Testing and modelling to obtain material behaviour for crash simulations

The thesis focusses on improving the material behaviour models used in vehicle crash simulations by identifying the mechanical properties most important to crash events, reformulating the material models used in crash simulations, and developing new tests to obtain crash-relevant material.

Crash investigation of side intrusion beam during high and low pressure tube hydroforming

Advanced high strength steels (AHSS), in particular, are an attractive group materials, offering higher strength for improved energy absorption and the opportunity to reduce weight through the use of thinner gauges. High pressure tube hydroforming (HPTH) has been used to produce safety components for these steels, but it is expensive. Low pressure tube hydroforming (LPTH) is a lower cost alternative to form the safety components in the car. The side intrusion beam is the second most critical part after front rail in the car structure for passenger safety during crash. The forming as well as crash behaviour of a square side intrusion beam from both processes was investigated using numerical simulation. This paper investigated the interaction between the forming and crash response of these materials in order to evaluate their potential for use in vehicle design for crashworthiness. The energy absorption characteristics of the different tubes were calculated and the results from the numerical analyses compared for both hydroforming process.

Crash landing at INSEAD : initiating a grounded theory of the pedagogical effectiveness of simulation games for teaching aspects of entrepreneurship

A practical teaching difficulty arising in a conducive environment provided opportunity to turn the particular problem into a case study with generic implications. Little research has been conducted on the use or effectiveness of simulation games for teaching entrepreneurship. In the context of established literature critiquing the effectiveness of simulation games as teaching devices in managerial contexts and at a point where problems in using a simulation game as part of entrepreneurship course became evident, the authors designed and executed a single-case research project to generate initial theoretical propositions about the pedagogical effectiveness of simulation games for teaching various concepts and aspects of entrepreneurship. The case analysed the perceived learning environment created when the Sky-High simulation was played by 41 MBA students taking an elective entrepreneurship course at INSEAD. The research design embodied the established methodological principles specified by Yin (1989), for effective case research. Theory building was based upon the grounded-theorizing procedures articulated by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Analysis and synthesis produced a grounded theory, in the form of a normative argument, containing four attribute categories and associated properties required of a simulation game to make it an efficacious teaching device in entrepreneurship contexts. The establishment of this grounded theory has made it both desirable and feasible to contemplate creation of an ISO quality standard for educational simulation games.

CAE crash analysis of structures in oblique loading

This work focussed on how tubular steel structures similar to that in frontal car frames deform under crash conditions. The novelty comes from finding three crash modes: axial crush, transitional and global bending. Each mode was categorised by reaction force and energy absorption, this allowing for better structural design practices.

Development of novel crash structures

In this thesis, the crash properties of carbon fibre composites were studied in detail. Also, novel materials were developed and characterized so that they could potentially be used for automotive crash applications.

Estimating fatality rates in occupational light vehicle users using vehicle registration and crash data

Objective: To estimate occupational light vehicle (OLV) fatality numbers using vehicle registration and crash data and compare these with previous estimates based on workers' compensation data. Method: New South Wales (NSW) Roads and Traffic Authority (RTA) vehicle registration and crash data were obtained for 2004. NSW is the only Australian jurisdiction with mandatory work-use registration, which was used as a proxy for work-relatedness. OLV fatality rates based on registration data as the denominator were calculated and comparisons made with published 2003/04 fatalities based on workers' compensation data. Results: Thirty-four NSW RTA OLV-user fatalities were identified, a rate of 4.5 deaths per 100,000 organisationally registered OLV, whereas the Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC), reported 28 OLV deaths Australia-wide. Conclusions: More OLV user fatalities were identified from vehicle registration-based data than those based on workers' compensation estimates and the data are likely to provide an improved estimate of fatalities specific to OLV use. Implications: OLV-use is an important cause of traumatic fatalities that would be better identified through the use of vehicle-registration data, which provides a stronger evidence base from which to develop policy responses.

Association between perception of fault for the crash and function, return to work and health status 1 year after road traffic injury: a registry-based cohort study

Objectives To establish the association between the patient's perception of fault for the crash and 12-month outcomes after non-fatal road traffic injury.Setting Two adult major trauma centres, one regional trauma centre and one metropolitan trauma centre in Victoria, Australia.Participants 2605 adult, orthopaedic trauma patients covered by the state's no-fault third party insurer for road traffic injury, injured between September 2010 and February 2014.Outcome measures EQ-5D-3L, return to work and functional recovery (Glasgow Outcome Scale—Extended score of upper good recovery) at 12 months postinjury.Results After adjusting for key confounders, the adjusted relative risk (ARR) of a functional recovery (0.57, 95% CI 0.46 to 0.69) and return to work (0.92, 95% CI 0.86 to 0.99) were lower for the not at fault compared to the at fault group. The ARR of reporting problems on EQ-5D items was 1.20–1.35 times higher in the not at fault group. Conclusions Patients who were not at fault, or denied being at fault despite a police report of fault, experienced poorer outcomes than the at fault group. Attributing fault to others was associated with poorer outcomes. Interventions to improve coping, or to resolve negative feelings from the crash, could facilitate better outcomes in the future.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.