Do insiders get abnormal returns? : event studies on the trades of insiders of the firms with differentiated corporate governance of the São Paulo stock exchange

The subject insider trading is controversial. This paper presents series of event studies carried through on the trades with stocks of the firm carried by insiders with the objective to detect abnormal returns, based on the access to privileged information. The sample is composed by trades performed by insiders of the companies with stocks negotiated in the São Paulo Stock Exchange, that are classified as firms with differentiated corporate governance. Indication that trades performed by insiders resulted in abnormal returns compared to the statistically significant expected ones, as in the purchases of common shares; or for selling of preferred stocks.

Staying in the Delaware Corporate Governance Lane: Fee Shifting Bylaws and a Legislative Reaffirmation of the Rules of the Road

The Delaware legislature has taken steps towards the adoption of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) that would prohibit fee shifting provisions in the articles and bylaws. The language in the legislative proposal, however, addresses fee shifting provisions only in the context of "internal corporate claims." Some have raised concerns that this language would allow for fee shifting provisions that applied to other types of actions, including at least some cases brought under the securities laws. This piece suggests that in fact the Delaware General Corporation Law already prohibits the adoption of bylaws and certificate provisions that apply to causes of action unrelated to internal corporate claims. As a result, there was no reason for the Delaware legislature to expressly bar fee shifting provisions in these types of actions.

Corporate governance and the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. listed companies

This study is an examination of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting by U.K. companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The research examines the significance of several corporate governance and firm-specific characteristics as potential determinants of the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. Our primary analysis provides evidence of a significant association between timely corporate internet reporting and the corporate governance characteristics of board experience and board independence. Our findings provide evidence that boards with less cross directorships, more experience in terms of the average age of directors, and lower length in service for executive directors provide more timely corporate internet reporting.We find that board independence is negatively associated with timely corporate internet reporting. Follow-up analysis provides additional evidence of a significant association between the timeliness of corporate internet reporting and board experience. The evidence indicates that role duality and block ownership are associated with less timely corporate internet reporting. Our findings also reveal strengths and weaknesses in the Internet reporting of U.K. listed companies. Companies need to voluntarily focus on improving the timeliness dimension of their corporate internet reporting so that the EU and U.K. accounting regulators do not replace recommendations with regulations.