Beyond Racial Precedents: Loving v. Virginia as an Appropriate Legal Model and Strategy for Same-Sex Marriage Litigation

This thesis explores how LGBT marriage activists and lawyers have employed a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection in recent same-sex marriage litigation. Special attention is paid to the Supreme Court's opinion in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. By exploring the use of racial precedent in same-sex marriage litigation and its treatment in state court cases, this thesis critiques the racial interpretation of due process and equal protection that became the basis for LGBT marriage briefs and litigation, and attempts to answer the question of whether a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation both constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarly literature fails to explore how this issue has been treated in case briefs, which are very important elements in any legal proceeding. I will argue that through an analysis of recent state court briefs in Massachusetts and Connecticut, Loving acts as logical precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. I also find, more significantly, that although this racial interpretation of due process and equal protection represented by Loving can be seen as an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation constitutionally, questions remain about its strategic effectiveness, as LGBT lawyers have moved away from race in some arguments in these briefs. Indeed, a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection doctrine imposes certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, of which we are warned by some Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and other scholars. In order to fully incorporate a discussion of race into the argument for legalizing same-sex marriage, the dangers posed by the black/white binary of race relations must first be overcome.

Virgina Woolf: Orlando [Rezension]

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Virginia Naumann, Hüftbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F00639

Virginia Naumann, Hüftbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F00640

Virginia Naumann, Hüftbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F00641

Virginia Naumann-Gungl, Brustbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F01400

Virginia Bateman, Rollenbild, Kniestück

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F08142

Virginia Naumann als Isolde, Rollenbild, Brustbild, Profil, in: Richard Wagner: Tristan und Isolde

Signatur des Originals: S 36/F09381

Virginia Blasis, Rollenbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G00490

Virginia Naumann, Rollenbild, Hüftbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G01768

Virginia Naumann, Rollenbild, Hüftbild

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G01769

Les Soeurs Ferni, Jeunes Violinistes. Carolina, agée de 14 ans, Virginia, agée de 16 ans. Nice, 1854

Signatur des Originals: S 36/G03005

Escribir con Artaud : Aproximaciones deleuzianas

La literatura en el pensamiento deleuziano, es decir la "literatura menor", es revolucionaria en tanto que posibilita crear nuevas formas de vidas, de percepciones, de resistencias. En este sentido, Deleuze explora y encuentra un particular interés por diferentes escritores como Virginia Woolf, Scott Fitzgerald, Marcel Proust, Franz Kafka, Antonin Artaud, Herman Melville, entre otros. A partir de una reflexión sobre sus textos, Deleuze crea conceptos que juegan dentro de su máquina. Podemos decir que toda la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze está fuertemente atravesada, entre otras cosas, por la literatura. Nuestro trabajo se sitúa en el cruce entre la producción deleuziana y la literatura, más concretamente en el encuentro entre Artaud y Deleuze. A partir del (re)encuentro entre Artaud y Deleuze, este trabajo trata sobre la "vida" de Artaud, de cómo Artaud perfora la escritura, perforando su cuerpo; de cómo Artaud atraviesa el cuerpo de Deleuze produciendo al mismo tiempo su devenir. Si escribir, en el pensamiento deleuziano, siempre implica escribir con (alguien), escribir con Artaud no significa interpretarlo, comentarlo, sino, atravesar(se) el mismo cuerpo deleuziano