Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought: Murakami Senshō and Critical Buddhism

Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.

Engineering Ethics: Looking Back, Looking Forward

The eight pieces constituting this Meeting Report are summaries of presentations made during a panel session at the 2011 Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (APPE) annual meeting held between March 3rd and 6th in Cincinnati. Lisa Newton organized the session and served as chair. The panel of eight consisted both of pioneers in the field and more recent arrivals. It covered a range of topics from how the field has developed to where it should be going, from identification of issues needing further study to problems of training the next generation of engineers and engineering-ethics scholars.

Tuberculosis in Texas correctional facilities between 2005--2009

It has been well documented that inmates incarcerated in prisons and correctional facilities exhibit higher incidence and prevalence of mycobacterium tuberculosis (TB) disease than the general population. This has public health implications because correctional systems may serve as reservoirs for TB disease that can lead to TB outbreaks in the facilities or can be spread to the general public once inmates are released. Although Texas has one of the largest correctional systems in both the US and the world, little is known about TB prevalence and incidence among Texas inmates. The purpose of this study was to elucidate the relationship between TB incidence and incarceration in Texas correctional facilities and investigate differences in various demographic factors. ^ The study used the national TB database from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to calculate and compare the overall incidences of TB disease among correctional facility inmates and similar non-inmates in Texas during 2005–2009. Data were also stratified by age, gender, race/ethnicity, birth status, and HIV status and compared between inmates and non-inmates using chi-squared analysis and relative risks with 95% confidence intervals to assess any significant differences. ^ Results suggest that the overall TB incidence among Texas correctional facility inmates per year (88.6 per 100,000) was significantly higher than that of Texas non-inmates (6.3 per 100,000); a 14 fold difference. Relative risk analyses by gender, race/ethnicity, and those with HIV infection found that the TB incidences for all these demographics were significantly and consistently higher in inmates compared to non-inmates. In particular, Hispanic inmates were more likely to develop TB than their non-inmate counterparts by a relative risk of 23.9 (95% CI 19.4–29.4). Likewise, both male and female inmates were more likely to develop TB than non-inmates (RR = 10.2, 95% CI 8.5–12.2; RR = 20.8, 95% CI 12.2–25.3, respectively), although female inmates unconventionally exhibited a higher TB incidence and relative risk than males inmates, which has not been shown. Among those with HIV infections, correctional facility inmates were 2.6 times were likely to develop TB disease than non-inmates (95% CI 1.5–4.4). ^ Inmates in Texas correctional facilities have a higher incidence of TB than non-inmates. Part of this higher risk may be because a large proportion of inmates come from populations already at high risks for TB, such as foreign born immigrants, those infected with HIV, and low SES groups such as many racial/ethnic minorities. Thus, these results may be used as a basis for more controlled and detailed research in the area, and to further characterize incarceration as a risk factor for TB incidence. They may also bring much needed attention about this health disparity to public health officials, legislators, and health administrators to expand and improve TB control in Texas correctional facilities, particularly among inmates released to the community, and reduce the risk of TB transmission to the general population.^

Analysis of the "European Charter on General Principles for Protection of the Environment and Sustainable Development" The Council of Europe Document CO-DBP (2003) 2

Analysis of the "European Charter on General Principles for Protection of the Environment and Sustainable Development" The Council of Europe Document CO-DBP (2003) 2

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

[Rules and regulations].

On covers: Book no. 1290-1292.

The theory of good and evil : a treatise on moral philosophy /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Lectures and essays,

Mode of access: Internet.

Nineteenth century teachers and other essays,

Samuel Taylor Coleridge.--Frederick Denison Maurice.--Thomas Erskine of Linlathen.--Life of Charles Kingsley.--Arthur Penrhyn Stanley.--The Cambridge apostles of 1830.--Richard Holt Hutton.--A study of Carlyle.--The majority.--James Fitzjames Stephen.--The moral influence of George Eliot.--John Ruskin.--Laurence Oliphant.--Count Leo Tolstoi.--Morals and politics.--Ethics and science.--Biography.--The relation of memory to will.--The vanity of men of letters.--Invalids.--Apologies.--Henry Thomas Buckle.--The unfaithful steward.--Brothers, an address to female students.--De senectute.--The drawbacks of the intellectual life.

Blowing the virtue-ethics whistle: Response to Faunce

The author elaborates some issues raised in the theoretical basis of whistleblowing put forward by Faunce. The author considers the relationship between bioethics teaching and professional behaviour and the role of principlism in teaching bioethics and medical ethics.

Assisted reproductive technologies and equity of access issues

In Australia and other countries, certain groups of women have traditionally been denied access to assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). These typically are single heterosexual women, lesbians, poor women, and those whose ability to rear children is questioned, particularly women with certain disabilities or who are older. The arguments used to justify selection of women for ARTs are most often based on issues such as scarcity of resources, and absence of infertility ( in lesbians and single women), or on social concerns: that it goes against nature''; particular women might not make good mothers; unconventional families are not socially acceptable; or that children of older mothers might be orphaned at an early age. The social, medical, legal, and ethical reasoning that has traditionally promoted this lack of equity in access to ARTs, and whether the criteria used for client deselection are ethically appropriate in any particular case, are explored by this review. In addition, the issues of distribution and just gatekeeping'' practices associated with these sensitive medical services are examined.