The ‘Public Interest’ Agency of International Organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Autonomy and regulation of state agencies:Reinforcement, indifference or compensation?

This paper analyses the relationships between the autonomy and regulation of state agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders (Belgium). The empirical basis is provided by broad surveys of public sector organizations carried out in 2002-2004. Three hypotheses on these relationships are formulated and examined, indicating different patterns. The reinforcement hypothesis, stating a negative relationship does not get any support. On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis, stating a positive relationship gets some support. In general, however, the indifference hypothesis, stating low or no correlations seems to be the most adequate. The hypotheses are also linked to prevalent administrative doctrines, and the empirical findings indicate how relevant they are. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2008.