Distribuição geográfica da fauna e flora da Baía de Guanabara

The author studied, the horizontal and vertical distribution of most common part of the flora and fauna of the bay of Guanabara at Rio de Janeiro. In this paper the eulittoral, poly, meso and oligohaline regions were localised and studied; and the first chart of its distribution was presented (fig. 2). The salinity of superficial waters was established through determinations based on 30 trips inside the buy for collecting biological materials. Some often 409 determinations which were previous reported together with the present ones served for the eleboration of a salinity map of the bay of Guanabara (fig. 1). This map of fig. 2 shows the geographic locations of the water regions. EULITTORAL WATER REGIME — Fig. 3 shows the diagram scheme of fauna and flora of this regime. Sea water salinity 34/1.000, density mean 1.027, transparent greenish waters, sea coast with moderate bursting waves. Limpid sea shore with white sand, gneiss with the big barnacle Tetraclita squamosa var. stalactifera (Lam. Pilsbry. Vertical distributions: barna¬cles layers with a green region in which are present the oyster Ostrea pa-rasitica L., the barnacles Tetraclita, Chthamalus, Balanus tintinnabulum var. tintinnabulum (L.) e var. antillensis Pilsbry in connection with several mollusca and the sea beatle Isopoda Lygia sp. Covered by water and exposed to air by the tidal ritms, there is a stratum of brown animals that is the layer of mussels Mytilus perna L., with others brown and chestnut animals : the Crustacea Pachygrapsus, the little crab Porcellana sp., the stone crab Me-nippe nodifrons Stimpson, the sea stars Echinaster brasiliensis (Mull. & Tr.), Astropecten sp. and the sea anemones Actinia sp. Underneath and never visible there is a subtidal region with green tubular algae of genus Codium and amidst its bunches the sea urchin Lycthchinus variegatus (Agass.) walks and more deeply there are numerous sand-dollars Encope emarginata (Leske). The microplancton of this regime is Ceratiumplancton. POLYHALINE WATER REGIMB — Water almost sea water, but directly influenced by continental lands, with rock salts dissolved and in suspension. Salinity: 33 to 32/1.000. This waters endure the actions of the popular nicknamed «water of the hill» (as the waters of mesohaline and oligohaline regimes), becoming suddenly reddish during several hours. That pheno¬menon returns several times in the year and come with great mortality of fishes. In these waters, according to Dr. J. G. FARIA there are species of Protozoa : Peridinea, the Glenoidinium trochoideum St., followed by its satellites which he thinks that they are able to secret toxical substances which can slaughter some species of fishes. In these «waters of the hill» was found a species of Copepoda the Charlesia darwini. In August 1946 the west shore of the Guanabara was plenty of killed fishes occupying a area of 8 feet large by 3 nautical miles of lenght. The enclosure for catching fishes in the rivers mouthes presents in these periods mass dead fishes. The phenomenon of «waters of the hill» appears with the first rains after a period of long dryness. MESOHALINE WATER REGIME — Fig. 4 shows the the diagramm scheme. Salt or brackish water from 30 to 17/1.000 salinity, sometimes until 10/1.000. Turbid waters with mud in suspension, chestnut, claveyous waters; shore dirty black mud without waving bursting; the waters are warmer and shorner than those of the polihaline regime. Mangrove shore with the mangrove trees : Rhizophora mangle L., Avicennia sp., Laguncularia sp., and the »cotton tree of sea» Hibiscus sp. Fauna: the great land crab «guaimú» Cardisoma guanhumi Latr., ashore in dry firm land. There is the real land crab Ucides cordatus (L.) in wetting mud and in neigh¬ bourhood of the burrows of the fiddler-crabs of genus Uca. On stones and in the roots of the Rhizophora inhabits the brightly colored mangrove-tree-crab («aratu» Portuguese nickname) Goniopsis cruentata (Latreille) and the sparingly the big oyster Ostrea rhizophorae Guild. Lower is the region of barnacles Balanus amphitrite var. communis Darwin and var. niveus Darwin; Balanus tintinnabulum var. tintinnabulum (L.) doesn't grow in this brackish water; lower is the region of Pelecipoda with prepollency of Venus and Cytherea shell-fishes and the Panopeus mud crab; there are the sea lettuce Ulva and the Gastreropod Cerithium. The Paguridae Clibanarius which lives in the empty shells of Gasteropod molluscs, and the sessile ascidians Tethium plicatum (Lesuer) appears in some seasons. In the bottom there is a black argillous mud where the «one landed shrimps» Alpheus sp. is hidden. OLIGOHALINE WATER REGIME — The salinity is lower than 10/1.000. average 8/1.000. There are no barnacles and no sea-beetles Isopods of genus Lygia; on the hay of the shore there are several graminea. This brackish water pervades by mouthes of rivers and penetrates until about 3 kilometers river above. While there is some salt dissolved in water, there are some mud crabs of the genus Uca, Sesarma, Metasesarma and Chasmagnatus. The presence of floating green plants coming from the rivers in the waters of a region indicated the oligohaline waters, with low salt content because when the average of NaCl increases above 8/1.000 these plants die and become rusty colored.

Delegation and information sharing in oligopoly

Information sharing in oligopoly has been analyzed by assuming that firms behave as a sole economic agent. In this paper I assume that ownership and management are separated. Managers are allowed to falsely report their costs to owners and rivals. Under such circumstances, if owners want to achieve information sharing they must use managerial contracts that implement truthful cost reporting by managers as a dominant strategy. I show that, contrary to the classical result, without the inclusion of message-dependent payments in managerial contracts there will be no information sharing. On the other hand, with the inclusion of such publicly observable payments and credible ex-ante commitment by owners not to modify these payments, there will be perfect information sharing without the need for third parties. Keywords: Information sharing, Delegation, Managerial contracts. JEL classification numbers: D21, D82, L13, L21

Sharing the surplus: a just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be the unique one satisfying several desirable properties. Furthermore, we illustrate the use of this method to resolve the sharing of benefits generated by international climate control agreements.

Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Investor protection, risk sharing and inequality

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, financial risk sharing and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk while lending to firms. This implies lower cost of external finance and better risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. Investor protection, by boosting the market for risk sharing plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between the size of the market for risk sharing and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-eight countries, and a panel of fifty countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

Convergence of the mass-transport steepest descent scheme for the sub-critical Patlak-Keller-Segel model

Variational steepest descent approximation schemes for the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation with a logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension are considered. We prove the convergence of the suitably interpolated in time implicit Euler scheme, defined in terms of the Euclidean Wasserstein distance, associated to this equation for sub-critical masses. As a consequence, we recover the recent result about the global in time existence of weak-solutions to the modified Patlak-Keller-Segel equation for the logarithmic interaction kernel in any dimension in the sub-critical case. Moreover, we show how this method performs numerically in one dimension. In this particular case, this numerical scheme corresponds to a standard implicit Euler method for the pseudo-inverse of the cumulative distribution function. We demonstrate its capabilities to reproduce easily without the need of mesh-refinement the blow-up of solutions for super-critical masses.

Evaluation of the reconstruction limits of a frequency-independent crosshole georadar waveform inversion scheme in the presence of dispersion

Waveform tomographic imaging of crosshole georadar data is a powerful method to investigate the shallow subsurface because of its ability to provide images of pertinent petrophysical parameters with extremely high spatial resolution. All current crosshole georadar waveform inversion strategies are based on the assumption of frequency-independent electromagnetic constitutive parameters. However, in reality, these parameters are known to be frequency-dependent and complex and thus recorded georadar data may show significant dispersive behavior. In this paper, we evaluate synthetically the reconstruction limits of a recently published crosshole georadar waveform inversion scheme in the presence of varying degrees of dielectric dispersion. Our results indicate that, when combined with a source wavelet estimation procedure that provides a means of partially accounting for the frequency-dependent effects through an "effective" wavelet, the inversion algorithm performs remarkably well in weakly to moderately dispersive environments and has the ability to provide adequate tomographic reconstructions.

The Importance of Revenue Sharing for the Local Economic Impacts of a Renewable Energy Project: A Social Accounting Matrix Approach

As demand for electricity from renewable energy sources grows, there is increasing interest, and public and financial support, for local communities to become involved in the development of renewable energy projects. In the UK, “Community Benefit” payments are the most common financial link between renewable energy projects and local communities. These are “goodwill” payments from the project developer for the community to spend as it wishes. However, if an ownership stake in the renewable energy project were possible, receipts to the local community would potentially be considerably higher. The local economic impacts of these receipts are difficult to quantify using traditional Input-Output techniques, but can be more appropriately handled within a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework where income flows between agents can be traced in detail. We use a SAM for the Shetland Islands to evaluate the potential local economic and employment impact of a large onshore wind energy project proposed for the Islands. Sensitivity analysis is used to show how the local impact varies with: the level of Community Benefit payments; the portion of intermediate inputs being sourced from within the local economy; and the level of any local community ownership of the project. By a substantial margin, local ownership confers the greatest economic impacts for the local community.

Taxation and Total Government Take from the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) Following Phase 3 of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS)

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 117

The Effects of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on Activity in the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and CO2 Leakage

NORTH SEA STUDY OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 115

Firm size and trade secret intensity: evidence from the Economic Espionage Act

This paper considers trade secrecy as an appropriation mechanism in the context ofb the US Economic Espionage Act (EEA) 1996. We examine the relation between trade secret intensity and firm size, using a cross section of 95 court cases. The paper builds on extant work in three respects. First, we create a unique body of evidence, using EEA prosecutions from 1996 to 2008. Second, we use an econometric approach to measurement, estimation and hypothesis testing. This allows us comprehensively to test the robustness of findings. Third, we focus on objectively measured valuations, instead of the subjective, self-reported values used elsewhere. We find a stable, robust value for the elasticity of trade secret intensity with respect to firm size, which indicates that a 10% reduction in firm size leads to a 7% increase in trade secret intensity. We find that this result is not sensitive to industrial sector, sample trimming, or functional form.

Complete Markets Strikes Back: Revisiting Risk Sharing Tests under Discount Rate Heterogeneity

Recent risk sharing tests strongly reject the hypothesis of complete markets, because in the data: (1) the individual consumption comoves with income and (2) the consumption dispersion increases over the life cycle. In this paper, I revisit the implications of these risk sharing tests in the context of a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity, which is extended to introduce the individual choices of effort in education. I .nd that a complete market model with discount rate heterogeneity can pass both types of the risk sharing tests. The endogenous positive correlation between income growth rate and patience makes the individual consumption comove with income, even if the markets are complete. I also show that this model is quantitatively admissible to account for both the observed comovement of consumption and income and the increase of consumption dispersion over the life cycle.