Establishing a community of practice of researchers, practitioners, policy-makers and communities to sustainably manage environmental health risks in Ecuador

The Sustainably Managing Environmental Health Risk in Ecuador project was launched in 2004 as a partnership linking a large Canadian university with leading Cuban and Mexican institutes to strengthen the capacities of four Ecuadorian universities for leading community-based learning and research in areas as diverse as pesticide poisoning, dengue control, water and sanitation, and disaster preparedness. By 2009, train-the-trainer project initiation involved 27 participatory action research Master’s theses in 15 communities where 1200 community learners participated in the implementation of associated interventions. This led to establishment of innovative Ecuadorian-led master’s and doctoral programs, and a Population Health Observatory on Collective Health, Environment and Society for the Andean region based at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar. Building on this network, numerous initiatives were begun, such as an internationally funded research project to strengthen dengue control in the coastal community of Machala, and establishment of a local community eco-health centre focusing on determinants of health near Cuenca. Alliances of academic and non-academic partners from the South and North provide a promising orientation for learning together about ways of addressing negative trends of development. Assessing the impacts and sustainability of such processes, however, requires longer term monitoring of results and related challenges.

An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks.

New ICT sectors: platforms for European growth? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/14, August 2012

Europe's failure to specialise in new ICT sectors and firms is likely to hold back Europe’s post-crisis recovery. Europe lacks in particular leading platform providers, who are capturing most of the value in the new ICT ecosystem. • In-depth analysis of some specific new emerging ICT sectors shows that the problem in Europe appears not to be so much in the generation of new ideas, but rather in bringing ideas successfully to market. Among the barriers are the lack of a single digital market, fragmented intellectual property regimes, lack of an entrepreneurial culture, limited access to risk capital and an absence of ICT clusters. • The EU policy framework, particularly the Innovation Union and Digital Agenda EU 2020 Flagships, could better leverage the growth power for Europe of new ICT markets. The emphasis should move beyond providing support for infrastructure and research, to funding programmes for pre-commercial projects. But perhaps most important is dealing with the fragmentation in European digital markets.

Intra-Euro rebalancing is inevitable, but insufficient. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/15, August 2012

Greece, Portugal and Spain face a serious risk of external solvency due to their close to minus 100 percent of GDP net negative international investment positions, which are largely composed of debt. The perceived inability of these countries to rebalance their external positions is a major root of the euro crisis. Intra-euro rebalancing through declines in unit labour costs (ULC) in southern Europe, and ULC increases in northern Europe should continue, but has limits because: The share of intra-euro trade has declined. Intra-euro trade balances have already adjusted to a great extent. The intra-euro real exchange rates of Greece, Portugal and Spain have also either already adjusted or do not indicate significant appreciations since 2000. There are only two main current account surplus countries, Germany and the Netherlands. A purely intra-euro adjustment strategy would require too-significant wage increases in northern countries and wage declines in southern countries, which do not seem to be feasible. Before the crisis, the euro was significantly overvalued despite the close-to balanced current account position. The euro has depreciated recently, but more is needed to support the extra-euro trade of southern euro-area members. A weaker euro would also boost exports, growth, inflation and wage increases in Germany, thereby helping further intra-euro adjustment and the survival of the euro.

A sovereign wealth fund to lift Germany's curse of excess savings. CEPS Policy Brief No. 280, 28 August 2012

As an alternative to the present system of intermediation of the German savings surplus, this paper suggests that the risk-adjusted rate of return could be improved by creating a sovereign wealth fund for Germany (designated DESWF), which could invest excess German savings globally. Such a DESWF would offer German savers a secure vehicle paying a guaranteed positive minimum real interest rate, with a top-up when real investment returns allowed. The vehicle would invest the funds in a portfolio that is highly diversified by geography and asset classes. Positive real returns can be expected in the long run based on positive real global growth. Since, in this case, a significant amount of funds would flow outside the euro area, the euro would depreciate, which would help crisis countries presently struggling to revive growth through exports and to close their external deficits so as to recoup their international credit-worthiness. Target imbalances would gradually disappear and German claims abroad would move from nominal claims on the ECB to diversified real and nominal claims on various private and public foreign entities in a variety of asset classes.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

The fiscal implications of a banking union. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02 [3?], September 2012

Systemic banking crises are a threat to all countries whatever their development level. They can entail major fiscal costs that can undermine the sustainability of public finances. More than anywhere else, however, a number of euro-area countries have been affected by a lethal negative feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk, followed by disintegration of the financial system, real economic fragmentation and the exposure of the European Central Bank. Recognising the systemic dimension of the problem, the Euro-Area Summit of June 2012 called for the creation of a banking union with common supervision and the possibility for the European Stability Mechanism to recapitalise banks directly.

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

Private long-term investment in uncertain times. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/23, December 2012

The economic and financial crisis in Europe is affecting the financing of long-term infrastructure investment. There are multiple clearly identifiable channels: reduced demand for long-term investment, a tightening prudential framework for lending, upward adjustment of risk perception, complex transition of the financial system, and increasing macroeconomic, sovereign and regulatory risk. Some of the identified channels are potentially dangerous spillovers from the crisis that entail the risk of a downward spiral (eg increasing regulatory risk), while others are efficient market responses (eg reduced investment demand, correction of pricing of risk). Consequently, public policy instruments should not address the accessibility of long-term finance per se, but should explicitly target the critical channels.

Towards a nutrient export risk matrix approach to managing agricultural pollution at source

A generic Nutrient Export Risk Matrix (NERM) approach is presented. This provides advice to farmers and policy makers on good practice for reducing nutrient loss and is intended to persuade them to implement such measures. Combined with a range of nutrient transport modelling tools and field experiments, NERMs can play an important role in reducing nutrient export from agricultural land. The Phosphorus Export Risk Matrix (PERM) is presented as an example NERM. The PERM integrates hydrological understanding of runoff with a number of agronomic and policy factors into a clear problem-solving framework. This allows farmers and policy makers to visualise strategies for reducing phosphorus loss through proactive land management. The risk Of Pollution is assessed by a series of informed questions relating to farming intensity and practice. This information is combined with the concept of runoff management to point towards simple, practical remedial strategies which do not compromise farmers' ability to obtain sound economic returns from their crop and livestock.

Determinants of intention to purchase chicken in Italy: the role of consumer risk perception and trust in different information sources

The article investigates how purchasing intentions among a sample of Italian consumers are influenced by different levels of risk perception and their trust in food-safety information provided by different sources such as the food industry, government agencies, or consumers' associations. The assessment of the determinants of intention to purchase was carried out by estimating a causal model for the chicken case in which attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived risk play a major role in determining buyer's behavior. In particular, the role of trust in influencing risk perception is highlighted either as a general construct or as specific constructs targeting food chain, policy actors, and the media. [EconLit citations: Q130, Q190, D120]. (C) 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Epidemiological risk assessment using linked network and grid based modelling: Phytophthora ramorum and Phytophthora kernoviae in the UK

We developed a stochastic simulation model incorporating most processes likely to be important in the spread of Phytophthora ramorum and similar diseases across the British landscape (covering Rhododendron ponticum in woodland and nurseries, and Vaccinium myrtillus in heathland). The simulation allows for movements of diseased plants within a realistically modelled trade network and long-distance natural dispersal. A series of simulation experiments were run with the model, representing an experiment varying the epidemic pressure and linkage between natural vegetation and horticultural trade, with or without disease spread in commercial trade, and with or without inspections-with-eradication, to give a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial started at 10 arbitrary locations spread across England. Fifty replicate simulations were made at each set of parameter values. Individual epidemics varied dramatically in size due to stochastic effects throughout the model. Across a range of epidemic pressures, the size of the epidemic was 5-13 times larger when commercial movement of plants was included. A key unknown factor in the system is the area of susceptible habitat outside the nursery system. Inspections, with a probability of detection and efficiency of infected-plant removal of 80% and made at 90-day intervals, reduced the size of epidemics by about 60% across the three sectors with a density of 1% susceptible plants in broadleaf woodland and heathland. Reducing this density to 0.1% largely isolated the trade network, so that inspections reduced the final epidemic size by over 90%, and most epidemics ended without escape into nature. Even in this case, however, major wild epidemics developed in a few percent of cases. Provided the number of new introductions remains low, the current inspection policy will control most epidemics. However, as the rate of introduction increases, it can overwhelm any reasonable inspection regime, largely due to spread prior to detection. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Risk taking from the participant's perspective: the case of driving and accident risk

Although perceived health risk plays a prominent role in theories of health behavior, its empirical role in risk taking is less clear. In Study 1 (N = 129), 2 measures of drivers' risk-taking behavior were found to be unrelated to self-estimates of accident concern but to be related to self-ratings of driving skill and the perceived thrill of driving. In Study 2 (N = 405), out of a wide range of potential influences, accident concern had the weakest relationship with risk taking. The authors concluded that although health risk is a key feature in many theories of health behavior and a central focus for researchers and policy makers, it may not be such a prominent factor for those actually taking the risk.

Risk accountability in the tender process of contractors in Ghana and UK

The process of how contractors take account of risk when calculating their bids for construction work is investigated based on preliminary investigations and case studies in Ghana and UK. Ghana and UK were chosen, more or less arbitrarily, for the purpose of case studies, and to test the idea that there are systematic differences between the approaches in different places. Clear differences were found in the risk pricing approaches of contractors in the two countries. The difference appeared to emanate from the professional knowledge and competence of the bid team members, company policy, corporate accountability and the business environments in which the contractors operate. Both groups of contractors take account of risk in estimates. However, risk accountability was found to be higher on the agenda in the tender process of UK contractors, documented more systematically, and assessed and managed more rigorously with input from the whole bid team. Risk accountability takes place at three levels of the tender process and is dictated strongly by market forces and company circumstances.