998 resultados para public expenditures
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The 2009-2010 (FY10) edition of Iowa Public Library Statistics includes information on income, expenditures, collections, circulation, and other measures, including staff. Each section is arranged by size code, then alphabetically by city. The totals and percentiles for each size code grouping are given immediately following the alphabetical listings. Totals and medians for all reporting libraries are given at the end of each section. There are 543 libraries included in this publication; 525 submitted a report. The table of size codes (page 5) lists the libraries alphabetically. The following table lists the size code designations, the population range in each size code, the number of libraries reporting in each size code, and the total population of the reporting libraries in each sizecode. The total population served by the 543 libraries is 2,339,070. Population data is used to determine per capita figures throughout the publication.
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The 2010-2011 (FY11) edition of Iowa Public Library Statistics includes information on income, expenditures, collections, circulation, and other measures, including staff. Each section is arranged by size code, then alphabetically by city. The totals and percentiles for each size code grouping are given immediately following the alphabetical listings. Totals and medians for all reporting libraries are given at the end of each section. There are 543 libraries included in this publication; 525 submitted a report. The table of size codes (page 5) lists the libraries alphabetically. The following table lists the size code designations, the population range in each size code, the number of libraries reporting in each size code, and the total population of the reporting libraries in each size code. The total population served by the 543 libraries is 2,339,070. Population data is used to determine per capita figures throughout the publication.
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The 2010-2011 (FY11) edition of Iowa Public Library Statistics includes information on income, expenditures, collections, circulation, and other measures, including staff. Each section is arranged by size code, then alphabetically by city. The totals and percentiles for each size code grouping are given immediately following the alphabetical listings. Totals and medians for all reporting libraries are given at the end of each section. There are 543 libraries included in this publication; 525 submitted a report. The table of size codes (page 5) lists the libraries alphabetically. The following table lists the size code designations, the population range in each size code, the number of libraries reporting in each size code, and the total population of the reporting libraries in each size code. The total population served by the 543 libraries is 2,339,070. Population data is used to determine per capita figures throughout the publication.
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Cette thèse analyse la co-évolution de deux secteurs dans la politique de la santé: santé publique (public health) et soins aux malades (health care). En d'autres termes, la relation entre les dimensions curative et préventive de la politique de la santé et leur développement dans la durée. Une telle recherche est nécessaire car les problèmes de la santé sont complexes et ont besoin de solutions coordonnées. De plus, les dépenses de la santé ont augmenté sans arrt durant les dernières décennies. Un moyen de réduire une future augmentation des dépenses pourrait consister en davantage d'investissement dans des mesures préventives. En relation avec cette idée, ma recherche analyse les politiques de la santé publique et les soins aux malades de cinq pays: Allemagne, Angleterre, Australie, Etats-Unis et Suisse. En m'appuyant sur la littérature secondaire, des statistiques descriptives et des entretiens avec des experts et des politiciens, j'analyse la relation entre les deux secteurs depuis la fin du dix-neuvième siècle. En particulier, je me focalise sur la relation des deux champs sur trois niveaux: institutions, acteurs et politiques. Mes résultats montrent les similitudes et les différences d'évolution entre les cinq pays. D'un c^oté, lorsque la profession médicale est politiquement active et que le pays consiste en une fédération centralisée ou en un gouvernement unitaire, les deux secteurs sont intégrés au niveau institutionnel, ralliant les professions et groupes d'intérêt des deux secteurs la cause commune dans une activité politique. Par contre, dans tous les pays, les deux secteurs ont co-évolué vers une complémentarité malgré de la politisation des professions et la centralisation du gouvernement. Ces résultats sont intéressants pour la science politique en général car ils soulignent l'importance des professions pour le développement institutionnel et proposent un cadre pour l'analyse de la co-évolution des politiques publiques en général. -- This Ph.D. thesis analyzes the co-evolution of the health care and the public health sectors. In other words, the relation between preventive and curative health policy and its evolution over time. Such research is necessary, because current health problems are complex and might need coordinated solutions. What is more, health expenditures have increased continuously in the last decades. One way to slow down further increase in health spending could be to invest more in preventative health policies. Therefore, I am connecting individual health care and public health into a common analysis, taking Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S. as examples. Based on secondary literature, descriptive statistics and interviews with experts and policymakers, I am analyzing how the two sectors' relations co-evolved between the late nineteenth and the early twenty-first century. Specifically, I am researching how health care and public health were related on the levels of institutions, actors and policies. My results show that there are differences and similarities in the co-evolution of policy sectors between these countries. On the one hand, when the medical profession was politically active and the country a centralized federation or a unitary state, there was institutional integration and common political advocacy of the sectors' interest groups and professions. On the other hand, in all countries, both sectors co-evolved towards complementarity, irrespectively of the politicization of professions and centralization of government. These findings are interesting for the political science literature at large, because they underline the importance of professions for institutional development and propose an analytical framework for analyzing the co-evolution of policy sectors in general.
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Neither democracy nor globalization can explain the doubling of the peacetime public share in many Western countries between World Wars I and II. Here we examine two other explanations that are consistent with the timing of the observed changes, namely, (1) a shift in the demand for public goods and (2) the effect of war on the willingness to share. We first model each of these approaches as a contingency-learning phenomenon within Schelling’s Multi-Person Dilemma. We then derive verifiable propositions from each hypothesis. National time series of public spending as a share of GNP reveal no unit root but a break in trend, a result shown to favor explanation (2) over (1).
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This study is focussed on public and private sector The study is confined to industrial Public companies in the states of Kerala and Orissa along with companies in India. undertakings only. sector and private sector private sector companies in other states were studied. Even though the original plan of 190 companies as the sample size could not be accomplished, as the responses were very poor, but data could be collected frmn 6 public and 5 private sector companies in Kerala, 8 public and 8 private sector companies in Orissa along with 27 private sector companies in other states totalling to 54 companies. The number of years of data collected varies from 2 years to 6 years. Factors which are affecting capital expenditures and hence leading to the performance of private sector compared to public sector companies are studied. After the study and analysis, comparisons are made between public sector and private sector, and suitable recomendations are made so that public sector industries can also perform equally well as the private sector industries in India.
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Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.
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Initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of external effects and increasing retums in explaining growth. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confumed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, although cross-country estimates did nol The problem lies with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low-frequency movements of high-frequency data. Using cointegration, new time series evidence confum the theory and conform to cross-country evidence. The implied Solow residual, which takes into account externaI effects to aggregate capital, has its behavior analyzed. The hypothesis that it is explained by government expenditures on infrasttucture is confIrmed. This suggests a supply-side role for government affecting productivity.
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Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.
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This work consists of three essays organized into chapters that seek to answer questions at first sight unrelated, but with one common denominator, which is the scarcity of public resources devoted to education, overall, especially in lower education. . The first chapter deals with the scarcity of resources devoted to education in a context of population aging. Two hypotheses were tested for Brazilian municipalities on the relationship between the aging of the population and educational expenditure. The first, already proven in the literature, is that there is an intergenerational conflict for resources and the increase of the share of elderly in the population reduces the educational expenditure. The second, proposed here for the first time, is that there should be reduction of competition for resources if there is a relationship of co-residence between young and old. The results indicated that an increase in the share of elderly reduces the educational expenditure per youth. But the results also illustrate that an increase in the share of elderly co-residing with youth (family arrangement more common in Latin American countries) raises the educational expenditure, which reflects a reduction of competition for resources between generations. The second chapter assesses the allocative efficiency of investments in Higher Education. Using the difference between first-year and last-year students’ scores from Enade aggregated by HEI as a product in the Stochastic Production Function, is possible to contribute with a new element in the literature aimed at estimating the production function of education. The results show that characteristics of institutions are the variables that best explain the performance of students, and that public institutions are more inefficient than the private ones. Finally, the third chapter presents evidence that the allocation of public resources in early childhood education is important for a better future school performance. In this chapter was calculated the effects of early childhood education on literacy scores of children attending the 2nd grade of elementary school. The results using OLS and propensity score matching show that students who started school at the ages to 5, 4, and 3 years had literacy scores between 12.22 and 19.54 points higher than the scores of those who began school at the ages 6 years or late. The results also suggest that the returns in terms of literacy scores diminish in relation to the number of years of early childhood education.
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Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.
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This paper uses dynamic programming to study the time consistency of optimal macroeconomic policy in economies with recurring public deficits. To this end, a general equilibrium recursive model introduced in Chang (1998) is extended to include govemment bonds and production. The original mode! presents a Sidrauski economy with money and transfers only, implying that the need for govemment fmancing through the inflation tax is minimal. The extended model introduces govemment expenditures and a deficit-financing scheme, analyzing the SargentWallace (1981) problem: recurring deficits may lead the govemment to default on part of its public debt through inflation. The methodology allows for the computation of the set of alI sustainable stabilization plans even when the govemment cannot pre-commit to an optimal inflation path. This is done through value function iterations, which can be done on a computeI. The parameters of the extended model are calibrated with Brazilian data, using as case study three Brazilian stabilization attempts: the Cruzado (1986), Collor (1990) and the Real (1994) plans. The calibration of the parameters of the extended model is straightforward, but its numerical solution proves unfeasible due to a dimensionality problem in the algorithm arising from limitations of available computer technology. However, a numerical solution using the original algorithm and some calibrated parameters is obtained. Results indicate that in the absence of govemment bonds or production only the Real Plan is sustainable in the long run. The numerical solution of the extended algorithm is left for future research.
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This paper explores the institutional change introduced by the public disclosure of an education development index (IDEB, Basic Education Development Index) in 2007 to identify the e ect of education accountability on yardstick competition in education spending for Brazilian municipalities. Our results are threefold. First, political incentives are pervasive in setting the education expenditures. The spatial strategic behavior on education spending is estimated lower for lame-ducks and for those incumbents with majority support at the city council. This suggests a strong relation between commitment and accountability which reinforces yardstick competition theory. Second, we nd a minor reduction (20%) in spatial interaction for public education spending after IDEB's disclosure | compared to the spatial correlation before the disclosure of the index. This suggests that public release of information may decrease the importance of the neighbors` counterpart information on voter`s decision. Third, exploring the discontinuity of IDEB`s disclosure rule around the cut-o of 30 students enrolled in the grade under assessment, our estimates suggest that the spatial autocorrelation | and hence yardstick competition | is reduced in 54%. Finally, an unforeseen result suggests that the disclosure of IDEB increases expenditures, more than 100% according to our estimates.
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Includes bibliography
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Includes bibliography