Firing and training costs and labour market segmentation

This dissertation consists of three essays on the labour market impact of firing and training costs. The modelling framework resorts to the search and matching literature. The first chapter introduces firing costs, both liner and non-linear, in a new Keynesian model, analysing business cycle effects for different wage rigidity degrees. The second chapter adds training costs in a model of a segmented labour market, accessing the interaction between these two features and the skill composition of the labour force. Finally, the third chapter analyses empirically some of the issues raised in the second chapter.

Avaliação do desempenho de fundos de investimento de ouro nos EUA: influência dos diferentes regimes de mercado na seletividade e market-timing

Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças

Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns in the French stock market

Dissertação de mestrado em Finanças

Supportive presentation for computer games

Supportive presentation, computer games, non-photorealistic rendering camera control, camera AI, human factors, user interfaces, action summary, action replay, non-photorealistic rendering case studies, psychology

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

Trade in bilateral oligopoly with endogenous market formation

We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place.

Atomic Cournotian Traders May Be Walrasian.

In a bilateral oligopoly, with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part, when is there a non-empty intersection between the sets of Walras and Cournot-Nash allocations? Using a two commodity version of the Shapley window model, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for a Cournot- Nash allocation to be a Walras allocation is that all atoms demand a null amount of one of the two commodities. We provide two examples which show that this characterization holds non-vacuously. When our condition fails to hold, we also confirm, through some examples, the result obtained by Okuno, Postlewaite, and Roberts (1980): small traders always have a negligible influence on prices, while the large traders keep their strategic power even when their behavior turns out to be Walrasian in the cooperative framework considered by Gabszewicz and Mertens (1971) and Shitovitz (1973).

Modeling Dependence Structure and Forecasting Market Risk with Dynamic Asymmetric Copula

We investigate the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure between equity portfolios from the US and UK. We demonstrate the statistical significance of dynamic asymmetric copula models in modelling and forecasting market risk. First, we construct “high-minus-low" equity portfolios sorted on beta, coskewness, and cokurtosis. We find substantial evidence of dynamic and asymmetric dependence between characteristic-sorted portfolios. Second, we consider a dynamic asymmetric copula model by combining the generalized hyperbolic skewed t copula with the generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model to capture both the multivariate non-normality and the dynamic and asymmetric dependence between equity portfolios. We demonstrate its usefulness by evaluating the forecasting performance of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall for the high-minus-low portfolios. From back-testing, e find consistent and robust evidence that our dynamic asymmetric copula model provides the most accurate forecasts, indicating the importance of incorporating the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure in risk management.

Do Legal Immigrants and Natives Compete in the Labour Market? Evidence from Catalonia

The precondition for labour-market competition between immigrants and natives is that both are willing to accept jobs that do not differ in quality. To test this hypothesis, in this paper we compare the working conditions between immigrants and natives in Catalonia. Comparing immigrants’ working conditions in relation to their native counterparts is not only a useful analysis for studying the extent to which immigrants and low-skilled native workers are direct competitors in the labour market, but also allows us to contribute to the literature on this issue by moving away from the conventional approach used in previous studies. Our results indicate that: i) natives and immigrants display a different taste for job (dis)amenities; ii) Catalan-born workers might be in direct competition with EU15 immigrants, while non-Catalan Spanish workers might be competing with Latin American immigrants, and; iii) African-born immigrants are the group in the Catalan workforce that by far face the worst working conditions.

Age effects, unobserved characteristics and hedonic price indexes: The Spanish car market in the 1990s

This paper computes and compares alternative quality-adjusted price indexes for new cars in Spain in the period 1990-2000. The proposed hedonic approach simultaneously controls for time-invariant unobserved product e¤ects and time-variant unobserved quality changes, that are assumed to be captured by model age effects. The results show that the non-adjusted price index largely overstates the increase in the cost of living induced by changes in car prices and that previous evidence for this market have not measured the real extent of that bias, probably due to the omission of controls for unobservables. It is also shown that omitting age effects can also lead to misleading conclusions. The estimated price indexes give also some insights on what could have been the determinants of price evolution in the Spanish car market.

A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement estimation

This paper analyses the impact of using different correlation assumptions between lines of business when estimating the risk-based capital reserve, the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR), under Solvency II regulations. A case study is presented and the SCR is calculated according to the Standard Model approach. Alternatively, the requirement is then calculated using an Internal Model based on a Monte Carlo simulation of the net underwriting result at a one-year horizon, with copulas being used to model the dependence between lines of business. To address the impact of these model assumptions on the SCR we conduct a sensitivity analysis. We examine changes in the correlation matrix between lines of business and address the choice of copulas. Drawing on aggregate historical data from the Spanish non-life insurance market between 2000 and 2009, we conclude that modifications of the correlation and dependence assumptions have a significant impact on SCR estimation.