Effects of quantitative easing on the USA economy: A test for policy effectiveness

The catastrophic disruption in the USA financial system in the wake of the financial crisis prompted the Federal Reserve to launch a Quantitative Easing (QE) programme in late 2008. In line with Pesaran and Smith (2014), I use a policy effectiveness test to assess whether this massive asset purchase programme was effective in stimulating the economic activity in the USA. Specifically, I employ an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model (ARDL), in order to obtain a counterfactual for the USA real GDP growth rate. Using data from 1983Q1 to 2009Q4, the results show that the beneficial effects of QE appear to be weak and rather short-lived. The null hypothesis of policy ineffectiveness is not rejected, which suggests that QE did not have a meaningful impact on output growth.

Proxy statement proposals after the 2008 financial crash

In traumatic financial times, both shareholders and the media promptly blame companies for lack of decent corporate governance mechanisms. Proxy statement proposals have increasingly been used by the more active shareholders as to vindicate managers to correct anomalies and restore financial markets’ confidence. I examine the proposals of the largest companies in the S&P 500 index after the Lehmann Brothers crash and their effect on stock prices. Proposals initiated by shareholders negatively impact the company’s stock price, particularly if the proposers are unions, pension funds and institutional investors. Also, I find corporate governance proposals to harm firm’s market performance, unlike compensation and social policy proposals whose effects are intangible. The exception to these disappointing attempts to improve companies’ conduct relies on proposals shared by several investors.

Politically driven cycles in fiscal policy: in depth analysis of the functional components of government expenditures

NIPE - WP 02/2016

Financial stress and sovereign debt composition

"Published online: 19 Oct 2015"

Credit markets and the propagation of monetary policy shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses which last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.

Financial liberalisation and industrial development in Malawi

It has been suggested that financial liberalisation may be a key policy to promote industrialisation as it removes the credit access constraint on firms, especially small and medium ones. We investigate the effect of credit expansion in the wake of liberalisation on the structure of the industrial sectors in Malawi and find that, in contrast to the hypothesis above, it resulted in an increase in industrial concentration and a decrease in net firm entry, especially in sectors that are more finance dependent. The case of Malawi is interesting because financial liberalisation has been justified precisely as a means for industrial development and because the implementation of the policy has been regarded as relatively successful.

Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and Institutional Infuences

We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macroeconomy on the financial distress of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an economic model of financial distress under the institutional setting of state protection against exit, and using our own firm-level measure of distress, we find important impacts of firm characteristics, macroeconomic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of financial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other economies highlights important policy implications.

The Timing of Asset Trade and Optimal Policy in Dynamic Open Economies

Using a standard open economy DSGE model, it is shown that the timing of asset trade relative to policy decisions has a potentially important impact on the welfare evaluation of monetary policy at the individual country level. If asset trade in the initial period takes place before the announcement of policy, a national policymaker can choose a policy rule which reduces the work effort of households in the policymaker’s country in the knowledge that consumption is fully insured by optimally chosen international portfolio positions. But if asset trade takes place after the policy announcement, this insurance is absent and households in the policymaker’s country bear the full consumption consequences of the chosen policy rule. The welfare incentives faced by national policymakers are very different between the two cases. Numerical examples confirm that asset market timing has a significant impact on the optimal policy rule.

Transmission of macro-liquidity shocks to liquidity-sorted stock portfolios’ returns: The role of the financial crisis

This study examines the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on the returns of UK stock portfolios sorted on the basis of a series of micro-liquidity measures. The macro-liquidity shocks are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in futures contracts on the 3-month LIBOR during the period June 1999- December 2009. We report definitive evidence that these shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with most liquid stocks playing a very active role. Our results emphatically document that the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign during the recent financial crisis; the standard inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and portfolios’ returns before the crisis has turned into positive during the crisis. This finding confirms the inability of interest rate cuts to boost returns in the shortrun during the crisis, because these were perceived by market participants as a signal of a deteriorating economic outlook.

Financial crisis and quantitative easing: can broad money tell us anything?

When Bank of England (and the Federal Reserve Board) introduced their quantitative easing (QE) operations they emphasised the effects on money and credit, but much of their empirical research on the effects of QE focuses on long-term interest rates. We use a flow of funds matrix with an independent central bank to show the implications of QE and other monetary developments, and argue that the financial crisis, the fiscal expansion and QE are likely to have constituted major exogenous shocks to money and credit in the UK which could not be digested immediately by the usual adjustment mechanisms. We present regressions of a reduced form model which considers the growth of nominal spending as determined by the growth of nominal money and other variables. These results suggest that money was not important during the Great Moderation but has had a much larger role in the period of the crisis and QE. We then use these estimates to illustrate the effects of the financial crisis and QE. We conclude that it would be useful to incorporate money and/or credit in wider macroeconometric models of the UK economy.

Stock Market Reaction to Fed Funds Rate Surprises: State Dependence and the Financial Crisis

This paper examines the impact of Federal Funds rate (FFR) surprises on stock returns in the United States over the period 1989-2009, focusing on the impact of the recent financial crisis. We find that prior to the crisis, stock prices increased as a response to unexpected FFR cuts. State dependence is also identified with stocks exhibiting larger increases when interest rate easing coincided with recessions, bear stock markets, and tightening credit market conditions. However, an important structural shift took place during the financial crisis, which changed the stock market response to FFR shocks, as well as the nature of state dependence. Specifically, during the crisis period stock market participants did not react positively to unexpected FFR cuts. Our results highlight the severity of the recent financial turmoil episode and the ineffectiveness of conventional monetary policy close to the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates.

Monetary policy under the Labour government 1997- 2010: the first 13 years of the MPC

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy under the new framework established in 1997 up to the end of the Labour government in May 2010. Performance was relatively good in the years before the crisis, but much weaker from 2008. The new framework largely neglected open economy issues, while the Treasury’s EMU assessment in 2003 can be interpreted in different ways. inflation targeting in the UK and elsewhere may have contributed in some way to the eruption and depth of the financial crisis from 2008, but UK monetary policy responded in a bold and innovative way. Overall, the design and operation of monetary policy were much better than in earlier periods, but there remains scope for significant further evolution.

Stock Market Liquidity and Macro-Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis

We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999-2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that there is a significant increase in shares’ trading activity and a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during the recent financial crisis the shocks-returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading.

Nominal Stability and Financial Globalization

Over the past four decades, advanced economies experienced a large growth in gross external portfolio positions. This phenomenon has been described as Financial Globalization. Over roughly the same time frame, most of these countries also saw a substantial fall in the level and variability of inflation. Many economists have conjectured that financial globalization contributed to the improved performance in the level and predictability of inflation. In this paper, we explore the causal link running in the opposite direction. We show that a monetary policy rule which reduces inflation variability leads to an increase in the size of gross external positions, both in equity and bond portfolios. This appears to be a robust prediction of open economy macro models with endogenous portfolio choice. It holds across different modeling specifications and parameterizations. We also present preliminary empirical evidence which shows a negative relationship between inflation volatility and the size of gross external positions.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.