The Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases

This paper discusses whether or not Strasbourg organs have created principled criteria governing the use of the doctrine within the context of free speech and public morals. The first part of the paper gives an overview of the doctrine and further examines how the doctrine has evolved within the European context. Part II focuses on the rationale behind the doctrine and discusses the legitimacy of the doctrine in light of its application to various forms of free speech. Part III covers one of the most problematic applications of the doctrine in matters concerning public morality, where Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation. This part will discuss whether or not the “lack of European consensus” criterion is an elusive concept that might create a risk of abuse in the application of the doctrine. The paper concludes that while margin of appreciation today serves as a flexible instrument between the local necessities and the universal application of human rights, the imprecise and contradictory points might lead to its potential abuse that might endanger its future existence.

Home Confined Consumers’ Freedom through Surrogate Activities: the Role of Personal Communities

This article explores the nature of surrogate consumption activity with three cases of non-institutionalised home confined consumers. The role played by personal communities in their daily lives is explored from the constrained rural contexts in which they consume. Despite the barriers to achieving normalcy in the marketplace, home confined consumers are able to realise freedom and agency, and express identity through engagement in surrogate consumption activity. Surrogate consumption activity also provides home confined consumers with opportunities to reinforce and challenge traditional family practices (discourses of care) through the ability for relationship culture development and social capital creation. Findings in this study show that home confined consumers, labeled as 'limited-choice' (Gabel, 2005) have the ability to display power, make choices, and find their voice despite non-interaction in the marketplace.

Democratic Participation, Engagement, and Freedom

It is commonly supposed that democracies should encourage greater political participation and civic engagement. This article identifies two distinct perspectives on political participation and civic engagement: a ‘freedom-centred’ model and an ‘ethical’ model. The ‘freedom-centred’ model defended here draws on the republican concept of freedom as non-domination, together with the political liberal notion of fair deliberative proceduralism, while the ethical model draws on Aristotelian, perfectionist, sources. It is argued that the ‘ethical’ model is overly concerned with the ‘moral renewal’ of modern social life, and is insensitive to problems of domination posed by its account of civic reciprocity and trust. By contrast, the ‘freedom-centred’ model developed offers a systematic account of personal and political freedom, which provides qualified support for deliberative modes of participation and engagement.

Multiculturalism, freedom of religion, equality, and the British constitution: The JFS case considered

In the JFS case, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom held that the admissions policy of a Jewish faith school constituted unlawful racial discrimination because it used the Orthodox Jewish interpretation of who is Jewish as a criterion for determining admission to the school. A detailed discussion of the case is located in the context of two broader debates in Britain, which are characterized as constitutional in character or, at least, as possessing constitutional properties. The first is the debate concerning the treatment of minority groups, multiculturalism, and the changing perceptions in public policy of the role of race and religion in national life. It is suggested that this debate has become imbued with strong elements of what has been termed “post-multiculturalism”. The second debate is broader still, and pertains to shifting approaches to “constitutionalism” in Britain. It is suggested that, with the arrival of the European Convention on Human Rights and EU law, the U.K. has seen a shift from a pragmatic approach to constitutional thinking, in which legislative compromise played a key part, to the recognition of certain quasi-constitutional principles, allowing the judiciary greatly to expand its role in protecting individual rights while requiring the judges, at the same time, to articulate a principled basis for doing so. In both these debates, the principle of equality plays an important role. The JFS case is an important illustration of some of the implications of these developments.

Quantum circuits for spin and flavor degrees of freedom of quarks forming nucleons

We discuss the quantum-circuit realization of the state of a nucleon in the scope of simple simmetry groups. Explicit algorithms are presented for the preparation of the state of a neutron or a proton as resulting from the composition of their quark constituents. We estimate the computational resources required for such a simulation and design a photonic network for its implementation. Moreover, we highlight that current work on three-body interactions in lattices of interacting qubits, combined with the measurement-based paradigm for quantum information processing, may also be suitable for the implementation of these nucleonic spin states.

Eternity, knowledge, and freedom

This article addresses the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom by developing a modi?ed version of Boethius’ solution to the problem–one that is meant to cohere with a dynamic theory of time and a conception of God as temporal. I begin the article by discussing the traditional Boethian solution, and a defence of it due to Kretzmann and Stump. After canvassing a few of the objections to this view, I then go on to o?er my own modi?ed Boethian solution, according to which temporal reality is fundamentally dynamic, but truth is not. My claim is that there are eternally existing, tenseless propositions, with determinate truth values, but that these are made true by events that come into existence, and are not themselves eternal.