introduced into the mainstream EU debate. The constructive position presented by Slovakia’s diplomacy in recent months has brought Bratislava tangible results, such as the reduction of its contribution to the permanent anti-crisis fund, the European Stabilisation Mechanism (ESM). Thus Slovakia, which adopted the single currency on 1 January 2009, has become an informal spokesman for the new, poorer members of the eurozone.

Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12

After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the government has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition remains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupation with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians. Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assume that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a dismissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.