Um Estudo sobre Rent-Seeking e seus Efeitos sobre a Acumulação de Capital e Bem Estar

None

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Caçadores de renda: uma investigação sobre a teoria do rent seeking

Este trabalho apresenta uma investigação sobre a teoria do Rent Seeking. Define o conceito de caçar renda e esclarece a diferença entre caçar renda e transferir renda. Mostra que o comportamento caçador de renda é determindado pela lógica da ação coletiva. Esta dissertação ainda analisa os impactos de bem estar social provocados por este tipo de comportamento. A evolução do processo investigativo revelou que o estudo do tema passa necessariamente pela análise da escassez da oferta arbitrariamente estabelecida, seja através da criação e manutenção artificial de monopólios, seja por meio de restrições ao comércio internacional

The brazilian education quality index (Ideb): measurement and incentives upgrades

The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

A model of capital accumulation and rent-seeking

A simple model incorporating rent-seeking into the standard neoclassical model of capital accumulation is presented. It embodies the idea that the performance of an economy depends on the efficiency of its institutions. It is shown that welfare is positively affected by the institutional efficiency, although output is not necessarily so. It is also shown that an economy with a monopolistic rent-seeker performs better than one with a competitive rent-seeking industry.

The effects of tax incentives for small firms on employment levels

This paper will examine the effects of tax incentives for small businesses on employment level evaluating a program with this purpose implemented in Brazil in the 1990s. We first develop a theoretical framework which guides both the de nition of the parameters of interest and their identi cation. Selection problems both into the treatment group and into the data sample are tackled by combining fixed effects methods and regression discontinuity design on alternative sub-samples of a longitudinal database of manufacturing firms. The results show that on the one hand the size composition of the treated fi rms may be changed due to the survival of some smaller firms that would have exited had it not been eligible to the program. On the other hand, the treated firms who do not depend on the program to survive do employ more workers.

O regime brasileiro de tributação de lucros auferidos por sociedades controladas e coligadas no exterior: uma visão do atual regime por meio da ótica da teoria do rent seeking

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo analisar, pela ótica da teoria do rent seeking, a evolução da legislação e da jurisprudência administrativa e judicial acerca do regime da tributação dos lucros, ganhos de capital e rendimentos auferidos por sociedades controladas e coligadas no exterior. Observar-se-á a hipótese da legislação e das suas diversas interpretações refletirem interesses predominantemente de apropriação de renda, tanto por parte da Administração Pública quanto dos agentes privados. Nesse sentido, após uma exposição da teoria do rent seeking e da sua relação com a teoria do patrimonialismo no Brasil, ela será aplicada no tema tributário proposto. Para tanto, verificar-se-á a evolução da legislação até o último diploma normativo relevante sobre o tema: a Medida Provisória nº 2.158-35/01. Neste momento, serão identificadas as principais controvérsias e os possíveis interesses nas diversas interpretações dadas às regras em questão, associando-os com os diversos problemas de rent seeking observáveis. A seguir, verificar-se-á, nas decisões do Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), do Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), e do Conselho Administrativo de Recursos Fiscais (CARF) qual a evolução do entendimento dos tribunais a respeito das referidas interpretações, verificando se algum consenso foi atingido e quais interesses estariam atingidos pelo rumo tomado pela jurisprudência sobre o tema. Neste contexto, a análise da evolução legislativa e jurisprudencial abordará os seguintes pontos controversos: (1) caracterização das regras brasileiras como CFC rules (característica antielisiva); (2) tributação de distribuição ficta ou de lucro da própria controladora ou coligada no Brasil; (3) constitucionalidade do artigo 43, parágrafo 2º, do Código Tributário Nacional, bem como do artigo 74 da Medida Provisória nº 2.158-35/01; e (4) a compatibilização com os Tratados contra a Dupla Tributação. Por fim, far-se-á uma conclusão, a partir dos resultados verificados, a respeito de como a evolução das regras tributárias em questão pode representar uma apropriação de renda sem benefícios públicos que pode favorecer indevidamente tanto o setor público como o privado.

Performance-based compensation vs. guaranteed compensation: contractual incentives and performance

Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

The effects of small firm tax incentives on employment levels

This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.

Essays on incentives, procurement and regulation

Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, "Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard", é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, "Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection" é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, "Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure", por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

Rent-sharing in Brazil: using trade liberalization as a natural experiment

This paper examines the extent of rent-sharing in Brazil, between 1988 and 1995, combining two different data sets: annual industrial surveys (pIA) and annual household surveys (PNADs). The aim is to use the trade liberalization policies that took place in Brazil in the early 1990s as a "natural experiment" to examine the impact ofproduct market rents on wages. We first estimate inter-industry wage differentials in Brazil, using the household surveys, afier controlling for various observable workers' characteristics. In a reduced form fixed effects equation, these controlled inter-industry differentials are seen to depend on the industries' rate of effective tariff. We also find that LSDV estimates of the effect of value-added per worker (computed using the industrial surveys) on the wage differentials are positive, but somewhat small. However, we find that instrumenting the valued-added with the effective tariffs more than doubles the estimated rent-sharing coefficient. The paper concludes that rent-sharing is prevalent in the Brazilian manufacturing sector, and this mechanism transferred part of the productivity gains due to trade liberalization to manufacturing workers in the form ofhigher (controlled) wage premium.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.