The interrelationship between monetary policy and the interbank money market during the financial crisis

Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus sechs Kapiteln und trägt zur Forschung in den Bereichen der Finanzmarktpolitik und der Geldpolitik bei. Das zweite Kapitel zeigt die Wechselbeziehung zwischen Geldmarktanspannungen und der Stabilität des Finanzsystems auf. Mittels der theoretischen Literatur werden verschiedene Einflussfaktoren einer aggregierten Liquiditätsnachfragefunktion präsentiert. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den Informationsgehalt der Ergebnisse der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte für den europäischen Geldmarkt. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass sich seit der Finanzkrise der Informationsgehalt der Hauptrefinanzierungsgeschäfte in zweierlei Hinsicht verändert hat. Im vierten Kapitel untersuchen wir die Wirksamkeit der Geldpolitik während der Finanzkrise europäische Geldmarktzinssätze zu steuern. Die Ergebnisse deuten auf eine erhebliche Divergenz zwischen den Zinssätzen und den Erwartungen über die zukünftige Geldpolitik hin. Weiterhin finden wir heraus, dass die unkonventionellen Maßnahmen der EZB für einen Rückgang der Euriborsätze von bis zu 60 Basispunkten verantwortlich sind. Das fünfte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Funktionsweise des besonderen geldpolitischen Instrumentariums der Schweizerischen Nationalbank.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Overshooting, and Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop an open economy macroeconomic model with real capital accumulation and microeconomic foundations. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but potentially twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through international portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Total Factor Productivity and Monetary Policy: Evidence from Conditional Volatility

This paper empirically assesses whether monetary policy affects real economic activity through its affect on the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy. Analysts typically argue that monetary policy either does not affect the real economy, the classical dichotomy, or only affects the real economy in the short run through aggregate demand new Keynesian or new classical theories. Real business cycle theorists try to explain the business cycle with supply-side productivity shocks. We provide some preliminary evidence about how monetary policy affects the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy through its affect on total factor productivity, an important measure of supply-side performance. The results show that monetary policy exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the supply-side of the macroeconomy. Moreover, the findings buttress the importance of countercyclical monetary policy as well as support the adoption of an optimal money supply rule. Our results also prove consistent with the effective role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation as well as the more recent rise in productivity growth.

The Geographic Distribution of the Size and Timing of Monetary Policy Actions

This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and nearly all states.

Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board

The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.

Post-Crisis Economic Reform in Indonesia:Policy for Intervening in Ownership in Historical Perspective

Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. 　　　In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. 　　　Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.

Asset composition of the Philippines' universal and commercial banks : monetary policy or self-discipline?

The central bank of the Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, BSP) has improved its monetary policy measures since the 2000s. After rationalizing the country's banking sector since late-1990s, its monetary policy and the uniiversal/commercial banks' (UCBs) behavior in allocating their assets has changed since mid-2000s. Though further and more detailed studies are nesessary, based on the results of simple correlation analyses conducted in this paper suggest a possible mixture of the country's monetary policy and their own decision-making in asset allocations, instead of a "follow-through" attitude.

International Capital Flows and Monetary Policy Spillovers

This dissertation examines the drivers and implications of international capital flows. The overarching motivation is the observation that countries not at the centre of global financial markets are subject to considerable spillovers from centre countries, notably from their monetary policy. I present new empirical evidence on the determinants of the observed patterns of international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, and study their effect on both financial markets and the real economy. In Chapter 2 I provide evidence on the determinants of a puzzling negative correlation observed between productivity growth and net capital inflows to developing and emerging market economies (EMEs) since 1980. By disaggregating net capital inflows into their gross components, I show that this negative correlation is explained by capital outflows related to purchases of very liquid assets from the fastest growing countries. My results suggest a desire for international portfolio diversification in liquid assets by fast growing countries is driving much of the original puzzle. In the reminder of my dissertation I pivot to study the foreign characteristics that drive international capital flows and monetary policy spillovers, with a particular focus on the role of unconventional monetary policy in the United States (U.S.). In Chapter 3 I show that a significant portion of the heterogeneity in EMEs' asset price adjustment following the quantitative easing operations by the Federal Reserve (the Fed) during 2008-2014 can be explained by the degree of bilateral capital market frictions between these countries and the U.S. This is true even after accounting for capital controls, exchange rate regimes, and domestic monetary policies. Chapter 4, co-authored with Michal Ksawery Popiel, studies unconventional monetary policy in a small open economy, looking specifically at the case of Canada since the global financial crisis. We quantify the effect Canadian unconventional monetary policy shocks had on the real economy, while carefully controlling for and quantifying spillovers from U.S. unconventional monetary policy. Our results indicate that the Bank of Canada's unconventional monetary policy increased Canadian output significantly from 2009-2010, but that spillovers from the Fed's policy were even more important for increasing Canadian output after 2008.