Prestimulus default mode activity influences depth of processing and recognition in an emotional memory task

Low self-referential thoughts are associated with better concentration, which leads to deeper encoding and increases learning and subsequent retrieval. There is evidence that being engaged in externally rather than internally focused tasks is related to low neural activity in the default mode network (DMN) promoting open mind and the deep elaboration of new information. Thus, reduced DMN activity should lead to enhanced concentration, comprehensive stimulus evaluation including emotional categorization, deeper stimulus processing, and better long-term retention over one whole week. In this fMRI study, we investigated brain activation preceding and during incidental encoding of emotional pictures and on subsequent recognition performance. During fMRI, 24 subjects were exposed to 80 pictures of different emotional valence and subsequently asked to complete an online recognition task one week later. Results indicate that neural activity within the medial temporal lobes during encoding predicts subsequent memory performance. Moreover, a low activity of the default mode network preceding incidental encoding leads to slightly better recognition performance independent of the emotional perception of a picture. The findings indicate that the suppression of internally-oriented thoughts leads to a more comprehensive and thorough evaluation of a stimulus and its emotional valence. Reduced activation of the DMN prior to stimulus onset is associated with deeper encoding and enhanced consolidation and retrieval performance even one week later. Even small prestimulus lapses of attention influence consolidation and subsequent recognition performance. Hum Brain Mapp, 2015. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities

Free riders and holdouts are market failures that potentially impede the completion of otherwise beneficial transactions. The key difference is that the free rider problem is a demand side externality that requires taxation to compel payment for a public good, while the holdout problem is a supply side externality that requires eminent domain to force the sale of land for large scale projects. This paper highlights that distinction between these two problems and uses the resulting insights to clarify the meaning of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment takings clause.

Empirical Analysis of Credit Risk Regime Switching and Temporal Conditional Default Correlation in Credit Default Swap Valuation: The Market liquidity effect

In this paper, we extend the debate concerning Credit Default Swap valuation to include time varying correlation and co-variances. Traditional multi-variate techniques treat the correlations between covariates as constant over time; however, this view is not supported by the data. Secondly, since financial data does not follow a normal distribution because of its heavy tails, modeling the data using a Generalized Linear model (GLM) incorporating copulas emerge as a more robust technique over traditional approaches. This paper also includes an empirical analysis of the regime switching dynamics of credit risk in the presence of liquidity by following the general practice of assuming that credit and market risk follow a Markov process. The study was based on Credit Default Swap data obtained from Bloomberg that spanned the period January 1st 2004 to August 08th 2006. The empirical examination of the regime switching tendencies provided quantitative support to the anecdotal view that liquidity decreases as credit quality deteriorates. The analysis also examined the joint probability distribution of the credit risk determinants across credit quality through the use of a copula function which disaggregates the behavior embedded in the marginal gamma distributions, so as to isolate the level of dependence which is captured in the copula function. The results suggest that the time varying joint correlation matrix performed far superior as compared to the constant correlation matrix; the centerpiece of linear regression models.

The Optimal Response to Default: Renegotiation or Extended Maturity?

This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater incentive to avoid default under extended maturity because it reduces the likelihood that they will be able to escape paying off the full loan balance. Thus, although extended maturity leaves open the possibility of foreclosure, it will be preferred to renegotiation as long as the dead weight loss from foreclosure is not too large.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.

Human Capital Externalities and Private Returns to Education in Kenya

We use micro data to analyse the effect of human capital externality on earnings and private returns to education. The earnings equations are estimated using the OLS method for a sample of full-time workers. The results show that human capital has a positive effect on earnings, indicating that an increase in education benefits all workers. However, men benefit more from women's education than the women do from men's. The effects of human capital externality on private returns to schooling are shown to vary substantially between rural and urban areas and across levels of the education system.

Competition of the mechanisms : how Chinese home appliance firms coped with default risk of trade credit?

During the transition period from a planned economy to a market economy in 1990s of China, there was a considerable accrual of deferred payment, and default due to inferior enforcement institutions. This is a very common phenomenon in the transition economies at that time. Interviews with home electronics appliance firms revealed that firms coped with this problem by adjusting their sales mechanisms (found four types), and the benefit of institutions was limited. A theoretical analysis claim that spot and integration are inferior to contracts, a contract with a rebate on volume and prepayment against an exclusive agent can realize the lowest cost and price. The empirical part showed that mechanisms converged into a mechanism with the rebate on volume an against exclusive agent and its price level is the lowest. The competition is the driving force of the convergence of mechanisms and improvement risk management capacity.

The default mode network is functionally and structurally disrupted in amnestic mild cognitive impairment — a bimodal MEG–DTI study

Over the past years, several studies on Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) and Alzheimer's disease (AD) have reported Default Mode Network (DMN) deficits. This network is attracting increasing interest in the AD community, as it seems to play an important role in cognitive functioning and in beta amyloid deposition. Attention has been particularly drawn to how different DMN regions are connected using functional or structural connectivity. To this end, most studies have used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), Positron Emission Tomography (PET) or Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI). In this study we evaluated (1) functional connectivity from resting state magnetoencephalography (MEG) and (2) structural connectivity from DTI in 26 MCI patients and 31 age-matched controls. Compared to controls, the DMN in the MCI group was functionally disrupted in the alpha band, while no differences were found for delta, theta, beta and gamma frequency bands. In addition, structural disconnection could be assessed through a decreased fractional anisotropy along tracts connecting different DMN regions. This suggests that the DMN functional and anatomical disconnection could represent a core feature of MCI.

Segregation of Heterotrimeric G Proteins in Cell Surface Microdomains: Gq Binds Caveolin to Concentrate in Caveolae, whereas Gi and Gs Target Lipid Rafts by Default

Select lipid-anchored proteins such as glycosylphosphatidylinositol (GPI)-anchored proteins and nonreceptor tyrosine kinases may preferentially partition into sphingomyelin-rich and cholesterol-rich plasmalemmal microdomains, thereby acquiring resistance to detergent extraction. Two such domains, caveolae and lipid rafts, are morphologically and biochemically distinct, contain many signaling molecules, and may function in compartmentalizing cell surface signaling. Subfractionation and confocal immunofluorescence microscopy reveal that, in lung tissue and in cultured endothelial and epithelial cells, heterotrimeric G proteins (Gi, Gq, Gs, and Gβγ) target discrete cell surface microdomains. Gq specifically concentrates in caveolae, whereas Gi and Gs concentrate much more in lipid rafts marked by GPI-anchored proteins (5′ nucleotidase and folate receptor). Gq, apparently without Gβγ subunits, stably associates with plasmalemmal and cytosolic caveolin. Gi and Gs interact with Gβγ subunits but not caveolin. Gi and Gs, unlike Gq, readily move out of caveolae. Thus, caveolin may function as a scaffold to trap, concentrate, and stabilize Gq preferentially within caveolae over lipid rafts. In N2a cells lacking caveolae and caveolin, Gq, Gi, and Gs all concentrate in lipid rafts as a complex with Gβγ. Without effective physiological interaction with caveolin, G proteins tend by default to segregate in lipid rafts. The ramifications of the segregated microdomain distribution and the Gq-caveolin complex without Gβγ for trafficking, signaling, and mechanotransduction are discussed.