Cooperative VET in Training Networks: Analysing the Free-Rider Problem in a Sociology-of-Conventions Perspective

In training networks, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises pool their resources to train apprentices within the framework of the dual VET system, while an intermediary organisation is tasked with managing operations. Over the course of their apprenticeship, the apprentices switch from one training company to another on a (half-) yearly basis. Drawing on a case study of four training networks in Switzerland and the theoretical framework of the sociology of conventions, this paper aims to understand the reasons for the slow dissemination and reluctant adoption of this promising form of organising VET in Switzerland. The results of the study show that the system of moving from one company to another creates a variety of free-rider constellations in the distribution of the collectively generated corporative benefits. This explains why companies are reluctant to participate in this model. For the network to be sustainable, the intermediary organisation has to address discontent arising from free-rider problems while taking into account that the solutions found are always tentative and will often result in new free-rider problems.

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm and apprehension costs as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for, and impact of, the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a solicitation but otherwise not predisposed to commit a crime.

Na 1 Nachlass Max Horkheimer, 639 - "On the Sociology of Class Relations" und "The Psychology of Nazidom" (p. IX 16.1-2-IX 17.1-2)

"On the Sociology of Class Relations" (GS 12, S.75-104); 1. 1943 Aufsatz. a) Typoskript mit handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 34 Blatt b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 31 Blatt c) Typoskript, 31 Blatt und eigenhändigen Ergänzungen, 1 Blatt d) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen Korrekturen, 26 Blatt; 2. Franz Neumann: 1 eigenhändiger Brief mit Unterschrift an Max Horkheimer mit Anmerkungen zum Aufsatz, ohne Ort, 30.09.1943, 11 Blatt; "The Psychology of Nazidom" (GS 5, S. 354-359); 1. Buchbesprechung von "Is Germany Inucable?" von Richard M. Brickner; veröffentlicht in: "The New Leader", 14.08.1943. a)Typoskript, 7 Blatt b) Typoskript mit eigenhändigen und handschriftlichen Korrekturen, 7 Blatt c) Zeitungsdruck, 3 Exemplare; 2. "What Shall We Do With Germany? A Panel Discussion of 'Is Germany Incurable?'". Zeitungsausschnitte aus : "The Saturday Review of Literature", 29.05.1343, 6 Blatt;

Nota sobre el Rule of Law y la ética de la virtud

Fil: Massini Correas, Carlos I.. Universidad de Mendoza