Limites des procédés d'investigation de la fonction érectile dans le cadre d'expertises médicolégales [Limits of the processes of investigation of the erectile function in forensic expertises].

Résumé La responsabilité d'un expert chargé d'apprécier la capacité érectile d'un prévenu est importante, car la peine infligée par le tribunal peut dépendre de ses conclusions. Sa tâche est en plus ardue car les procédés d'investigations de la fonction érectile ont tous des limites. Malgré toutes ces limites qui sont décrites dans cet article, l'expert peut aider à la recherche de la vérité comme les auteurs le démontrent. Summary The responsability of the expert in charge to appreciate the erectile capacity of an accused is considerable, as the sentence inflicted by the Tribunal could depend directly on his conclusions. His duty is harder as all the investigation procedures of the erectile functions have limits. Despite these limits, described in this article, the expert can help to discover the truth, as demonstrated by the authors.

On the institution of the moral subject: on the commander and the commanded in Nietzsche's discussion of law

The article discusses how Nietzsche understands the institution of law and morals in distinction to Kant and the Christian tradition. It argues that Nietzsche to a large extent is inspired by the paradigm-shift toward a evolutionary biological thinking introduced by several of his peers in the late 19th century, among else F. A. Lange, who sees this shift as a sobering scientific-materialistic alternative to Kant. In Nietzsche, the Kantian moral imperative is replaced with a notion of a morality emerging thanks to historical, or pre-historical, civilizational processes, imposed on a feebleminded human without any inherent rational dispositions to obey Law. It is also a process, which rather than universalizing the human, splits it in a duality where one part obeys old immediate self-interests and another part obeys new 'commands,' having been shouted 'into the ear' by a so-called 'commander.' The compliance with law takes two radically different forms in Nietzsche: servile and mediocre individuals need to be exposed to discipline and punishment in order to adopt Law; while so-called 'sovereign' individuals are able to impose law upon themselves. The figure of the 'sovereign' has consequently been an issue for vigorous debate in especially the Anglo-Saxon tradition of Nietzsche research, since his apparent 'respect for law' and 'sense of duty' reiterate typical Kantian qualities. Relating to these discussions, I suggest that Nietzsche's 'sovereign' (in one context) is identical his 'commander' (in other contexts). When the 'sovereign' as such imposes law upon himself and others, his act is conventional and arbitrary (like language in Saussure), and is rather irrational than rational as in Kant. His will is not a good will, nor a rational will with a vision of human autonomy. His command of himself and others is a performative, thus without truth-value (like illocutionary speech-acts in Austin and Searle).

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Out of the darkness and into the light : a study of inauthentic and authentic speech

Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c

Where's Albania? : staking out the politics of the real and reality in documentary cinema

This thesis, entitled, "Where's Albania? Staking Out the Politics of the Real and Reality in Documentary Cinema," charts the documentary tradition's path from its first incarnations, as filmed travelogue or ethnographic study, for example, right through to its development as a form acting as an objective observer, reflexive commentator, and finally, as a postmodern hybrid. This thesis begins by locating the documentary tradition's origins in realism. Foregrounding documentary cinema as a realist style is important in that it is a contention that spans this entire study. After working through the numerous modes of documentary as outlined by Bill Nichols, I suggest the documentary is often best understood as a hybrid form drawing on numerous modes and conventions. This argument permits my study to make a shift into postmodern theory, wherein I examine postmodernism's relationship to the documentary both as being influenced by it, but also as subsequently forcing documentary cinema to look back at itself and reevaluate the claims it has made in the past, and how postmodernism has drawn these claims to the surface of debate. My thesis concludes with a study of the mockumentary. This analysis confirms the link between postmodernism and documentary, but perhaps more importantly, this analysis investigates postmodemism's critique of the image and representation in general, two elements historically linked to documentary cinema's success as "truth teller."

Doppler vortography : detection and quantification of the vortices in the left ventricle

Nous proposons une nouvelle méthode pour quantifier la vorticité intracardiaque (vortographie Doppler), basée sur l’imagerie Doppler conventionnelle. Afin de caractériser les vortex, nous utilisons un indice dénommé « Blood Vortex Signature (BVS) » (Signature Tourbillonnaire Sanguine) obtenu par l’application d’un filtre par noyau basé sur la covariance. La validation de l’indice BVS mesuré par vortographie Doppler a été réalisée à partir de champs Doppler issus de simulations et d’expériences in vitro. Des résultats préliminaires obtenus chez des sujets sains et des patients atteints de complications cardiaques sont également présentés dans ce mémoire. Des corrélations significatives ont été observées entre la vorticité estimée par vortographie Doppler et la méthode de référence (in silico: r2 = 0.98, in vitro: r2 = 0.86). Nos résultats suggèrent que la vortographie Doppler est une technique d’échographie cardiaque prometteuse pour quantifier les vortex intracardiaques. Cet outil d’évaluation pourrait être aisément appliqué en routine clinique pour détecter la présence d’une insuffisance ventriculaire et évaluer la fonction diastolique par échocardiographie Doppler.

Landscape all'Antica and Topographical Anachronism in Roman Fresco Painting of the Sixteenth Century

An article derived from the first chapter of the writer's doctoral thesis, “Paysage et Pouvoir. Les décors topographiques à Rome et dans le Latium au XVIe siècle.”

Overview and response to reviewers of The Singing Neanderthals

Why are humans musical? Why do people in all cultures sing or play instruments? Why do we appear to have specialized neurological apparatus for hearing and interpreting music as distinct from other sounds? And how does our musicality relate to language and to our evolutionary history? Anthropologists and archaeologists have paid little attention to the origin of music and musicality — far less than for either language or ‘art’. While art has been seen as an index of cognitive complexity and language as an essential tool of communication, music has suffered from our perception that it is an epiphenomenal ‘leisure activity’, and archaeologically inaccessible to boot. Nothing could be further from the truth, according to Steven Mithen; music is integral to human social life, he argues, and we can investigate its ancestry with the same rich range of analyses — neurological, physiological, ethnographic, linguistic, ethological and even archaeological — which have been deployed to study language. In The Singing Neanderthals Steven Mithen poses these questions and proposes a bold hypothesis to answer them. Mithen argues that musicality is a fundamental part of being human, that this capacity is of great antiquity, and that a holistic protolanguage of musical emotive expression predates language and was an essential precursor to it. This is an argument with implications which extend far beyond the mere origins of music itself into the very motives of human origins. Any argument of such range is bound to attract discussion and critique; we here present commentaries by archaeologists Clive Gamble and Iain Morley and linguists Alison Wray and Maggie Tallerman, along with Mithen's response to them. Whether right or wrong, Mithen has raised fascinating and important issues. And it adds a great deal of charm to the time-honoured, perhaps shopworn image of the Neanderthals shambling ineffectively through the pages of Pleistocene prehistory to imagine them humming, crooning or belting out a cappella harmonies as they went.

TIGGE: Comparison of the prediction of northern hemisphere extratropical cyclones by different ensemble prediction systems

The Observing System Research and Predictability Experiment (THORPEX) Interactive Grand Global Ensemble (TIGGE) is a World Weather Research Programme project. One of its main objectives is to enhance collaboration on the development of ensemble prediction between operational centers and universities by increasing the availability of ensemble prediction system (EPS) data for research. This study analyzes the prediction of Northern Hemisphere extratropical cyclones by nine different EPSs archived as part of the TIGGE project for the 6-month time period of 1 February 2008–31 July 2008, which included a sample of 774 cyclones. An objective feature tracking method has been used to identify and track the cyclones along the forecast trajectories. Forecast verification statistics have then been produced [using the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) operational analysis as the truth] for cyclone position, intensity, and propagation speed, showing large differences between the different EPSs. The results show that the ECMWF ensemble mean and control have the highest level of skill for all cyclone properties. The Japanese Meteorological Administration (JMA), the National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), the Met Office (UKMO), and the Canadian Meteorological Centre (CMC) have 1 day less skill for the position of cyclones throughout the forecast range. The relative performance of the different EPSs remains the same for cyclone intensity except for NCEP, which has larger errors than for position. NCEP, the Centro de Previsão de Tempo e Estudos Climáticos (CPTEC), and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) all have faster intensity error growth in the earlier part of the forecast. They are also very underdispersive and significantly underpredict intensities, perhaps due to the comparatively low spatial resolutions of these EPSs not being able to accurately model the tilted structure essential to cyclone growth and decay. There is very little difference between the levels of skill of the ensemble mean and control for cyclone position, but the ensemble mean provides an advantage over the control for all EPSs except CPTEC in cyclone intensity and there is an advantage for propagation speed for all EPSs. ECMWF and JMA have an excellent spread–skill relationship for cyclone position. The EPSs are all much more underdispersive for cyclone intensity and propagation speed than for position, with ECMWF and CMC performing best for intensity and CMC performing best for propagation speed. ECMWF is the only EPS to consistently overpredict cyclone intensity, although the bias is small. BoM, NCEP, UKMO, and CPTEC significantly underpredict intensity and, interestingly, all the EPSs underpredict the propagation speed, that is, the cyclones move too slowly on average in all EPSs.

Transreal proof of the existence of universal possible worlds

Transreal arithmetic is total, in the sense that the fundamental operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division can be applied to any transreal numbers with the result being a transreal number [1]. In particular division by zero is allowed. It is proved, in [3], that transreal arithmetic is consistent and contains real arithmetic. The entire set of transreal numbers is a total semantics that models all of the semantic values, that is truth values, commonly used in logics, such as the classical, dialetheaic, fuzzy and gap values [2]. By virtue of the totality of transreal arithmetic, these logics can be implemented using total, arithmetical functions, specifically operators, whose domain and counterdomain is the entire set of transreal numbers

The error of representation: basic understanding

Representation error arises from the inability of the forecast model to accurately simulate the climatology of the truth. We present a rigorous framework for understanding this kind of error of representation. This framework shows that the lack of an inverse in the relationship between the true climatology (true attractor) and the forecast climatology (forecast attractor) leads to the error of representation. A new gain matrix for the data assimilation problem is derived that illustrates the proper approaches one may take to perform Bayesian data assimilation when the observations are of states on one attractor but the forecast model resides on another. This new data assimilation algorithm is the optimal scheme for the situation where the distributions on the true attractor and the forecast attractors are separately Gaussian and there exists a linear map between them. The results of this theory are illustrated in a simple Gaussian multivariate model.

Predictability of the Arctic sea ice edge

Skillful sea ice forecasts from days to years ahead are becoming increasingly important for the operation and planning of human activities in the Arctic. Here we analyze the potential predictability of the Arctic sea ice edge in six climate models. We introduce the integrated ice-edge error (IIEE), a user-relevant verification metric defined as the area where the forecast and the “truth” disagree on the ice concentration being above or below 15%. The IIEE lends itself to decomposition into an absolute extent error, corresponding to the common sea ice extent error, and a misplacement error. We find that the often-neglected misplacement error makes up more than half of the climatological IIEE. In idealized forecast ensembles initialized on 1 July, the IIEE grows faster than the absolute extent error. This means that the Arctic sea ice edge is less predictable than sea ice extent, particularly in September, with implications for the potential skill of end-user relevant forecasts.

Important, unimportant a critical anticipation of the assumptions of legal positivism in Alice in Wonderland

Almost a full century separates Lewis’ Alice in Wonderland (1865) and the second, lengthier and more elaborate edition of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law (1960; first edition published in 1934). And yet, it is possible to argue that the former anticipates and critically addresses many of the philosophical assumptions that underlie and are elemental to the argument of the latter. Both texts, with the illuminating differences that arise from their disparate genre, have as one of their key themes norms and their functioning. Wonderland, as Alice soon finds out, is a world beset by rules of all kinds: from the etiquette rituals of the mad tea-party to the changing setting for the cricket game to the procedural insanity of the trial with which the novel ends. Pure Theory of Law, as Kelsen emphatically stresses, has the grundnorm as the cornerstone upon which the whole theoretical edifice rests2. This paper discusses some of the assumptions underlying Kelsen’s argument as an instance of the modern worldview which Lewis satirically scrutinizes. The first section (Sleepy and stupid) discusses Lewis critique of the idea that, to correctly apprehend an object (in the case of Kelsen’s study, law), one has to free it from its alien elements. The second section (Do bats eat cats?) discusses the notion of systemic coherence and its impact on modern ways of thinking about truth, law and society. The third section (Off with their heads!) explores the connections between readings of systems as neutral entities and the perpetuation of political power. The fourth and final section (Important, Unimportant) explains the sense in which a “critical anticipation” is both possible and useful to discuss the philosophical assumptions structuring some positivist arguments. It also discusses the reasons for choosing to focus on Kelsen’s work, rather than on that of Lewis’ contemporary, John Austin, whose The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (published in 1832) remains influential in legal debates today.