927 resultados para Public regulatory reform
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Incluye Bibliografía
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Objectives: The Brazilian public health system does not provide electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), which is limited to a few academic services. National mental health policies are against ECT. Our objectives were to analyze critically the public policies toward ECT and present the current situation using statistics from the Institute of Psychiatry of the University of Sao Paulo (IPq-HCFMUSP) and summary data from the other 13 ECT services identified in the country. Methods: Data regarding ECT treatment at the IPq-HCFMUSP were collected from January 2009 to June 2010 (demographical, number of sessions, and diagnoses). All the data were analyzed using SPSS 19, Epic Info 2000, and Excel. Results: During this period, 331 patients were treated at IPq-HCFMUSP: 221 (67%) were from Sao Paulo city, 50 (15.2%) from Sao Paulo's metropolitan area, 39 (11.8%) from Sao Paulo's countryside, and 20 (6.1%) from other states; 7352 ECT treatments were delivered-63.0% (4629) devoted entirely via the public health system (although not funded by the federal government); the main diagnoses were a mood disorder in 86.4% and schizophrenia in 7.3% of the cases. Conclusions: There is an important lack of public assistance for ECT, affecting mainly the poor and severely ill patients. The university services are overcrowded and cannot handle all the referrals. The authors press for changes in the mental health policies.
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While India's state-owned enterprises are widely believed to be inefficient, there is a dearth of studies that document such inefficiency on any rigorous basis. Yet, since improvement in firm efficiency is one of the basic objectives of privatization, it is important to assess whether efficiency is indeed lower in the public sector than in the private sector. This paper compares the performance of state-owned enterprises with those of private sector firms in respect of technical efficiency. The comparison is made in eight different sectors over the period 1991-92 to 1998-99. We measure technical efficiency using the method of Data Envelopment Analysis. Judging by the average levels of technical efficiency, no conclusive evidence of superior performance on the part of the private sector is found.
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Although 23 states and the District of Columbia have now legalized marijuana for medical purposes, marijuana remains a prohibited substance under federal law. Because the production, sale, possession and use of marijuana remain illegal, there is a risk of prosecution under federal laws. Furthermore, those who help marijuana users and providers put themselves at risk — federal law punishes not only those who violate drug laws but also those who assist or conspire with them to do so. In the case of lawyers representing marijuana users and businesspeople, this means not only the real (though remote) risk of criminal prosecution but also the more immediate risk of professional discipline. Elsewhere, we wrote about the difficult place in which lawyers find themselves when representing marijuana clients. We argued that while both the criminal law and the rules of professional conduct rightly require legal obedience from lawyers, other countervailing factors must be considered when evaluating lawyers’ representation of marijuana clients. In particular, we asserted that considerations of equity and access to justice weigh dispositively in favor of protecting lawyers who endeavor to help their clients comply with state marijuana laws, and we suggested means of interpreting relevant criminal law provisions and rules of professional conduct to achieve this result. This article builds on that analysis, taking on the particular issue of the public lawyer’s’ role in marijuana regulation. For government lawyers, the key issues in exercising discretion in the context of marijuana are not clients’ access to the law and equality but rather determining the clients’ wishes and serving them diligently and ethically. Lawyers representing state agencies, legislatures and the executive branch of government draft and interpret the rules and regulations regarding marijuana. Lawyers for federal, state and local governments then interpret those rules to determine the obligations and responsibilities of those they represent and to help their clients meet those obligations and carry out their required tasks. Both state and federal prosecutors are charged with determining what conduct remains illegal under the new rules and, perhaps more importantly, with exercising discretion regarding whom to prosecute and to what extent. Marijuana regulation is not a niche area of government regulation; it will influence the practice of virtually every public lawyer in the years to come. Public lawyers must understand the changes in marijuana law and the implications for government clients. Given the pervasiveness of the modern regulatory state, the situation is no easier — and, in many ways, it is more complicated — for public lawyers than it is for private ones. Public lawyers face myriad practice challenges with respect to marijuana law reform, and while we do not purport to identify and resolve all of the issues that are sure to arise in this short paper, we hope that the article helps alert public lawyers to some of the risks involved in participating in marijuana regulation so that they can think carefully about their obligations when these issues arise.
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The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.
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Bibliographic footnotes.
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January 3, 1961.
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Reuse of record except for individual research requires license from Congressional Information Service, Inc.
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Mode of access: Internet.
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"Spring 1994."