History of the veterinary service, World War II, 1939-1945.

Mode of access: Internet.

Rivalry within and between strategic networks : an investigation of the United States Automotive Industry

As a consequence of the increased incidence of collaborative arrangements between firms, the competitive environment characterising many industries has undergone profound change. It is suggested that rivalry is not necessarily enacted by individual firms according to the traditional mechanisms of direct confrontation in factor and product markets, but rather as collaborative orchestration between a number of participants or network members. Strategic networks are recognised as sets of firms within an industry that exhibit denser strategic linkages among themselves than other firms within the same industry. Based on this, strategic networks are determined according to evidence of strategic alliances between firms comprising the industry. As a result, a single strategic network represents a group of firms closely linked according to collaborative ties. Arguably, the collective outcome of these strategic relationships engineered between firms suggest that the collaborative benefits attributed to interorganisational relationships require closer examination in respect to their propensity to influence rivalry in intraindustry environments. Derived in large from the social sciences, network theory allows for the micro and macro examination of the opportunities and constraints inherent in the structure of relationships in strategic networks, establishing a relational approach upon which the conduct and performance of firms can be more fully understood. Research to date has yet to empirically investigate the relationship between strategic networks and rivalry. The limited research that has been completed utilising a network rationale to investigate competitive patterns in contemporary industry environments has been characterised by a failure to directly measure rivalry. Further, this prior research has typically embedded investigation in industry settings dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives, such as the microprocessor and airline industries. These industries, due to the presence of such imperatives, are arguably more inclined to support the realisation of network rivalry, through subscription to prescribed technological standards (eg., microprocessor industry) or by being bound by regulatory constraints dictating operation within particular market segments (airline industry). In order to counter these weaknesses, the proposition guiding research - Are patterns of rivalry predicted by strategic network membership? – is embedded in the United States Light Vehicles Industry, an industry not dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives. Further, rivalry is directly measured and utilised in research, thus distinguishing this investigation from prior research efforts. The timeframe of investigation is 1993 – 1999, with all research data derived from secondary sources. Strategic networks were defined within the United States Light Vehicles Industry based on evidence of horizontal strategic relationships between firms comprising the industry. The measure of rivalry used to directly ascertain the competitive patterns of industry participants was derived from the traditional Herfindahl Index, modified to account for patterns of rivalry observed at the market segment level. Statistical analyses of the strategic network and rivalry constructs found little evidence to support the contention of network rivalry; indeed, greater levels of rivalry were observed between firms comprising the same strategic network than between firms participating in opposing network structures. Based on these results, patterns of rivalry evidenced in the United States Light Vehicle Industry over the period 1993 – 1999 were not found to be predicted by strategic network membership. The findings generated by this research are in contrast to current theorising in the strategic network – rivalry realm. In this respect, these findings are surprising. The relevance of industry type, in conjunction with prevailing network methodology, provides the basis upon which these findings are contemplated. Overall, this study raises some important questions in relation to the relevancy of the network rivalry rationale, establishing a fruitful avenue for further research.

How terrorist campaigns end : The Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States

This study explores the decline of terrorism by conducting source-based case studies on two left-wing terrorist campaigns in the 1970s, those of the Rode Jeugd in the Netherlands and the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. The purpose of the case studies is to bring more light into the interplay of different external and internal factors in the development of terrorist campaigns. This is done by presenting the history of the two chosen campaigns as narratives from the participants’ points of view, based on interviews with participants and extensive archival material. Organizational resources and dynamics clearly influenced the course of the two campaigns, but in different ways. This divergence derives at least partly from dissimilarities in organizational design and the incentive structure. Comparison of even these two cases shows that organizations using terrorism as a strategy can differ significantly, even when they share ideological orientation, are of the same size and operate in the same time period. Theories on the dynamics of terrorist campaigns would benefit from being more sensitive to this. The study also highlights that the demise of a terrorist organization does not necessarily lead to the decline of the terrorist campaign. Therefore, research should look at the development of terrorist activity beyond the lifespan of a single organization. The collective ideological beliefs and goals functioned primarily as a sustaining force, a lens through which the participants interpreted all developments. On the other hand, it appears that the role of ideology should not be overstated. Namely, not all participants in the campaigns under study fully internalized the radical ideology. Rather, their participation was mainly based on their friendship with other participants. Instead of ideology per se, it is more instructive to look at how those involved described their organization, themselves and their role in the revolutionary struggle. In both cases under study, the choice of the terrorist strategy was not merely a result of a cost-benefit calculation, but an important part of the participants’ self-image. Indeed, the way the groups portrayed themselves corresponded closely with the forms of action that they got involved in. Countermeasures and the lack of support were major reasons for the decline of the campaigns. However, what is noteworthy is that the countermeasures would not have had the same kind of impact had it not been for certain weaknesses of the groups themselves. Moreover, besides the direct impact the countermeasures had on the campaign, equally important was how they affected the attitudes of the larger left-wing community and the public in general. In this context, both the attitudes towards the terrorist campaign and the authorities were relevant to the outcome of the campaigns.

Drawn to the Sea: Charles Bradford Hudson (1865-1939), Artist, Author, Army Officer, with Special Notice of His Work for the United States Fish Commission and Bureau of Fisheries

The biography of Charles Bradford Hudson that follows this preface had its seeds about 1965 when I (VGS) was casually examining the extensive files of original illustrations of fishes stored in the Division of Fishes, National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution. I happened upon the unpublished illustration of a rainbow trout by Hudson and was greatly impressed with its quality. The thought occurred to me then that the artist must have gone on to do more than just illustrate fishes. During the next 20 years I occasionally pawed through those files, which contained the work of numerous artists, who had worked from 1838 to the present. In 1985, I happened to discuss the files with my supervisor, who urged me to produce a museum exhibit of original fish illustrations. This I did, selecting 200 of the illustrations representing 21 artists, including, of course, Hudson. As part of the text for the exhibit, Drawn from the Sea, Art in the Service of Ichthyology, I prepared short biographies of each of the artists. The exhibit, with an available poster, was shown in the Museum for six months, and a reduced version was exhibited in U.S. and Canadian museums during the next 3 years.

The law of the sea: the United States, Canada and the deep seabed

The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was fought over competing claims to sovereignty over a group of islands off the east coast of South America. The dispute was between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina claims the islands under rights to Spanish succession, the fact that they lie off the Argentine coast line and that in 1833 Great Britain took the islands illegally and by force. The United Kingdom claims the islands primarily through prescription--the fact that they have governed the islands in a peaceful, continuous and public manner since 1833. The British also hold that the population living on the islands, roughly eighteen hundred British descendants, should be able to decide their own future. The United Kingdom also lays claim to the islands through rights of discovery and settlement, although this claim has always been challenged by Spain who until 1811 governed the islands. Both claims have legal support, and the final decision if there will ever be one is difficult to predict. Sadly today the ultimate test of sovereignty does not come through international law but remains in the idea that "He is sovereign who can defend his sovereignty." The years preceding the Argentine invasion of 1982 witnessed many diplomatic exchanges between The United Kingdom and Argentina over the future of the islands. During this time the British sent signals to Argentina that ii implied a decline in British resolve to hold the islands and demonstrated that military action did more to further the talks along than did actual negotiations. The Argentine military junta read these signals and decided that they could take the islands in a quick military invasion and that the United Kingdom would consider the act as a fait accompli and would not protest the invasion. The British in response to this claimed that they never signaled to Argentina that a military solution was acceptable to them and launched a Royal Navy task force to liberate the islands. Both governments responded to an international crisis with means that were designed both to resolve the international crisis and increase the domestic popularity of the government. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing an all-time low in popularity for post-War Prime Ministers while Argentine President General Galtieri needed to gain mass popular support so he could remain a viable President after he was scheduled to lose command of the army and a seat on the military junta that ran the country. The military war for the Falklands is indicative of the nature of modern warfare between Third World countries. It shows that the gap in military capabilities between Third and First World countries is narrowing significantly. Modern warfare between a First and Third World country is no longer a 'walk over' for the First World country.

Report of the Secretary of War, communicating; in compliance witha resolution of the Senate, a map showing the operations of the army of the United States in Texas and the adjacent Mexican Stateson the Rio Grande, accompanied by astronomical observations, and descriptive and military memoirs of the country.

UANL

Military laws of the united states; including those relatingto the Marine Corps, to which is prefixed the Constitution of the United StatesComplied by Colonel Trueman Corss, U.S. Army

UANL

PRETERM BIRTH AND OCCUPATIONAL PHYSICAL ACTIVITY: A CASE-CONTROL STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LENGTH OF GESTATION AND THE PHYSICAL DEMAND OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES (UNITED STATES)

A case-control study has been conducted examining the relationship between preterm birth and occupational physical activity among U.S. Army enlisted gravidas from 1981 to 1984. The study includes 604 cases (37 or less weeks gestation) and 6,070 controls (greater than 37 weeks gestation) treated at U.S. Army medical treatment facilities worldwide. Occupational physical activity was measured using existing physical demand ratings of military occupational specialties.^ A statistically significant trend of preterm birth with increasing physical demand level was found (p = 0.0056). The relative risk point estimates for the two highest physical demand categories were statistically significant, RR's = 1.69 (p = 0.02) and 1.75 (p = 0.01), respectively. Six of eleven additional variables were also statistically significant predictors of preterm birth: age (less than 20), race (non-white), marital status (single, never married), paygrade (E1 - E3), length of military service (less than 2 years), and aptitude score (less than 100).^ Multivariate analyses using the logistic model resulted in three statistically significant risk factors for preterm birth: occupational physical demand; lower paygrade; and non-white race. Controlling for race and paygrade, the two highest physical demand categories were again statistically significant with relative risk point estimates of 1.56 and 1.70, respectively. The population attributable risk for military occupational physical demand was 26%, adjusted for paygrade and race; 17.5% of the preterm births were attributable to the two highest physical demand categories. ^

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. First series--report no. 12. 1975 Perkins diesel 247 CID (4.0 liters), F.I. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. First series--report no. 13. 1975 American Motors 258 CID (4.2 liters), 1V. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. Second series--report no. 1. 1976 Chevrolet Vega 140 CID (2.3 liters), 2V. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. Second series--report no. 2. 1976 Chevrolet 305 CID (5.0 liters), 2V. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. Second series--report no. 3. 1977 Chrysler 225 CID (3.7 liters), 2V. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. First series--report no. 16. 1975 Volvo 121 CID (2.0 liters), F.I. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.

Performance characteristics of automotive engines in the United States. First series--report no. 17. 1975 Buick 455 CID (7.5 liters), 4V. Interim report.

Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Mass.National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.