Franchise nations : theorising diaspora from outside In(dia)

Research on diaspora has long been dominated by approaches that centre on displacement, relocation, mixed identities, cultural hybridity, loss, yearning and disaffection. In this paper, I outline a fresh conceptual framework, franchise nation, which approaches the study of diaspora from the perspective of the state. What this framework allows is the study of the processes that states employ to woo, nurture and engage their diasporas so as to extend their sovereignty extra-territorially, ie. statecraft. The franchise nation concept draws on the notion of cultural expediency and complements two approaches that dominate the study of statecraft today: soft power and nation branding. However, the point of this is not, to borrow Gayatri Spivak’s words, to be either pro or anti-sovereign but rather to stay awake to how sovereignty is “invoked, extended, deterritorialised, aggregated, [and] abrogated” (2007). Far from suggesting the imminent arrival of a post-national period, the intention with the franchise nation concept is to explicate and better understand the complexities that inhabit the terrain between diaspora, home and host nation that allow and accompany the exercise of sovereignty from afar.

Legal ethics in a post-Westphalian world : building the international rule of law and otehr tasks

The emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan professions (law and arms) into two of the least cosmopolitan. Sovereign states determined the content of the law within their borders – including which, if any, ecclesiastical law was to be applied; what form of economic regulation was adopted; and what, if any, international law applied. Similarly, states sought to ensure that all military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world may significantly reverse these processes. The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the ethics of how, and for what ends, it is practised. Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of sovereign states through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting with the rule of law. An increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks. The same could be said of the military. This essay will review the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions and outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers can and should play in it.

Professions without borders : global ethics and the international rule of law

The emergence of strong sovereign states after the Treaty of Westphalia turned two of the most cosmopolitan professions (law and arms) into two of the least cosmopolitan. Sovereign states determined the content of the law within their borders – including which, if any, ecclesiastical law was to be applied; what form of economic regulation was adopted; and what, if any, international law applied. Similarly, states sought to ensure that all military force was at their disposal in national armies. The erosion of sovereignty in a post-Westphalian world may significantly reverse these processes. The erosion of sovereignty is likely to have profound consequences for the legal profession and the ethics of how, and for what ends, it is practised. Lawyers have played a major role in the civilization of sovereign states through the articulation and institutionalisation of key governance values – starting with the rule of law. An increasingly global profession must take on similar tasks. The same could be said of the military. This essay will review the concept of an international rule of law and its relationship to domestic conceptions and outline the task of building the international rule of law and the role that lawyers can and should play in it.

Consumer misbehaviour during professional service encounters

To date, consumer behaviour research is still over-focused on the functional rather than the dysfunctional. Both empirical and anecdotal evidence suggest that service organisations are burdened with the concept of consumer sovereignty, while consumers freely flout the ‘rules’ of social exchange and behave in deviant and dysfunctional ways. Further, the current scope of consumer misbehaviour research suggests that the phenomenon has principally been studied in the context of economically-focused exchange. This limits our current understanding of consumer misbehaviour to service encounters that are more transactional than relational in nature. Consequently, this thesis takes a Social Exchange approach to consumer misbehaviour and reports a three-stage multi-method study that examined the nature and antecedents of consumer misbehaviour in professional services. It addresses the following broad research question: What is the nature of consumer misbehaviour during professional service encounters? Study One initially explored the nature of consumer misbehaviour in professional service encounters using critical incident technique (CIT) within 38 semi-structured in-depth interviews. The study was designed to develop a better understanding of what constitutes consumer misbehaviour from a service provider’s perspective. Once the nature of consumer misbehaviour had been qualified, Study Two focused on developing and refining calibrated items that formed Guttman-like scales for two consumer misbehaviour constructs: one for the most theoretically-central type of consumer misbehaviour identified in Study One (i.e. refusal to participate) and one for the most well-theorised and salient type of consumer misbehaviour (i.e. verbal abuse) identified in Study One to afford a comparison. This study used Rasch modelling to investigate whether it was possible to calibrate the escalating severity of a series of decontextualised behavioural descriptors in a valid and reliable manner. Creating scales of calibrated items that capture the variation in severity of different types of consumer misbehaviour identified in Study One allowed for a more valid and reliable investigation of the antecedents of such behaviour. Lastly, Study Three utilised an experimental design to investigate three key antecedents of consumer misbehaviour: (1) the perceived quality of the service encounter [drawn from Fullerton and Punj’s (1993) model of aberrant consumer behaviour], (2) the violation of consumers’ perceptions of justice and equity [drawn from Rousseau’s (1989) Psychological Contract Theory], and (3) consumers’ affective responses to exchange [drawn from Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) Affective Events Theory]. Investigating three key antecedents of consumer misbehaviour confirmed the newly-developed understanding of the nature of consumer misbehaviour during professional service encounters. Combined, the results of the three studies suggest that consumer misbehaviour is characteristically different within professional services. The most salient and theoretically-central behaviours can be measured using increasingly severe decontextualised behavioural descriptors. Further, increasingly severe forms of consumer misbehaviour are likely to occur as a response to consumer anger at low levels of interpersonal service quality. These findings have a range of key implications for both marketing theory and practice.

Reorienting diaspora : China and India as franchise nations

In this paper, I outline a new approach towards media and diaspora using the concept of the ‘franchise nation’. It is my contention that current theories on migration, media and diaspora with their emphasis on exile, multiple belongings, hybrid identities and their representations are inadequate to the task of explaining the emergence of a new trend in diaspora, home and host nation relationship. This, I suggest, is a recent shift most notable in the attitudes of the Chinese and Indian governments toward their diasporas. From earlier eras where Chinese sojourners were regarded as disloyal and Indians overseas left to fend for themselves, Chinese and Indian migrants are today directly addressed and wooed by their nations of origin. This change is motivated in part by the realisation that diasporic populations are, in fact, resources that can bring significant influence to bear on home nation interests within host nations. Such sway in foreign lands gains greater importance as China and India are, by virtue of their economic rise and prominence on the world stage, subject to ever more intense international scrutiny. Members of these diasporas have willingly responded to these changes by claiming and cultivating pivotal roles for themselves within host nations as spokespersons, informants and representatives, trading on their assumed familiarity with home cultures, language and commerce. As a result, China and India have initiated a number of statecraft strategies in recent years to (re)engage their diasporas. Both nations have identified media as amongst the key instruments of their strategies. New media enhances the ability of all parties—home and host states, institutions and individuals—to participate, interact and reciprocate. While China’s centralised government has utilised the notion of soft power (ruan shili) to describe its practices, India’s efforts are diffused along the lines of nation branding via myriad labels like India Inc. and the Global Indian. To explain this emergent trend, I propose a new framework, franchise nation, defined as a reciprocal relationship between nation and diaspora that is characterised by mutual obligations and benefits. In appropriating this phrase from Stephenson, I liken contemporary statecraft operating in China and India to a business franchising system wherein benefits may be economic or cultural and; those thus connected signal their willingness for mutual exchange and concede a sense of obligation. As such, franchise nation is not concerned with remote, unidirectional interference in home nation affairs a la Anderson’s ‘long-distance nationalism’. Rather, it is a framework that seeks to reflect more closely the dynamism of the relationship between diaspora, home and host nations.

Introduction to special issue on what criminology can say about the war on terror

On 20 September 2001, the former US President, George W. Bush, declared what is now widely, and arguably infamously, known as a ‘war on terror’. In response to the fatal 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC, President Bush identified the US military response as having far-reaching and long-lasting consequences. It was, he argued, ‘our war on terror’ that began ‘with al Qaeda, but … it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’ (CNN 2001). This was to be a war that would, in the words of former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, seek to eliminate a threat that was ‘aimed at the whole democratic world’ (Blair 2001). Blair claimed that this threat is of such magnitude that unprecedented measures would need to be taken to uphold freedom and security. Blair would later admit that it was a war that ‘divided the country’ and was based on evidence ‘about Saddam having actual biological and chemical weapons, as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be wrong’ (Blair 2004). The failures of intelligence ushered in new political rhetoric in the form of ‘trust me’ because ‘instinct is no science’ (Blair 2004). The war on terror has been one of the most significant international events in the past three decades, alongside the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the unification of Europe and the marketization of the People's Republic of China. Yet, unlike the other events, it will not be remembered for advancing democracy or sovereignty, but for the conviction politics of particular politicians who chose to dispense with international law and custom in pursuit of personal instincts that proved fatal. Since the invasions of Afghanistan in October 2001 and …

International tax cooperation in the Post-GFC era

Over the last five years we have observed the fallout from the global financial crisis (GFC). International cooperation and jointly adopted policies have dominated many of the solutions to the problems which have arisen. Initially, many nations in response to the GFC, implemented a two pronged short term solution by undertaking fiscal intervention and delivering rescue packages aimed at first, bailing out financial institutions and second, preventing or minimising the impact of a recession. Both programs involved large amounts of domestic spending. It was difficult in early 2007 to foresee the reduction that nations were about the face in domestic revenue collected. Five years on, not only have the first line effects of the GFC reduced the revenue raised by governments around the world, but the consequential costs associated with the rescue packages have also depleted domestic revenue bases. The response by stakeholders has been to attempt to secure domestic revenue bases through fiscally sustainable measures. Domestic sovereignty allows the levying of taxes as a nation chooses. However, rather than raise domestic taxes, revenue may also be increased by stemming the flow of income and capital to low and no-tax jurisdictions. The intervening five-year period since the GFC allows a unique insight into the response by nations and international organisations to tax evasion, tax avoidance and aggressive tax competition through the cross border flows of capital and the resulting affect that the GFC has had on international tax cooperation. By investigating the change in the international tax landscape over the last five years, which reveals the work done by stakeholders in developing fiscally responsible responses to the problems that have arisen, it may be possible to predict the trajectory of the international tax landscape over the next five years.

Global forest governance

This book identifies the fundamental legal principles and the governance requirements of sustainable forest management. An analytical model for assessing forest regulation is created which identifies the doctrinal concepts that underpin forest regulation (justice, property, sovereignty and governance). It also highlights the dominant public international institutions involved in forest regulation (UNFF, UNFCCC and WB) which is followed by analysis of non-state international forest regulation (forest certification and ecosystem markets). The book concludes by making a number of practical recommendations for reform of global forest governance arrangements and suggested reforms for individual international forest institutions.

Foundations of International Climate Law : Objectives, principles and methods

This chapter explores the objectives, principle and methods of climate law. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) lays the foundations of the international regime by setting out its ultimate objectives in Article 2, the key principles in Article 3, and the methods of the regime in Article 4. The ultimate objective of the regime – to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference – is examined and assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are considered when seeking to understand the definition of this concept. The international environmental principles of: state sovereignty and responsibility, preventative action, cooperation, sustainable development, precaution, polluter pays and common but differentiated responsibility are then examined and their incorporation within the international climate regime instruments evaluated. This is followed by an examination of the methods used by the mitigation and adaptation regimes in seeking to achieve the objective of the UNFCCC. Methods of the mitigation regime include: domestic implementation of policies, setting of standards and targets and allocation of rights, use of flexibility mechanisms, and reporting. While it is noted that methods of the adaptation regime are still evolving, the latter includes measures such as impact assessments, national adaptation plans and the provision of funding.

The legal nature of justice in REDD+

Formation of Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) policy within the international climate regime has raised a number of discussions about ‘justice’. REDD+ aims to provide an incentive for developing countries to preserve or increase the amount of carbon stored in their forested areas. Governance of REDD+ is multi-layered: at the international level, a guiding framework must be determined; at the national level, strong legal frameworks are a pre-requisite to ensure both public and private investor confidence and at the sub-national level, forest-dependent peoples need to agree to participate as stewards of forest carbon project areas. At the international level the overall objective of REDD+ is yet to be determined, with competing mitigation, biological and justice agendas. Existing international law pertaining to the environment (international environmental principles and law, IEL) and human rights (international human rights law, IHRL) should inform the development of international and national REDD+ policy especially in relation to ensuring the environmental integrity of projects and participation and benefit-sharing rights for forest dependent communities. National laws applicable to REDD+ must accommodate the needs of all stakeholders and articulate boundaries which define their interactions, paying particular attention to ensuring that vulnerable groups are protected. This paper i) examines justice theories and IEL and IHRL to inform our understanding of what ‘justice’ means in the context of REDD+, and ii) applies international law to create a reference tool for policy-makers dealing with the complex sub-debates within this emerging climate policy. We achieve this by: 1) Briefly outlining theories of justice (for example – perspectives offered by anthropogenic and ecocentric approaches, and views from ‘green economics’). 2) Commenting on what ‘climate justice’ means in the context of REDD+. 3) Outlining a selection of IEL and IHRL principles and laws to inform our understanding of ‘justice’ in this policy realm (for example – common but differentiated responsibilities, the precautionary principle, sovereignty and prevention drawn from the principles of IEL, the UNFCCC and CBD as relevant conventions of international environmental law; and UNDRIP and the Declaration on the Right to Development as applicable international human rights instruments) 4) Noting how this informs what ‘justice’ is for different REDD+ stakeholders 5) Considering how current law-making (at both the international and national levels) reflects these principles and rules drawn from international law 6) Presenting how international law can inform policy-making by providing a reference tool of applicable international law and how it could be applied to different issues linked to REDD+. As such, this paper will help scholars and policy-makers to understand how international law can assist us to both conceptualise and embody ‘justice’ within frameworks for REDD+ at both the international and national levels.

The BRICS and the responsibility to protect : lessons from the Libyan and Syrian crises

The emerging ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) principle presents a significant challenge to the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) states’ traditional emphasis on a strict Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs. Despite formally endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, each of the BRICS has, to varying degrees, retained misgivings about coercive measures under the doctrine’s third pillar. This paper examines how these rising powers engaged with R2P during the 2011–2012 Libyan and Syrian civilian protection crises. The central finding is that although all five states expressed similar concerns over NATO’s military campaign in Libya, they have been unable to maintain a common BRICS position on R2P in Syria. Instead, the BRICS have splintered into two sub-groups. The first, consisting of Russia and China, remains steadfastly opposed to any coercive measures against Syria. The second, comprising the democratic IBSA states (India, Brazil and South Africa) has displayed softer, more flexible stances towards proposed civilian protection measures in Syria, although these three states also remain cautious about the implementation of R2P’s coercive dimension. This paper identifies a number of factors which help to explain this split, arguing that the failure to maintain a cohesive BRICS position on R2P is unsurprising given the many internal differences and diverging national interests between the BRICS members. Overall, the BRICS’ ongoing resistance to intervention is unlikely to disappear quickly, indicating that further attempts to operationalize R2P’s third pillar may prove difficult.

On facilitating regional integration and economic development with collaborative technologies in the South Pacific

The current global economic instability and the vulnerability of small island nations are providing the impetus for greater integration between the countries of the South Pacific region. This exercise is critical for their survival in today’s turbulent economic environment. Past efforts of regional integration in the South Pacific have not been very successful. Reasons attributed to this outcome include issues related to damage of sovereignty, and lack of a shared integration infrastructure. Today, the IT resources with collaborative capacities provide the opportunity to develop a shared IT infrastructure to facilitate integration in the South Pacific. In an attempt to develop a model of regional integration with an IT-backed infrastructure, we identify and report on the antecedents of the current stage of regional integration, and the stakeholders’ perceived benefits of an IT resources backed regional integration in the South Pacific. Employing a case study based approach, the study finds that while most stakeholders were positive about the potential of IT-backed regional integration, significant challenges exist that hinder the realisation of this model. The study finds that facilitating IT-backed regional integration requires enabling IT infrastructure, equitable IT development in the region, greater awareness on the potential of the modern IT resources, market liberalisation of the information and telecommunications sector and greater political support for IT initiatives.