895 resultados para Transaction cost economics


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Recognising the importance of alliance decision making in a virtual enterprise (VE), this paper proposes an analysis template to facilitate this process. The existing transaction-cost and resource-based theories in the literature are first reviewed, showing some deficiencies in both type of theories, and the potential of the resource based explanations. The paper then goes on to propose a resource-based analysis template, integrating both the motives of using certain business forms and the factors why different forms help achieve different objectives, Resource-combination effectiveness, management complexity and flexibility are identified as the three factors providing fundamental explanations of an organization's alliance making decision process. The template provides a comprehensive and generic approach for analysing alliance decisions.

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This study looks at the impact of the recent financial crisis on the short-term performance of European acquisitions. We use institutional theory and transaction cost economic theory to study whether bidders derive lower or higher returns from acquisitions announced after 2008. We investigate shareholders’ stock price reaction to 2245 deals which occurred during 2004–12 across 22 European Union countries. Our results from both univariate and multivariate analysis show that the deals announced in the post-crisis period, corresponding to the period of economic recession, generate higher returns to shareholders as compared to acquisitions announced in the pre-crisis period. We also test the relevance of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), that is, the Eurozone, to this value accrual during the recessionary period. We observe that non-EMU transactions obtain significantly higher gains vis-à-vis EMU transactions in the post-crisis years. Overall, announcement returns of European acquisitions have been affected by the financial crisis and the global recession; and companies that target countries with different currency regimes are likely to generate better returns from their acquisitions.

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Literature describing the notion and practice of business models has grown considerably over the last few years. Innovative business models appear in every sector of the economy challenging traditional ways of creating and capturing value. However, research describing the theoretical foundations of the field is scarce and many questions still remain. This article examines business models promoting various aspects of sustainable development and tests the explanatory power of two theoretical approaches, namely the resource based view of the firm and transaction cost theory regarding their emergence and successful market performance. Through the examples of industrial ecology and the sharing economy the author shows that a sharp reduction of transaction costs (e.g. in the form of internet based systems) coupled with resources widely available but not utilised before may result in fast growing new markets. This research also provides evidence regarding the notion that these two theoretical approaches can complement each other in explaining corporate behaviour.

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Cette thèse examine le rôle du pouvoir de marché dans le marché bancaire. L’emphase est mis sur la prise de risque, les économies d’échelle, l’efficacité économique du marché et la transmission des chocs. Le premier chapitre présente un modèle d’équilibre général dynamique stochastique en économie ouverte comprenant un marché bancaire en concurrence monopolistique. Suivant l’hypothèse de Krugman (1979, 1980) sur la relation entre les économies d’échelle et les exportations, les banques doivent défrayer un coût de transaction pour échanger à l’étranger qui diminue à mesure que le volume de leurs activités locales augmente. Cela incite les banques à réduire leur marge locale afin de profiter davantage du marché extérieur. Le modèle est solutionné et simulé pour divers degrés de concentration dans le marché bancaire. Les résultats obtenus indiquent que deux forces contraires, les économies d’échelle et le pouvoir de marché, s’affrontent lorsque le marché se concentre. La concentration permet aussi aux banques d’accroître leurs activités étrangères, ce qui les rend en contrepartie plus vulnérables aux chocs extérieurs. Le deuxième chapitre élabore un cadre de travail semblable, mais à l’intérieur duquel les banques font face à un risque de crédit. Celui-ci est partiellement assuré par un collatéral fourni par les entrepreneurs et peut être limité à l’aide d’un effort financier. Le modèle est solutionné et simulé pour divers degrés de concentration dans le marché bancaire. Les résultats montrent qu’un plus grand pouvoir de marché réduit la taille du marché financier et de la production à l’état stationnaire, mais incite les banques à prendre moins de risques. De plus, les économies dont le marché bancaire est fortement concentré sont moins sensibles à certains chocs puisque les marges plus élevés donnent initialement de la marge de manoeuvre aux banques en cas de chocs négatifs. Cet effet modérateur est éliminé lorsqu’il est possible pour les banques d’entrer et de sortir librement du marché. Une autre extension avec économies d’échelle montre que sous certaines conditions, un marché moyennement concentré est optimal pour l’économie. Le troisième chapitre utilise un modèle en analyse de portefeuille de type Moyenne-Variance afin de représenter une banque détenant du pouvoir de marché. Le rendement des dépôts et des actifs peut varier selon la quantité échangée, ce qui modifie le choix de portefeuille de la banque. Celle-ci tend à choisir un portefeuille dont la variance est plus faible lorsqu’elle est en mesure d’obtenir un rendement plus élevé sur un actif. Le pouvoir de marché sur les dépôts amène un résultat sembable pour un pouvoir de marché modéré, mais la variance finit par augmenter une fois un certain niveau atteint. Les résultats sont robustes pour différentes fonctions de demandes.

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Doutoramento em Gestão.

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Researching administrative history is problematical. A trail of authoritative documents is often hard to find; and useful summaries can be difficult to organise, especially if source material is in paper formats in geographically dispersed locations. In the absence of documents, the reasons for particular decisions and the rationale underpinning particular policies can be confounded as key personnel advance in their professions and retire. The rationale for past decisions may be lost for practical purposes; and if an organisation’s memory of events is diminished, its learning through experience is also diminished. Publishing this document tries to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort by other researchers that need to venture into how policies of charging for public sector information have been justified. The author compiled this work within a somewhat limited time period and the work does not pretend to be a complete or comprehensive analysis of the issues.----- A significant part of the role of government is to provide a framework of legally-enforceable rights and obligations that can support individuals and non-government organisations in their lawful activities. Accordingly, claims that governments should be more ‘business-like’ need careful scrutiny. A significant supply of goods and services occurs as non-market activity where neither benefits nor costs are quantified within conventional accounting systems or in terms of money. Where a government decides to provide information as a service; and information from land registries is archetypical, the transactions occur as a political decision made under a direct or a clearly delegated authority of a parliament with the requisite constitutional powers. This is not a market transaction and the language of the market confuses attempts to describe a number of aspects of how governments allocate resources.----- Cost recovery can be construed as an aspect of taxation that is a sole prerogative of a parliament. The issues are fundamental to political constitutions; but they become more complicated where states cede some taxing powers to a central government as part of a federal system. Nor should the absence of markets be construed necessarily as ‘market failure’ or even ‘government failure’. The absence is often attributable to particular technical, economic and political constraints that preclude the operation of markets. Arguably, greater care is needed in distinguishing between the polity and markets in raising revenues and allocating resources; and that needs to start by removing unhelpful references to ‘business’ in the context of government decision-making.

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Présentation à la Annual Law & Economics Conference 2007, Université de Bologne.

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This research primarily represents a contribution to the lobbying regulation research arena. It introduces an index which for the first time attempts to measure the direct compliance costs of lobbying regulation. The Cost Indicator Index (CII) offers a brand new platform for qualitative and quantitative assessment of adopted lobbying laws and proposals of those laws, both in the comparative and the sui generis dimension. The CII is not just the only new tool introduced in the last decade, but it is the only tool available for comparative assessments of the costs of lobbying regulations. Beside the qualitative contribution, the research introduces an additional theoretical framework for complementary qualitative analysis of the lobbying laws. The Ninefold theory allows a more structured assessment and classification of lobbying regulations, both by indication of benefits and costs. Lastly, this research introduces the Cost-Benefit Labels (CBL). These labels might improve an ex-ante lobbying regulation impact assessment procedure, primarily in the sui generis perspective. In its final part, the research focuses on four South East European countries (Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia), and for the first time brings them into the discussion and calculates their CPI and CII scores. The special focus of the application was on Serbia, whose proposal on the Law on Lobbying has been extensively analysed in qualitative and quantitative terms, taking into consideration specific political and economic circumstances of the country. Although the obtained results are of an indicative nature, the CII will probably find its place within the academic and policymaking arena, and will hopefully contribute to a better understanding of lobbying regulations worldwide.

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Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.