Iowa Department of Transportation, Office of Contracts Letting Summary, July 1, 2008 - June 30, 2009

Twelve regularly scheduled lettings and nine emergency/special lettings were held by the Iowa Department of Transportation for construction and maintenance work during the period covered by this report. At these lettings, projects totaling $1,030,584,566 were approved.

Iowa Department of Transportation, Contracts Accepted, April 4, 2011

Contracts Accepted by Iowa Department of Transportation

Iowa Department of Transportation, Contracts Accepted, March 21, 2011

Contracts Accepted by Iowa Department of Transportation

Iowa Department of Transportation, Contracts Accepted, March 28, 2011

Contracts Accepted by Iowa Department of Transportation

Civil Rights, Iowa Department of Contracts, March 15, 2011, Vol. 1, no. 1

Newsletter produced by the Iowa Department of Contract for Iowa Department of Transportation, on civil rights.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, March 28, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 4, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 11, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Contracts Accepted, Iowa Department of Transportation, April 18, 2011

Contracts Accepted for letting reports from the Iowa Department of Transportation.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.

Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm's performance: a quasi-experimental approach

Many regional governments in developed countries design programs to improve the competitiveness of local firms. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of public programs whose aim is to enhance the performance of firms located in Catalonia (Spain). We compare the performance of publicly subsidised companies (treated) with that of similar, but unsubsidised companies (non-treated). We use the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) methodology to construct a control group which, with respect to its observable characteristics, is as similar as possible to the treated group, and that allows us to identify firms which retain the same propensity to receive public subsidies. Once a valid comparison group has been established, we compare the respective performance of each firm. As a result, we find that recipient firms, on average, change their business practices, improve their performance, and increase their value added as a direct result of public subsidy programs.