Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm.s corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the .undersheltering puzzle,. and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.

Tax differentials and inflow of foreign direct investments : evidence from foreign operations of U.S. multinational companies

This paper concerns the measurement of the impact of tax differentials across countries on inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by using comprehensive data on the foreign operations of U.S. multinational corporations that has been collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. Department of Commerce. In particular, this research focuses on examining: (1) how responsive FDI locations are to tax differentials across countries, (2) how different the tax effect on FDI inflow is between developed and developing countries, and (3) whether investment location decisions have become more or less sensitive to tax differences between countries over time ranging from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Estimation results suggest that high rates of corporate income taxation are associated with reduced foreign assets of U.S. multinational firms in all industries by decreasing the return to foreign asset investment. Further, foreign assets of U.S. multinationals in all industries have become more responsive to non-income tax differentials across countries than to income tax differences from 1999 to 2004. Empirical estimates also indicate that foreign investment by American firms is associated with higher tax sensitivity more in developed countries than in those that are developing.