Acute Effects of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide in Healthy Subjects.

BACKGROUND: After no research in humans for >40 years, there is renewed interest in using lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in clinical psychiatric research and practice. There are no modern studies on the subjective and autonomic effects of LSD, and its endocrine effects are unknown. In animals, LSD disrupts prepulse inhibition (PPI) of the acoustic startle response, and patients with schizophrenia exhibit similar impairments in PPI. However, no data are available on the effects of LSD on PPI in humans. METHODS: In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled, crossover study, LSD (200 μg) and placebo were administered to 16 healthy subjects (8 women, 8 men). Outcome measures included psychometric scales; investigator ratings; PPI of the acoustic startle response; and autonomic, endocrine, and adverse effects. RESULTS: Administration of LSD to healthy subjects produced pronounced alterations in waking consciousness that lasted 12 hours. The predominant effects induced by LSD included visual hallucinations, audiovisual synesthesia, and positively experienced derealization and depersonalization phenomena. Subjective well-being, happiness, closeness to others, openness, and trust were increased by LSD. Compared with placebo, LSD decreased PPI. LSD significantly increased blood pressure, heart rate, body temperature, pupil size, plasma cortisol, prolactin, oxytocin, and epinephrine. Adverse effects produced by LSD completely subsided within 72 hours. No severe acute adverse effects were observed. CONCLUSIONS: In addition to marked hallucinogenic effects, LSD exerts methylenedioxymethamphetamine-like empathogenic mood effects that may be useful in psychotherapy. LSD altered sensorimotor gating in a human model of psychosis, supporting the use of LSD in translational psychiatric research. In a controlled clinical setting, LSD can be used safely, but it produces significant sympathomimetic stimulation.

Les neurosciences au Tribunal : de la responsabilité à la dangerosité, enjeux éthiques soulevés par la nouvelle loi française

AIM: In the past few years, spectacular progress in neuroscience has led to the emergence of a new interdisciplinary field, the so-called "neurolaw" whose goal is to explore the effects of neuroscientific discoveries on legal proceedings and legal rules and standards. In the United States, a number of neuroscientific researches are designed specifically to explore legally relevant topics and a case-law has already been developed. In Europe, neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in criminal courtrooms, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. Though largely debated, up to now the use of neuroscience in legal contexts had not specifically been regulated by any legislation. In 2011, with the new bioethics law, France has become the first country to admit by law the use of brain imaging in judicial expertise. According to the new law, brain imaging techniques can be used only for medical purposes, or scientific research, or in the context of judicial expertise. This study aims to give an overview of the current state of the neurolaw in the US and Europe, and to investigate the ethical issues raised by this new law and its potential impact on the rights and civil liberties of the offenders. METHOD: An overview of the emergence and development of "neurolaw" in the United States and Europe is given. Then, the new French law is examined in the light of the relevant debates in the French parliament. Consequently, we outline the current tendencies in Neurolaw literature to focus on assessments of responsibility, rather than dangerousness. This tendency is analysed notably in relation to the legal context relevant to criminal policies in France, where recent changes in the legislation and practice of forensic psychiatry show that dangerousness assessments have become paramount in the process of judicial decision. Finally, the potential interpretations of neuroscientific data introduced into psychiatric testimonies by judges are explored. RESULTS: The examination of parliamentary debates showed that the new French law allowing neuroimaging techniques in judicial expertise was introduced in the aim to provide a legal framework that would protect the subject against potential misuses of neuroscience. The underlying fear above all, was that this technology be used as a lie detector, or as a means to predict the subject's behaviour. However, the possibility of such misuse remains open. Contrary to the legislator's wish, the defendant is not fully guaranteed against uses of neuroimaging techniques in criminal courts that would go against their interests and rights. In fact, the examination of the recently adopted legislation in France shows that assessments of dangerousness and of risk of recidivism have become central elements of the criminal policy, which makes it possible, if not likely that neuroimaging techniques be used for the evaluation of the dangerousness of the defendant. This could entail risks for the latter, as judges could perceive neuroscientific data as hard evidence, more scientific and reliable than the soft data of traditional psychiatry. If such neuroscientific data are interpreted as signs of potential dangerousness of a subject rather than as signs of criminal responsibility, defendants may become subjected to longer penalties or measures aiming to ensure public safety in the detriment of their freedom. CONCLUSION: In the current context of accentuated societal need for security, the judge and the expert-psychiatrist are increasingly asked to evaluate the dangerousness of a subject, regardless of their responsibility. Influenced by this policy model, the judge might tend to use neuroscientific data introduced by an expert as signs of dangerousness. Such uses, especially when they subjugate an individual's interest to those of society, might entail serious threats to an individual's freedom and civil liberties.

Visualizing the spatiotemporal dynamics of DNA damage in budding yeast.

Fluorescence microscopy has enabled the analysis of both the spatial distribution of DNA damage and its dynamics during the DNA damage response (DDR). Three microscopic techniques can be used to study the spatiotemporal dynamics of DNA damage. In the first part we describe how we determine the position of DNA double-strand breaks (DSBs) relative to the nuclear envelope. The second part describes how to quantify the co-localization of DNA DSBs with nuclear pore clusters, or other nuclear subcompartments. The final protocols describe methods for the quantification of locus mobility over time.

Evaluation du risque de récidive dans les expertises pénales: quels outils? Quets indicateurs? Quelles pratiques [Risk assessment in forensic psychiatric reports: what kind assessment instrument? What indicator? What practical?].

Here we present results of studies conducted by the Research Unit of Legal Psychiatry and Psychology of Lausanne about risk assessment and protective factors in the evaluation of violence recidivism. It aims to help experts in considering the relevance and use of tools at their disposal. Particular attention is given to the significance of protective factors and impulsive dimensions, as to the inter-raters process that leads to the final deliberations.

Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness. In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility. In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry. In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment. Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders. By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.

Síndrome Hemolítico Urémico

INTRODUCCIÓN Esta entidad (SHU) fue descrita por Gasser (1) en 1955; desde entonces se ha progresado ensu epidemiología y patología, algo en su etiología y siguen existiendo dudas sobre su patogenia. El progreso en su resolución es más debido a tratamientos sintomáticos y de sostén que al conocimiento de la enfermedad. De todos modos cada vez es más diagnosticada, siendo la primera causa de insuficiencia renal aguda primitiva en la infancia (prescindiendo de aquellos casos secundarios a fallo hemodinámico o prerrenal), sobre todo en niños de uno a tres años....

La consultation infirmière dans un centre d'urgence pédiatrique universitaire suisse [The nurse consultation in a Swiss university paediatric emergency department].

In Switzerland, overcrowding in tertiary emergency departments is a frequent problem, resulting in lengthy waiting times, lower satisfaction on the part of families and a risk for patient's safety. The setting up of a nurse consultation in a university paediatric emergency centre has helped to improve the quality of care in this context.

Evaluation de l'application de la PCIME dans un hôpital de pays développé

1.1 Contexte1 Depuis 20 ans, l'OMS (Organisation Mondiale de la Santé) et l'UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund) ont élaboré un programme basé sur l'EBM (evidence Based Medicine) pour aider les pays en voie de développement à diminuer la mortalité infantile dans leur pays. Le succès de la Prise en Charge Intégrée de la Maladie de l'Enfant (PCIME) a permis de l'implanter dans plus de 100 pays en proposant une stratégie sur 3 plans : amélioration des compétences du personnel soignant, amélioration globale du système de santé et amélioration des pratiques familiales et communautaires en matière de santé. 1.2 Objectifs Cette étude évalue l'impact de l'utilisation des arbres décisionnels et des fiches-types de prise en charge proposés par la PCIME dans un hôpital de pays développé tel que l'HEL (Hôpital de l'Enfance). Nous adapterons les modèles pour 2 populations distinctes, le nourrisson âgé de 1 semaine à 2 mois et l'enfant dyspnéique âgé de 2 mois à 5 ans. 1.3 Méthode Dans une première phase, les prises en charge à l'HEL sont analysées par une grille d'évaluation standardisée permettant de les comparer à la prise en charge type PECIME. Les items insuffisamment effectués selon la grille d'évaluation sont présentés aux médecins avec un rappel du rôle de chacun. La seconde partie évalue l'amélioration obtenue dans les prises en charge. Les résultats des deux études vont permettre l'élaboration d'un premier questionnaire et d'une fiche de type check list pour les parents. L'étude évalue deux prises en charge cliniques distinctes. D'une part les nourrissons âgés de 1 semaine à 2 mois et d'autre part les jeunes enfants âgés entre 2 mois et 5 ans qui se présentent avec une dyspnée aux urgences de l'HEL. 1.4 Résultats escomptés Par le biais d'une récolte de données suffisante et d'une formation dispensée entre les deux phases de l'étude, nous nous attendons à une optimisation de la prise en charge des enfants et de leur famille. 1.5 Plus-value escomptée Nous aimerions qu'une telle étude puisse amener des clefs pour une prise en charge complète de l'enfant et de sa famille, en mettant l'accent sur les points essentiels des différentes parties d'une consultation.