Substantive Change Prospectus for the M.D. degree at Florida International University

Planning document for FIU College of Medicine submitted to Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) Commission on Colleges (COC) in April, 2009. (N.B. Appendices not included)

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.

Belief and Bounded Rationality

Predictive accounts of belief ascription, either following the principle of charity or Dennett's intentional stance, have proved popular recently. However, such accounts require us first to treat agents as perfectly rational agents and then revise this assumption as appropriate. I argue that such downwards revision is no easy task and that several proposed accounts are not satisfactory. I propose a way of characterising agent's belief states which shares Dennett's approach but avoids treating agents as perfectly rational, and develop a formal account in terms of fan models.

Emotional Theory of Rationality

In recent decades, it has been definitely established the existence of a close relationship between the emotional phenomena and rational processes, but we still do not have a unified definition, or effective models to describe any of them well. To advance our understanding of the mechanisms governing the behavior of living beings we must integrate multiple theories, experiments and models from both fields. In this paper we propose a new theoretical framework that allows integrating and understanding, from a functional point of view, the emotion-cognition duality. Our reasoning, based on evolutionary principles, add to the definition and understanding of emotion, justifying its origin, explaining its mission and dynamics, and linking it to higher cognitive processes, mainly with attention, cognition, decision-making and consciousness. According to our theory, emotions are the mechanism for brain function optimization, besides being the contingency and stimuli prioritization system. As a result of this approach, we have developed a dynamic systems-level model capable of providing plausible explanations for some psychological and behavioral phenomena, and establish a new framework for scientific definition of some fundamental psychological terms.

Unpacking insanity defence standards: an experimental study of rationality and control tests in criminal law

The present study investigated the impact of different legal standards on mock juror decisions concerning whether a defendant was guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. Undergraduate students (N = 477) read a simulated case summary involving a murder case and were asked to make an insanity determination. The cases differed in terms of the condition of the defendant (rationality deficit or control deficit) and the legal standard given to the jurors to make the determination (Model Penal Code, McNaughten or McNaughten plus a separate control determination). The effects of these variables on the insanity determination were investigated. Jurors also completed questionnaires measuring individualism and hierarchy attitudes and perceptions of facts in the case. Results indicate that under current insanity standards jurors do not distinguish between defendants with rationality deficits and defendants with control deficits regardless of whether the legal standard requires them to do so. Even defendants who lacked control were found guilty at equal rates under a legal standard excusing rationality deficits only and a legal standard excluding control and rationality deficits. This was improved by adding a control test as a partial defence, to be determined after a rationality determination. Implications for the insanity defence in the Criminal Justice System are discussed.

The River And The Sea: Fieldwork In Human Ecology And Ethnobiology.

This article is a commentary on the experiences that motivated my decision to become a human ecologist and ethnobiologist. These experiences include the pleasure of studying and of having the sense of being within nature, as well as the curiosity towards understanding the world and minds of local people. In particular, such understanding could be driven by addressing the challenging questions that originate in the interactions of such individuals with their natural surroundings. I have been particularly interested in the sea and the riverine forests that are inhabited by coastal or riverine small-scale fishers. Sharing the distinctive world of these fishers enjoyably incited my curiosity and challenged me to understand why fishers and their families 'do as they do' for their livelihoods including their beliefs. This challenge involved understanding the rationality (or the arguments or views) that underlies the decisions these individuals make in their interaction with nature. This curiosity was fundamental to my career choice, as were a number of reading interests. These reading interests included political economy and philosophy; evolution and sociobiology; evolutionary, human, and cultural ecology; cultural transmission; fisheries; local knowledge; ecological economics; and, naturally, ethnobiology.

A evolução da noção de parâmetros

This paper presents an overview of the concept of parameter in the Principles and Parameters theory, showing that a) in the first stage parameters were conceived as variation associated to the Principles and b) in the second stage as properties of the lexicon, and more specifically as properties of functional categories. The latter view has also developed from a substantive conception of functional categories to a more formal abstract characterization of functional heads. The paper also discusses parameters related to different levels of representation.

Risco, corpo e socialidade no voo livre

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

Interesses fisicos no lazer : a influencia do esporte de alto rendimento para a criança na relação lazer-escola-processo educativo

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física

A recreação/lazer e a educação fisica : a manobra da autenticidade do jogo

Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Faculdade de Educação Física

Preparação profissional em educação fisica : a questão dos estagios

Universidade Estadual de Campinas . Faculdade de Educação Física