Computational Analysis of Intelligent Agents: Social and Strategic Settings

The central motif of this work is prediction and optimization in presence of multiple interacting intelligent agents. We use the phrase `intelligent agents' to imply in some sense, a `bounded rationality', the exact meaning of which varies depending on the setting. Our agents may not be `rational' in the classical game theoretic sense, in that they don't always optimize a global objective. Rather, they rely on heuristics, as is natural for human agents or even software agents operating in the real-world. Within this broad framework we study the problem of influence maximization in social networks where behavior of agents is myopic, but complication stems from the structure of interaction networks. In this setting, we generalize two well-known models and give new algorithms and hardness results for our models. Then we move on to models where the agents reason strategically but are faced with considerable uncertainty. For such games, we give a new solution concept and analyze a real-world game using out techniques. Finally, the richest model we consider is that of Network Cournot Competition which deals with strategic resource allocation in hypergraphs, where agents reason strategically and their interaction is specified indirectly via player's utility functions. For this model, we give the first equilibrium computability results. In all of the above problems, we assume that payoffs for the agents are known. However, for real-world games, getting the payoffs can be quite challenging. To this end, we also study the inverse problem of inferring payoffs, given game history. We propose and evaluate a data analytic framework and we show that it is fast and performant.

Tributos indiretos na cadeia produtiva do camarão

The state of Rio Grande do Norte counts with a relevant potential in the shrimp farming supply chain. In the larviculture step the state responds for more than half of the national production. In the farming step it is the second largest producer. In the industrial step, its industries have almost 40% of the shrimp processing capacity of the northeast of Brazil. However, this country has the highest tax rate comparing with the main shrimp producer countries. Considering the influence of taxes in the competition among companies, the main goal of this research is to analyze the impact of indirect taxes in the above steps of the supply chain. To achieve it, it will be used the data of the 2011 Census of the Shrimp Farming and it will be applied the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index to identify the market form of those steps. In order to contribute with the characterization of the supply chain, CEO´s of farms and industries will be interviewed. The price-elasticity of the shrimp larvae, the in natura shrimp and the processed shrimp will be analyzed in order to verify the possibility that each one of those three steps has to pass-through the onus of the end of benefit over the ICMS. The data analysis shows that the larviculture step functions as a duopoly and, facing the end of that benefit, it will be able to pass-through most its onus to the farming step. On the other hand, this step functions similar to a perfect competing market, which diminishes its capacity to pass-through that onus to the processing step. This step operates as oligopoly with a lower concentration than the larviculture step but, due to the fact that it faces an oligopsony, it will end up assuming most of that onus, which will cause a decrease in the amount of processed shrimp. It is concluded that the end of that benefit would impact negatively, in this state, the supply chain at all, but mainly the farming and the industrial steps

An Analysis of Colombian Power Market Price Behavior from an Industrial Organization Perspective

We analyze the behavior of spot prices in the Colombian wholesale power market, using a series of models derived from industrial organization theory -- We first create a Cournot-based model that simulates the strategic behavior of the market-leader power generators, which we use to estimate two industrial organization variables, the Index of Residual Demand and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -- We use these variables to create VAR models that estimate spot prices and power market impulse-response relationships -- The results from these models show that hydroelectric generators can use their water storage capability strategically to affect off-peak prices primarily, while the thermal generators can manage their capacity strategically to affect on-peak prices -- In addition, shocks to the Index of Residual Capacity and to the HHI cause spot price fluctuations, which can be interpreted as the generators´ strategic response to these shocks

Essays on Financial Constraints, R&D Investments, and Competition

This dissertation consists of two chapters of theoretical studies that investigate the effect of financial constraints and market competition on research and development (R&D) investments. In the first chapter, I explore the impact of financial constraints on two different types of R&D investments. In the second chapter, I examine the impact of market competition on the relationship between financial constraints and R&D investments. In the first chapter, I develop a dynamic monopoly model to study a firm’s R&D strategy. Contrary to intuition, I show that a financially constrained firm may invest more aggressively in R&D projects than an unconstrained firm. Financial constraints introduce a risk that a firm may run out of money before its project bears fruit, which leads to involuntary termination on an otherwise positive-NPV project. For a company that relies on cash flow from assets in place to keep its R&D project alive, early success can be relatively important. I find that when the discovery process can be expedited by heavier investment (“accelerable” projects), a financially constrained company may find it optimal to “over”-invest in order to raise the probability of project survival. The over-investment will not happen if the project is only “scalable” (investment scales up payoffs). The model generates several testable implications regarding over-investment and project values. In the second chapter, I study the effects of competition on R&D investments in a duopoly framework. Using a homogeneous duopoly model where two unconstrained firms compete head to head in an R&D race, I find that competition has no effect on R&D investment if the project is not accelerable, and the competing firms are not constrained. In a heterogeneous duopoly model where a financially constrained firm competes against an unconstrained firm, I discover interesting strategic interactions that lead to preemption by the constrained firm in equilibrium. The unconstrained competitor responds to its constrained rival’s investment in an inverted-U shape fashion. When the constrained competitor has high cash flow risk, it accelerates the innovation in equilibrium, while the unconstrained firm invests less aggressively and waits for its rival to quit the race due to shortage of funds.

Incentive based policies on climate change: taxes and tradable emssions permits

The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...

El efecto de la definición regulatoria de banda ancha sobre la difusión y la competencia del mercado de servicios de Internet fijo en Colombia

A partir de la dinámica evolutiva de la economía de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones y el establecimiento de estándares mínimos de velocidad en distintos contextos regulatorios a nivel mundial, en particular en Colombia, en el presente artículo se presentan diversas aproximaciones empíricas para evaluar los efectos reales que conlleva el establecimiento de definiciones de servicios de banda ancha en el mercado de Internet fijo. Con base en los datos disponibles para Colombia sobre los planes de servicios de Internet fijo ofrecidos durante el periodo 2006-2012, se estima para los segmentos residencial y corporativo el proceso de difusión logístico modificado y el modelo de interacción estratégica para identificar los impactos generados sobre la masificación del servicio a nivel municipal y sobre las decisiones estratégicas que adoptan los operadores, respectivamente. Respecto a los resultados, se encuentra, por una parte, que las dos medidas regulatorias establecidas en Colombia en 2008 y 2010 presentan efectos significativos y positivos sobre el desplazamiento y el crecimiento de los procesos de difusión a nivel municipal. Por otra parte, se observa sustituibilidad estratégica en las decisiones de oferta de velocidad de descarga por parte de los operadores corporativos mientras que, a partir del análisis de distanciamiento de la velocidad ofrecida respecto al estándar mínimo de banda ancha, se demuestra que los proveedores de servicios residenciales tienden a agrupar sus decisiones de velocidad alrededor de los niveles establecidos por regulación.