A percepção da fiscalização dos contratos de mão de obra terceirizada pelos agentes envolvidos nesse processo no âmbito da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte: uma análise sob o modelo do principal-agente

Outsourcing has emerged as one of the new ways of guiding the work. For its advantages and be consistent with the paradigms of managerial reform, outsourcing also started to be used in the Public Administration. However, taking into account the particularities of the latter, some issues are relevant when outsourcing concluded with the State. Gains notoriety, for example, the step of monitoring these contracts, to the extent that, from this activity, we can avoid the negative effects of outsourcing like the fact that the state will pay for labor and wage liens that are obligation of the company providing the services. This study aims to understand the perception that this process is under the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, from the point of view of different stakeholders, also explaining the motivations that these agents have to perform the supervisory process. As a theoretical basis was used the Agency Theory, which reinforces the supervisory activities as a necessary means to minimize moral hazard and adverse selection, seeking to understand not only the different motivations tax contracts to properly perform their duties, but also analyze other phenomena arising from this contractual relationship. To achieve the proposed objectives, were taken a literature review and a presentation of how to organize the management and oversight of contracts in UFRN. The methodological procedures included questionnaires and interviews with those involved in the process. After analyzing the results obtained in the survey instruments , and also based on the laws, regulations and instructions governing the procurement process within the UFRN, it was concluded that the process of overseeing the outsourcing of labor contracts in UFRN is not fully institutionalized, some points should be strengthened in order to have the consolidation of this process, highlighting the need for training of UFRN servers that act as tax, the knowledge that the contractual penalties are applied effectively, the need that there is a supervisor of tax of contractors and also the realization of the rotation system of outsourced employees

Insurance underwriter or financial development fund: what role for reserve pooling in Latin America?

Includes bibliography

Prevention and insurance of conflict and terrorism: issues and evidence for Latin America

Includes bibliography

As decisões de investimento e a instabilidade financeira

Initially, the text handles the theories of ancient classical and changes with the emerging of the debates of the schools of economic of Keynes and Kalecki. Over the years, from 1930 onwards, investment theories were debated and modified by various schools of economic thought. One of the debates that stands out in this work are the theories of Minsky that will bring new reformulations to Keynesian theory and a greater focus on psychological factors as determinants of investment decisions. Through financial instability hypothesis Minsky explains how the decisions to invest and the access to credit cause instability to financial system. Finally the work will show how access to credit is material when companies decide to invest and how these investments are often handled due to information asymmetries in the market. The financial institutions seek to maximize their profits while dribbling moral hazard and adverse selection, and thus the government needs to intervene once in a while as a regulator to maintain the solvency of the system

A property rights approach to strategy

This article is about how resources can be conceptualized as bundles of attributes for which one can assign economic property rights. Strategic considerations are deliberately incorporated into the analysis through the assessment of the activities of capture and protection of property rights, along with the examination of the institutional environment. These basic elements combine in order to design an approach to strategy. In developing this approach, the authors identify four key questions for structuring the strategy formulation process of the firm. The analytical framework is illustrated through a particular case: the collection of royalties on the genetically modified (GM) technology in soybean seeds.

Say on Pay: ein Überblick über Gestaltungsoptionen, ökonomische Konsequenzen und Erkenntnisse aus Empirie und Laborexperimenten

Unter dem Stichwort Say on Pay (SoP) haben in den letzen Jahren die meisten Länder der EU und die USA den Aktionären Abstimmungsrechte im Zusammenhang mit der Vergütung des Top-Managements eingeräumt. Zwischen den einzelnen Ländern bestehen jedoch erhebliche Unterschiede hinsichtlich der konkreten Ausgestaltung des SoP. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die Wirkungen unterschiedlicher Gestaltungsoptionen des SoP auf die Anreizgestaltung und den Nutzen des Managements und der Aktionäre im Rahmen eines einfachen linearen Agency Modells. Dabei erweisen sich das vorvertragliche bindende SoP und das bedingt verpflichtende, nachvertragliche bindende SoP gegenüber den anderen untersuchten Varianten als überlegen. Während das konsultative SoP an seiner mangelnden Durchsetzbarkeit leidet, bietet das nachvertragliche bindende SoP Anreize für opportunistisches Verhalten auf Seiten der Aktionäre und führt deshalb zu Wohlfahrtsverlusten. In Ergänzung der Modellanalyse wird ein Überblick über die wichtigsten empirischen und experimentellen Studien zum Thema SoP gegeben und deren Inhalt im Lichte der Modellergebnisse diskutiert. Most countries of the European Union as well as the US recently introduced shareholder votes on the remuneration of executives, also referred to as “Say on Pay” (SoP). Interestingly, legislators in different jurisdictions opted for quite dissimilar voting right regimes. We provide an overview of the main regulatory approaches and discuss the potential impact of variations in SoP design on the structure of compensation contracts and the utility of shareholders and executives. We find that pre-contractual SoP and conditional post-contractual SoP with binding consequences are in the best interest of shareholders. By contrast, advisory SoP typically suffers from lacking enforceability. We also find that post-contractual SoP with binding consequences results in efficiency losses because it fuels moral hazard on the part of shareholders. We complement the theoretical analysis with a discussion of recent empirical and experimental studies on Say on Pay.

The Optimal Response to Default: Renegotiation or Extended Maturity?

This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater incentive to avoid default under extended maturity because it reduces the likelihood that they will be able to escape paying off the full loan balance. Thus, although extended maturity leaves open the possibility of foreclosure, it will be preferred to renegotiation as long as the dead weight loss from foreclosure is not too large.

¿Es la pobreza un determinante crucial de participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes? : Una exploración con datos de algunas regiones de Argentina

De acuerdo con los modelos teóricos más usados para el estudio del trabajo infantil, uno de los principales determinantes de su nivel es la pobreza del hogar en el que residen los niños. Más concretamente, Basu y Van (1998) plantean a nivel teórico el llamado por ellos ?luxury axiom? (la), según el cual los hogares están comandados por padres altruistas y pobres que recurren al trabajo infantil como un medio de escapar de la pobreza. Según este mismo esquema teórico y si la economía está en una situación de equilibrio múltiple, puede que la aplicación efectiva de las leyes que prohíben el trabajo infantil provoque un empeoramiento del bienestar de los hogares y aumente la pobreza. Para que esto se dé, es necesario también que el otro axioma del modelo de Basu y Van (1998), el ?complementary axiom?, no se verifique en la realidad. Con datos provenientes de la Encuesta de Actividades de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (EANNA) realizada en la Argentina en 2004, se exploran empíricamente estas hipótesis. En primer lugar, se trata de examinar en qué medida el ingreso familiar estaría actuando como un determinante de la participación económica de niños entre 5 y 17 años. Luego se procede a analizar la cuestión simulando una situación de política pública que reduzca en un porcentaje dado la participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes y observando su impacto sobre las tasas de pobreza de las distintas regiones de la Argentina. También se analizan hipótesis específicas, como, por ejemplo, la endogeneidad del ingreso familiar total que estaría recibiendo los efectos de un moral hazard en la conducta de los adultos

¿Es la pobreza un determinante crucial de participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes? : Una exploración con datos de algunas regiones de Argentina

De acuerdo con los modelos teóricos más usados para el estudio del trabajo infantil, uno de los principales determinantes de su nivel es la pobreza del hogar en el que residen los niños. Más concretamente, Basu y Van (1998) plantean a nivel teórico el llamado por ellos ?luxury axiom? (la), según el cual los hogares están comandados por padres altruistas y pobres que recurren al trabajo infantil como un medio de escapar de la pobreza. Según este mismo esquema teórico y si la economía está en una situación de equilibrio múltiple, puede que la aplicación efectiva de las leyes que prohíben el trabajo infantil provoque un empeoramiento del bienestar de los hogares y aumente la pobreza. Para que esto se dé, es necesario también que el otro axioma del modelo de Basu y Van (1998), el ?complementary axiom?, no se verifique en la realidad. Con datos provenientes de la Encuesta de Actividades de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (EANNA) realizada en la Argentina en 2004, se exploran empíricamente estas hipótesis. En primer lugar, se trata de examinar en qué medida el ingreso familiar estaría actuando como un determinante de la participación económica de niños entre 5 y 17 años. Luego se procede a analizar la cuestión simulando una situación de política pública que reduzca en un porcentaje dado la participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes y observando su impacto sobre las tasas de pobreza de las distintas regiones de la Argentina. También se analizan hipótesis específicas, como, por ejemplo, la endogeneidad del ingreso familiar total que estaría recibiendo los efectos de un moral hazard en la conducta de los adultos

¿Es la pobreza un determinante crucial de participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes? : Una exploración con datos de algunas regiones de Argentina

De acuerdo con los modelos teóricos más usados para el estudio del trabajo infantil, uno de los principales determinantes de su nivel es la pobreza del hogar en el que residen los niños. Más concretamente, Basu y Van (1998) plantean a nivel teórico el llamado por ellos ?luxury axiom? (la), según el cual los hogares están comandados por padres altruistas y pobres que recurren al trabajo infantil como un medio de escapar de la pobreza. Según este mismo esquema teórico y si la economía está en una situación de equilibrio múltiple, puede que la aplicación efectiva de las leyes que prohíben el trabajo infantil provoque un empeoramiento del bienestar de los hogares y aumente la pobreza. Para que esto se dé, es necesario también que el otro axioma del modelo de Basu y Van (1998), el ?complementary axiom?, no se verifique en la realidad. Con datos provenientes de la Encuesta de Actividades de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (EANNA) realizada en la Argentina en 2004, se exploran empíricamente estas hipótesis. En primer lugar, se trata de examinar en qué medida el ingreso familiar estaría actuando como un determinante de la participación económica de niños entre 5 y 17 años. Luego se procede a analizar la cuestión simulando una situación de política pública que reduzca en un porcentaje dado la participación económica de niños, niñas y adolescentes y observando su impacto sobre las tasas de pobreza de las distintas regiones de la Argentina. También se analizan hipótesis específicas, como, por ejemplo, la endogeneidad del ingreso familiar total que estaría recibiendo los efectos de un moral hazard en la conducta de los adultos

Bounding ATE with ITT

We propose the bounds on ATE using intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator when there are compliers/noncompliers in randomized trials. The bounds are given as ITTNACE, (2) noncompliers' average treatment effect (NACE) is nonnegative. We give an example of poverty impacts of health insurance, and effects of adverse selection and moral hazard of health insurance.

Innovative tools to address drought risk in grazing lands

Drought spells can impose severe impacts in most vulnerable farms. It is well known that uninsured exposure exacerbates income inequality in farming systems. However, high administrative costs of traditional insurance hinder small farmers? access to risk management tools. The existence of moral hazard and systemic risk prevents the implementation of traditional insurance programs to address drought risk in rural areas. Innovative technologies like satellite images are being used to derive vegetation index which are highly correlated with drought impacts. The implementation of this technology in agricultural insurance may help to overcome some of the limitations of traditional insurance. However, basis risk has been identified as one of the main problems that hinder the acceptance of index insurance. In this paper we focus on the analyses of basis risk under different contract options in the grazing lands of the Araucanía region. A vegetation index database is used to develop an actuarial insurance model and estimate risk premiums for moderate and severe drought coverage. Risk premium sharply increases with risk coverage. In contrast with previous findings in the literature, our results are not conclusive and show that lowering the coverage level does not necessarily imply a reduction in basis risk. Further analyses of the relation between contract design and basis risk is a promising area of research that may render an important social utility for most vulnerable farming systems.

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used

Framing Banking Union in the Euro Area: Some empirical evidence. CEPS Working Document No. 389, 3 February 2014

Evidence shows that financial integration in the euro area is retrenching at a quicker pace than outside the union. Home bias persists: Governments compete on funding costs by supporting ‘their’ banks with massive state aids, which distorts the playing field and feeds the risk-aversion loop. This situation intensifies friction in credit markets, thus hampering the transmission of monetary policies and, potentially, economic growth. This paper discusses the theoretical foundations of a banking union in a common currency area and the legal and economic aspects of EU responses. As a result, two remedies are proposed to deal with moral hazard in a common currency area: a common (unlimited) financial backstop to a privately funded recapitalisation/resolution fund and a blanket prohibition on state aids.

Flexibility clauses in the Stability and Growth Pact: No need for revision. CEPS Policy Brief No. 319, 24 July 2014

This Policy Brief offers an in-depth review of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and looks at whether the margins of flexibility within existing rules are sufficient in the current climate of low growth, or whether there is a need to broaden them. The issue is especially relevant as the changing economic environment is raising fresh questions about whether the EU’s current common economic policies are able to manage dismal growth and low inflation. The fragile state of confidence in financial markets and the unresolved but inevitable questions of moral hazard linked to lax fiscal policies mean that no large-scale fiscal expansion to support the recovery of economic activity is feasible. The discussion may therefore only concern the scope within the SGP to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and to provide room for the implementation of structural reforms. Here, we analyse the flexibility clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact under three headings; namely “exceptional circumstances”, “structural reforms and other relevant factors”, and the “investment clause”. Recommendation: Our main conclusion is that the SGP contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and has the margins needed to finance structural reforms during the transition to the new regime. We therefore see no need to change the existing rules of the SGP. We believe that the ongoing debate about a fresh growth strategy for the eurozone and the European Union would greatly benefit from removing from the Council table ill-formulated and unnecessary demands for greater flexibility in the SGP.