The Importance of Stock Market Returns in Estimated Monetary Policy Rules: a Structural Approach

This paper estimates a standard version of the New Keynesian Monetary (NKM) model augmented with financial variables in order to analyze the relative importance of stock market returns and term spread in the estimated U.S. monetary policy rule. The estimation procedure implemented is a classical structural method based on the indirect inference principle. The empirical results show that the Fed seems to respond to the macroeconomic outlook and to the stock market return but does not seem to respond to the term spread. Moreover, policy inertia and persistent policy shocks are also significant features of the estimated policy rule.

On the strategic equivalence of multiple-choice test scoring rules

A disadvantage of multiple-choice tests is that students have incentives to guess. To discourage guessing, it is common to use scoring rules that either penalize wrong answers or reward omissions. These scoring rules are considered equivalent in psychometrics, although experimental evidence has not always been consistent with this claim. We model students' decisions and show, first, that equivalence holds only under risk neutrality and, second, that the two rules can be modified so that they become equivalent even under risk aversion. This paper presents the results of a field experiment in which we analyze the decisions of subjects taking multiple-choice exams. The evidence suggests that differences between scoring rules are due to risk aversion as theory predicts. We also find that the number of omitted items depends on the scoring rule, knowledge, gender and other covariates.

Union Formation and Bargaining Rules in the Labor Market

This paper analyzes union formation in a model of bargaining between a firm and several unions. We address two questions: first, the optimal configuration of unions (their number and size) and, second, the impact of the bargaining pattern (simultaneous or sequential). For workers, grouping into several unions works as a price discrimination device which, at the same time, decreases their market power. The analysis shows that optimal union configuration depends on the rules that regulate the bargaining process (monopoly union, Nash bargaining or right to manage).

Consumption and portfolio rules whit stochastic hyperbolic discounting

We extend the classic Merton (1969, 1971) problem that investigates the joint consumption-savings and portfolio-selection problem under capital risk by assuming sophisticated but time-inconsistent agents. We introduce stochastic hyperbolic preferences as in Harris and Laibson (2013) and find closed-form solutions for Merton's optimal consumption and portfolio selection problem in continuous time. We find that the portfolio rule remains identical to the time-consistent solution with power utility and no borrowing constraints. However,the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is unambiguously greater than the time-consistent, exponential case and,importantly, it is also more responsive to changes in risk. These results suggest that hyperbolic discounting with sophisticated agents offers promise for contributing to explaining important aspects of asset market data.

Preferences, actions and voting rules

In this paper we address several issues related to collective dichotomous decision-making by means of quaternary voting rules, i.e., when voters may choose between four actions: voting yes, voting no, abstaining and not turning up-which are aggregated by a voting rule into a dichotomous decision: acceptance or rejection of a proposal. In particular we study the links between the actions and preferences of the actors. We show that quaternary rules (unlike binary rules, where only two actions -yes or no- are possible) leave room for "manipulability" (i.e., strategic behaviour). Thus a preference profile does not in general determine an action profile. We also deal with the notions of success and decisiveness and their ex ante assessment for quaternary voting rules, and discuss the role of information and coordination in this context.

Group size and decision rules in legislative bargaining

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small and large groups. In particular, we use a Baron-Ferejohn protocol and investigate the effects of decision rules on delay (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of the distribution within a coalition). We find that larger groups and unanimity rule are associated with significantly larger decision making costs in the sense that first round proposals more often fail, leading to more costly delay. The higher rate of failure under unanimity rule and in large groups is a combination of three facts: (1) in these conditions, a larger number of individuals must agree, (2) an important fraction of individuals reject offers below the equal share, and (3) proposers demand more (relative to the equal share) in large groups.

Fisheries rules and regulations in 23 states of Nigeria: a note

In order to make a sound proposal to the Kainji Lake Fisheries Management and Conservation Unit regarding the amendment of the existing Fisheries Laws and Regulations, including the raise of fishing license fees, the Fisheries Departments of 21 Nigerian States were visited in August-September 2000. In that occasion the staff was interviewed, existing documents were revised, and the results were compared with those of Kebbi and Niger State

On the Benefits of Including Age-structure in Harvest Control Rules

This paper explores the benefits of including age-structure in the control rule (HCR) when decision makers regard their (age-structured) models as approximations. We find that introducing age structure into the HCR reduces both the volatility of the spawning biomass and the yield. Although at a fairly imprecise level the benefits are lower, there are still major advantages for actual assessment precision of the case study. Moreover, we find that when age-structure is included in the HCR the relative ranking of different policies in terms of variance in biomass and yield does not differ. These results are shown both theoretically and numerically by applying the model to the Southern Hake fishery.

Intermediate serial cost-sharing rules

In this paper we give a generalization of the serial cost-sharing rule defined by Moulin and Shenker (1992) for cost sharing problems. According to the serial cost sharing rule, agents with low demands of a good pay cost increments associated with low quantities in the production process of that good. This fact might not always be desirable for those agents, since those cost increments might be higher than others, for example with concave cost functions. In this paper we give a family of cost sharing rules which allocates cost increments in all the possible places in the production process. And we characterize axiomatically each of them by means of an axiomatic characterization related to the one given for the serial cost-sharing rule by Moulin and Shenker (1994).

Characterizing distribution rules for cost sharing games

In noncooperative cost sharing games, individually strategic agents choose resources based on how the welfare (cost or revenue) generated at each resource (which depends on the set of agents that choose the resource) is distributed. The focus is on finding distribution rules that lead to stable allocations, which is formalized by the concept of Nash equilibrium, e.g., Shapley value (budget-balanced) and marginal contribution (not budget-balanced) rules.

Recent work that seeks to characterize the space of all such rules shows that the only budget-balanced distribution rules that guarantee equilibrium existence in all welfare sharing games are generalized weighted Shapley values (GWSVs), by exhibiting a specific 'worst-case' welfare function which requires that GWSV rules be used. Our work provides an exact characterization of the space of distribution rules (not necessarily budget-balanced) for any specific local welfare functions remains, for a general class of scalable and separable games with well-known applications, e.g., facility location, routing, network formation, and coverage games.

We show that all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to GWSV rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. Therefore, it is neither the existence of some worst-case welfare function, nor the restriction of budget-balance, which limits the design to GWSVs. Also, in order to guarantee equilibrium existence, it is necessary to work within the class of potential games, since GWSVs result in (weighted) potential games.

We also provide an alternative characterization—all games conditioned on any fixed local welfare functions possess an equilibrium if and only if the distribution rules are equivalent to generalized weighted marginal contribution (GWMC) rules on some 'ground' welfare functions. This result is due to a deeper fundamental connection between Shapley values and marginal contributions that our proofs expose—they are equivalent given a transformation connecting their ground welfare functions. (This connection leads to novel closed-form expressions for the GWSV potential function.) Since GWMCs are more tractable than GWSVs, a designer can tradeoff budget-balance with computational tractability in deciding which rule to implement.

Measurement of the neutron (^3He) spin structure function at low Q^2 : a connection between the Bjorken and Drell-Hearn-Gerasimov sum rules

The spin dependent cross sections, σT_1/2 and σT_3/2 , and asymmetries, A_∥ and A_⊥ for ³He have been measured at the Jefferson Lab's Hall A facility. The inclusive scattering process ³He(e,e)X was performed for initial beam energies ranging from 0.86 to 5.1 GeV, at a scattering angle of 15.5°. Data includes measurements from the quasielastic peak, resonance region, and the deep inelastic regime. An approximation for the extended Gerasimov-Drell-Hearn integral is presented at a 4-momentum transfer Q² of 0.2-1.0 GeV².

Also presented are results on the performance of the polarized ³He target. Polarization of ³He was achieved by the process of spin-exchange collisions with optically pumped rubidium vapor. The ³He polarization was monitored using the NMR technique of adiabatic fast passage (AFP). The average target polarization was approximately 35% and was determined to have a systematic uncertainty of roughly ±4% relative.

A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems

In this paper we introduce a new axiom, denoted claims separability, that is satisfied by several classical division rules defined for claims problems. We characterize axiomatically the entire family of division rules that satisfy this new axiom. In addition, employing claims separability, we characterize the minimal overlap rule, given by O'Neill (1982), Piniles rule and the rules in the TAL-family, introduced by Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006), which includes the uniform gains rule, the uniform losses rule and the Talmud rule.