874 resultados para effort allocation
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This paper addresses three questions: (1) why does the share of skilledworkers in regional population tend to be higher in wealthier regions? (2)what determines changes in this share over time? and (3) why is it that internalmigration tends to raise average skill levels of the receiving regions relativeto that of the sending regions? I construct a two--region dynamic model withagglomeration and congestion to answer these questions. It is shown that,under certain relationship between wages and demand for land, unskilledworkers are discouraged more strongly from living in a wealthier region andare less mobile than skilled workers.
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Objective: Single port laparoscopy andNOTES aim at decreasing the number¦of trocars, at a price of increased technical difficulty and cost, without until now¦any proof of benefit for the patient.Morbidity related to 5 mm trocar sites (TS)¦is claimed to be low, but there are no good quality data on this topic. The aim¦of the present prospective study is to measure the morbidity and overall specific¦impact related to the 5 mm TS and compare them to larger TS.¦Methods:Wecollected prospectively data on 300 consecutive patients operated¦by laparoscopy in our institution between 2009 and 2010. Pain, morbidity,¦cosmetic, and overall patient discomfort were assessed specifically for each¦TS, using standardized questionnaires, at 3 time points: at discharge from¦the hospital, at 1 month and at 6 months after surgery. Results were compared¦between 5 mmand larger TS (10 mm, 12 mmand 15 mm).Trocar sites replaced¦by a minilaparotomy or a stoma were excluded from analysis. In this study we¦present the short-term results.¦Results: Three-hundred patients (mean age 47·5, women 55%) were operated¦with 1074 TS of which 477(44%) were 5 mm TS. Indication to laparoscopy was¦cholecystectomy (31·3%), appendectomy (26·6%), upper GI surgery (16·3%),¦colon resection (13·3%) or other (12·3%). Follow-up at 1 month was completed¦in 90%.¦The 5 mm TS had an infection rate of 0·2%, and a hematoma rate of 1·7%.¦VAS pain scores at the 5mm TS were ≤3 in 91·6% at rest and in 75·9% upon¦effort at discharge, and in 97% at 1 month. Median patient scar assessment¦score (PSAS) of the 5 mm TS at 1 month was 6 (IQR: 2-9) out of 60 (0 =¦best score). Overall discomfort of the 5 mm TS in a VAS scale was 0 in 77%¦and ≤3 in 95% of patients at 1 month. Morbidity, pain assessments, PSAS, and¦overall discomfort scores were all significantly better for 5 mm TS compared to¦larger TS.¦Conclusion: Morbidity, pain, cosmetic impact and overall patient's discomfort¦related to a 5 mm trocar site is extremely low. For this reason, any potential¦advantage related to omitting 5 mm trocars to perform the same type of surgery¦will be difficult to demonstrate.
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We present a polyhedral framework for establishing general structural properties on optimal solutions of stochastic scheduling problems, where multiple job classes vie for service resources: the existence of an optimal priority policy in a given family, characterized by a greedoid(whose feasible class subsets may receive higher priority), where optimal priorities are determined by class-ranking indices, under restricted linear performance objectives (partial indexability). This framework extends that of Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996), which explained the optimality of priority-index policies under all linear objectives (general indexability). We show that, if performance measures satisfy partial conservation laws (with respect to the greedoid), which extend previous generalized conservation laws, then theproblem admits a strong LP relaxation over a so-called extended greedoid polytope, which has strong structural and algorithmic properties. We present an adaptive-greedy algorithm (which extends Klimov's) taking as input the linear objective coefficients, which (1) determines whether the optimal LP solution is achievable by a policy in the given family; and (2) if so, computes a set of class-ranking indices that characterize optimal priority policies in the family. In the special case of project scheduling, we show that, under additional conditions, the optimal indices can be computed separately for each project (index decomposition). We further apply the framework to the important restless bandit model (two-action Markov decision chains), obtaining new index policies, that extend Whittle's (1988), and simple sufficient conditions for their validity. These results highlight the power of polyhedral methods (the so-called achievable region approach) in dynamic and stochastic optimization.
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The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.
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The emphasis on integrated care implies new incentives that promote coordinationbetween levels of care. Considering a population as a whole, the resource allocation systemhas to adapt to this environment. This research is aimed to design a model that allows formorbidity related prospective and concurrent capitation payment. The model can be applied inpublicly funded health systems and managed competition settings.Methods: We analyze the application of hybrid risk adjustment versus either prospective orconcurrent risk adjustment formulae in the context of funding total health expenditures for thepopulation of an integrated healthcare delivery organization in Catalonia during years 2004 and2005.Results: The hybrid model reimburses integrated care organizations avoiding excessive risktransfer and maximizing incentives for efficiency in the provision. At the same time, it eliminatesincentives for risk selection for a specific set of high risk individuals through the use ofconcurrent reimbursement in order to assure a proper classification of patients.Conclusion: Prospective Risk Adjustment is used to transfer the financial risk to the healthprovider and therefore provide incentives for efficiency. Within the context of a National HealthSystem, such transfer of financial risk is illusory, and the government has to cover the deficits.Hybrid risk adjustment is useful to provide the right combination of incentive for efficiency andappropriate level of risk transfer for integrated care organizations.
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When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.
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We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.
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The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.
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This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.
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This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.
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Previous indirect evidence suggests that impulses towards pro-socialbehavior are diminished when an external authority is responsiblefor an outcome. The responsibility-alleviation effect states that ashift of responsibility to an external authority dampens internalimpulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity. In a gift-exchangeexperiment, we find that subjects respond with more generosity(higher effort) when a wage is determined by a random process thanwhen it is assigned by a third party, indicating that even a slightshift in perceived responsibility for the final payoffs can changebehavior. Responsibility-alleviation is a factor in economicenvironments featuring substantial personal interaction.
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The goal of this paper is to present an optimal resource allocation model for the regional allocation of public service inputs. Theproposed solution leads to maximise the relative public service availability in regions located below the best availability frontier, subject to exogenous budget restrictions and equality ofaccess for equal need criteria (equity-based notion of regional needs). The construction of non-parametric deficit indicators is proposed for public service availability by a novel application of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models, whose results offer advantages for the evaluation and improvement of decentralised public resource allocation systems. The method introduced in this paper has relevance as a resource allocation guide for the majority of services centrally funded by the public sector in a given country, such as health care, basic and higher education, citizen safety, justice, transportation, environmental protection, leisure, culture, housing and city planning, etc.
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We postulate a two-region world, comprised of North (calibrated after the US) and South(calibrated after China). Our optimization results show the compatibility of the following threedesiderata:(1) Global CO2 emissions follow a conservative path that leads to the stabilizationof concentrations at 450 ppm.(2) North and South converge to a path of sustained growth at 1% per year (28.2%per generation) in 2075.(3) During the transition to the steady state, North also grows at 1% per year whileSouth s rates of growth are markedly higher.The transition paths require a drastic reduction of the share of emissions allocated to North,large investments in knowledge, both in North and South, as well as very large investments ineducation in South. Surprisingly, in order to sustain North s utility growth rate, some output mustbe transferred from South to North during the transition.Although undoubtedly subject to many caveats, our results support a degree of optimism byproviding prima facie evidence of the possibility of tackling climate change in a way that is fairboth across generations and across regions while allowing for positive rates of humandevelopment.
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In this paper we address the issue of locating hierarchical facilities in the presence of congestion. Two hierarchical models are presented, where lower level servers attend requests first, and then, some of the served customers are referred to higher level servers. In the first model, the objective is to find the minimum number of servers and theirlocations that will cover a given region with a distance or time standard. The second model is cast as a Maximal Covering Location formulation. A heuristic procedure is then presented together with computational experience. Finally, some extensions of these models that address other types of spatial configurations are offered.